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ABSTRACT: 
Foreign aid has become, since the end of World War II, a 
powerful and cost-effective foreign policy tool for developed states 
in their relations with Third World nations. In the context of the 
South Pacific, Australia and Japan, the region's two largest donors, 
increased their aid commitments during the 1970s. This was a time 
of rapid change in the region, characterised by decolonisation and 
the subsequent arrival of the Cold War. The impact of the latter on 
aid policy was profound. Both donors, as members of the Western 
Alliance, increased their aid volumes to the region to counter the 
perceived threat posed by Soviet inroads. The period between 
1976, a time of significant change in the region, and the present 
day is examined to take into account the influence that the Cold 
War and its aftermath had on aid patterns. 
The aid patterns and policies of Japan and Australia are 
looked at individually during the Cold War period and beyond. A 
comparison of the two donors follows, which shows the similarities 
and differences as well as the changes and continuities in their 
approaches to the region, and the extent to which they have 
evolved over time. While the thesis is guided by two of only a few 
comparative analyses of aid donor ambitions, an attempt is made to 
develop a basis for comparison that takes into account the unique 
nature of the South Pacific. It is argued throughout that 
commercial, humanitarian and security dimensions, in addition to 
the desire to be seen as good international citizens, and a sense of 
identity with the region, were key determinants of each donor's aid 
philosophy. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
1.1 NATURE AND SCOPE: 
This thesis compares the foreign aid of Japan and Australia to 
the countries of the South Pacific, from the mid 1970s to the present, 
a time of widespread change in the region. The starting point marks 
the beginnings of Japanese and the increase in Australian ODA 
volumes, following the attainment of independence by a number of 
former colonies. Looked at historically, the South Pacific can be 
placed in the second wave of independence and self-determination 
which began in the 1960s, inspired by the resolve of the United 
Nations to give the right of 'countries' and 'peoples' to self-
determination. 1 It is not the intention of this thesis to outline a 
detailed history of decolohisation in the South Pacific which began 
in 1962 with Western Samoa, as this has already been given more 
than adequate attention by scholars2. With independence came the 
end of the purse strings of the former coloniser, which meant aid 
1 Two significant United Nations Resolutions from 1960 helped shape the decolonisation 
process in the South Pacific. These were Resolution 1514, the so-called "anti-colonisation 
resolution" which gave the right to 'countries' and 'peoples' to have self-determination and 
Resolution 54(15) which defined these different forms of self-determinations as 1) Free 
Association, 2)Integration, and 3) Independence, and it was the free choice of the people 
concerned as to which form they opted for. Significantly, the 'size criteria' for independence 
was eliminated, thus allowing for the small islands of the South Pacific to move towards / 
independence. 
2 For a more detailed examination of the independence of the South Pacific Island states, 
see, for example, P. Larmour, "The Decolonisation of the Pacific Islands", in R. Crocombe et 
aI, Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South 
Pacific, 1983 (Politics in the Pacific Islands, vol. 4) and Y. Ghai, "Reflections on Self-
Determination in the South Pacific" in D. Clark and R. Williamson (eds), Self-Determination: 
International Perspectives, New York: St Martin's Press, Inc, 1996 
2 
flows from elsewhere became a fact of life for the newly-
independent Pacific Island states. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, independence captured 
the attention of powers outside the region, particularly the Soviet 
Union. Colonial rulers had kept the nation very much an 'American 
lake' as the Cold War was waged elsewhere on the globe. 
Independence, however, meant the island states could conduct their 
own foreign policy: 
Many of the positions they adopted were not to the liking 
of conservative Western capitals, whether 'flirting' with 
the Soviet Union through fishing deals or hostility to the 
presence of nuclear ships in the region. The fact of 
independence as a political condition in the region 
concentrated the minds of the great powers, some of 
which sought to exploit strategic windows of op~ortunity 
for themselves or to outflank rivals and enemies. 
As the last major geographic region to be colonised, and thus the last 
to be affected by the Cold War, the South Pacific acquired a 
strategic importance and economic value which enormously 
increased the political clout of the region.4 Preventing the Soviets 
encroaching into the region during the Cold War required a resolve 
on the part of the West to pay closer attention to the region. 
Instability in the form of a military coup in Fiji, political instability 
3 J. Dalton "The South Pacific in the post-Cold War world: old friends or new allies or 
alliances?" A paper presented at the Society for Military History Meeting held at the Royal 
Military College, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 20-23 May 1993, pI 
4 The creation of enonnous Exclusive Economic Zones in the region after 1977 in which 
huge supplies of tuna and other marine resources were located meant that a region so small in 
land area had almost overnight acquired a new and greatly enhanced economic value. The start 
of Japan's aid to the region is largely attributable to the creation of these zones. 
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in Vanuatu, the breakdown of law and order in Papua New Guinea 
and political protest and violence in New Caledonia, it was believed, 
made the Soviet Union's task considerably easier. 
The interventionist nature of the Cold War resulted in 
increased diplomatic attention and foreign aid for the region. 
Australia and New Zealand, who had previously been relied on to 
protect the Western interests in the region, could no longer do so. 
Significantly, Australian ODA to the South Pacific was increased 
noticeably after 1976, as will be shown, the same year that the 
Soviet Union attempted to establish diplomatic relations with key 
members of the region. Japan, like Australia, was to be heavily 
influenced by the Cold War in its aid programme to the region, 
though not until the mid 1980s when pressured to do so by the 
United States. In Japan's case, a predominantly commercially-
motivated aid relationship with the region gave way to one founded 
on a range of interests, encapsulated in its own concept of 
'comprehensive security' . 
In 1989, the massive changes in Eastern Europe that 
followed the fall of the Berlin Wall signalled the end of the Cold 
War. The West had 'won', yet contrary to the expectations of many, 
foreign aid outlasted the cessation of East-West rivalry. Despite 
cutbacks in many bilateral aid programs, particularly those of the 
United States, annual aid flows as monitored by the Organization for 
4 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OEeD) have maintained 
a consistent level. 
The changing natures of the aid regImes of Japan and 
Australia in the aftermath of the Cold War, like those of other 
donors, need closer examination, and this period of transition is 
covered in this thesis. Without such a powerful motivation as 
keeping the South Pacific free of the Kremlin, the strategic 
importance of aid has declined significantly. Both donors, however, 
continued as the region's largest sources of ODA. What this 
suggests is that wide-ranging and often inter-related foreign policy 
objectives remain at the core of Japan's and Australia's aid 
philosophies. The international reputations of both, pressure from 
former regional donors, especially the United States, commercial 
and security considerations, and of course humanitarianism, among 
others, are still at the forefront of policymakers' thinking in both 
donor nations. The future direction of Australian and Japanese aid to 
the region, however, is by no means certain. 
In brief, this study seeks to answer the following questions: 
1) What are the motivations behind Japanese and Australian 
foreign aid to the South Pacific? 
2) How and why have the Japanese and Australian foreign aid 
programmes to the South Pacific evolved since 1977 to 1989? 
5 
3) What impact did the end of the Cold War have on the 
Japanese and Australian foreign aid programmes to the South 
Pacific? 
4) What are the similarities and differences between the 
two donors' aid programmes, and how did the Cold War 
affect them? 
It is important to note that these are broad questions and not 
hypotheses. Equal weight has not been attached to each. 
Several additional points need to be raised about the nature 
of this thesis. Secondary sources were relied on more heavily for the 
Japanese component than they were in the discussion of Australian 
aid because many key Japanese reports are not available in English. 
In the interests of originality, an attempt was made to balance this by 
heavily utilising primary sources relating to Australian aid, 
particularly those governmental reviews which outline the 
motivations behind its aid programme. These were supplemented 
where applicable by relevant secondary sources. 
It must also be stressed that the scope of this thesis will be 
limited to only certain aspects of the aid programmes of Australia 
and Japan. So much has been written by scholars and the relevant 
government departments of each donor, that a full investigation of 
their aid delivery would be impossible. The emphasis is on the 
motivations behind aid. The recipient side of the equation has 
6 
received much attention already, and was, therefore, omitted from 
this thesis. Similarly, this is not an attempt to assess the strengths or 
weaknesses of each programme. The individual aid relationships 
with Pacific Island states have not been given close attention, except 
for when they highlight an integral aspect of the broader policy 
initiatives of each donor. Indeed, it is these broader policy initiatives 
which have been focused on. Of the multitude of statistics which 
relate to the nature of aid relationships between donor and recipient, 
only those which reinforce a point will be used. In short, therefore, 
the nature of individual donor-recipient aid relationships, and 
specific programmes or projects within them, while not neglected, 
have been relegated as secondary to the objectives of the thesis, and 
have been largely used to illustrate an integral point. 
1.2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1.2.1 Theories of Foreign Aid: 
There are three general bodies of International Relations 
theory that attempt to understand donor motivations, with little 
consensus between them.s The first, and most dominant, is the 
Realist paradigm. Realist scholars assume that aid policies are 
5 This summary ofthe three bodies comes from P.J. Schreader, S.W. Hook, and B. Taylor, 
"ClarifYing the Foreign Aid puzzle: A comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish 
Aid Flows, World Politics Volume 50, 1988, pp.297-299 
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driven, first and foremost, by strategic interests, with national 
security and self-preservation being the major objective. Not 
surprisingly then, humanitarian needs and economic development 
are seen as secondary. There are two Realist schools,6 with differing 
conceptions of what 'security' entails. Classical Realists see that aid 
priorities are motivated by the politico-military strategic importance 
of recipient states, in the form of military alliances. Neorealists, on 
the other hand, acknowledge the commercial dimension of national 
security, with the economic potential of the recipient state providing 
the impetus for aid priorities. 
The second body of International Relations theory relating to 
aid is the Idealist paradigm.7 Idealists see aid as a positive, and are 
particularly optimistic about aid's ability to further the economic 
development of the donor as well as the recipient, and its potential to 
end Third World poverty. They see that humanitarian concerns 
dominated aid motivations, and see aid as a source of cooperation 
between donor and recipient, not a cause of conflict. In this respect, 
and in nearly all as they relate to aid, Idealists and Realists are poles 
apart. 
6 For more on the classical realist perspective, see N. Eberstadt, Foreign Aid and American 
~,Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1988. For an example of the neo-
realist stance, see R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987 
7 See, for example, D.H. Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign 
Aid Regime. 1949-1989, Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1993 
8 
Neo-Marxism, the third paradigm, considers economIC 
motives to be central to aid donor motives. It is a wide-ranging 
paradigm, and from dependency to world systems to classical 
Marxism, is based on the premise that capitalist exploitation, in the 
form of aid, enhances the power of elites in both the industrialised 
and developed nations. Moreover, aid is seen as widening the 
existing economic disparities between wealthy states and Third 
World countries. 
While it can be argued that each body of theory has its 
strengths, it was decided that this thesis should not be guided by any 
of them in particular. An assessment of the aid programmes of Japan 
and Australia without examining the situation from anyone 
perspective was deemed more appropriate. As will be shown, a 
separate theory drawing on the best elements of each was 
formulated, and will be discussed below. 
1.2.2 Comparative studies of Aid Donors: 
It is necessary, at the outset, to examme the existing scholarly 
literature relating to the theory of foreign aid. By doing so, the 
contribution this thesis makes to an understanding of foreign aid 
motivations in the South Pacific context can be outlined. The first 
point that needs to be stated is that there has been a paucity of 
9 
comparative and systematic studies of aid donors, despite the 
enormous body of scholarly literature that has been devoted to 
foreign aid. Many examinations of individual aid donors to the 
region have been made in recent years, yet comparative studies of 
aid donors are rare internationally, and especially so in the setting of 
the South Pacific. 
In many respects, it seemed logical to examine the two largest 
donors to the region, because of the availability of data relating to 
both. Additionally, because they are the largest donors, it is 
reasonable to assume that their ranges of interests were many and 
varied, and as such, the motivations behind their respective aid 
programmes would be more than suitable for a comparative analysis. 
There were, however, further considerations behind the 
selection of Australia and Japan. Japan, as a donor, did not become 
involved in the region until the late 1970s, and initially on a small 
scale. In the ensuing 25 years, however, its aid grew almost 
exponentially. In many respects, Japan provides a contrast to 
Australia, as the latter has longstanding influence in the region, with 
a range of historical ties which account for this. In a sense, Japan is 
an 'outsider' to the region, though it did have an involvement in the 
region dating back several centuries. In other words, there is 
sufficient similarity between the two donors, despite their 
differences, to merit a comparative analysis. 
10 
Comparative studies of aid donors, though rare, were 
examined, and one in particular was heavily influential: the 
collaborative work of Peter J. Schraeder. Steven W. Hook, and 
Bruce Taylor.s It is profitable, therefore, to examine what it is that 
they have to say about previous aid scholarship. For them, "the 
ongoing debate over the foreign aid regime remains trapped in 
something of an intellectual vacuum given the lack of scholarly 
understanding of the determinants of foreign aid programs." 9 
Normative critiques of aid are numerous, yet critical analysis based 
on comprehensive empirical evidence is scarce. Moreover, they 
argue that the empirically based scholarship that exists has been 
confmed to individual case studies, or has been limited to the 
recipient side of the aid equation, most notably in terms of 
examining the relationship between economic dependence and 
political compliance within developing states. As for the donor side 
8 Shraeder, Hook and Taylor's empirical analysis is of the motivating factors behind the 
aid policies of four northern industrialised democracies, all major aid donors, France, Japan, 
Sweden and the United States, in an African context. They chose Africa as the target of 
assistance because of its large number and diversity of countries, as well as a desire to control 
potential subsystem differences within the various regions of the Third World. They used an 
inductive approach that tests for a variety of foreign aid determinants to review the volume and 
direction of the aid flows and the empirically grounded linkages between the foreign policy 
interests of these donors and their observable behaviour in disbursing foreign aid are examined. 
The 1980s is their starting point because that decade serves as a unique 'hinge' period between 
the cold war and the transformed international environment of the 1990s. However, the end 
point of their study is 1989, the historic year that marked the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
beginning of the end of communism, to ensure that the results are not confounded by changes 
within the international system that accompanied the end ofthe cold war. 
P.J Schraeder, S.W. Hook, and B. Taylor, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A 
Comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish Aid Flows", World Politics 50, 
January 1998 
9 Schraeder et ai, pp.295-297 
11 
of the equation, there have been very few systematic and 
. I 10 comparatIve ana yses. 
Schraeder, Hook and Taylor concede that self-interest as a 
factor in aid calculations by donors is axiomatic in the scholarly 
literature, although they believe that exactly which interests come 
into play is a question rarely fully addressed. l1 The case study 
oriented literature that seeks to explain the motivations of aid donors 
is largely descriptive, and this further compounds a clear 
understanding of donor-interests. 
Both qualitative and empirical studies of aid donors have their 
shortcomings. The former relies too heavily on the case study 
approach which hinders generalisation across the field of donor 
countries. Often these studies are unique and noncomparable.12 
Empirical research is equally problematic. One difficulty is that the 
majority of statistical analyses have been confined to individual case 
studies, so that, like qualitative research, such studies prevent 
generalisation of donor countries.13 Even statistical examinations 
that focus on several cases fail to capture the most important 
dimensions of the aid relationship cited within the qualitatively 
10 Ibid. pp.295-296 
11 Schraede et aI, p.296 
12 Ibid. p.301 
13 Ibid. p.30 1 
/ 
12 
oriented case study literature, for example, regIOn, culture and 
'd I 14 1 eo ogy. 
The end result of the shortcomings of the aid debate has been 
that a number of key questions have not been fully answered. These 
include: which motivating factors have been of greatest importance 
in the formulation and implementations of aid policies? Did foreign 
aid policies differ with the specific interests of the particular donor 
country, or is it possible to distinguish cross-national trends? How 
do the aid disbursements of donors compare? Were ostensible cold 
war factors, such as the strategic importance of recipient countries, 
the primary driving forces of these policies, or were other factors, 
such as economic gain or culture, salient even during the cold war?15 
To a large degree, this thesis seeks to provide answers to these 
questions drawn from the context of the South Pacific. 
In essence, therefore, Schraeder, Hook and Taylor's study is 
an attempt to: 
... bridge the gap between the quantitatively oriented 
researcher who seeks to uncover cross-national trends that 
often blur country-specific distinctions and the regional 
specialist who often seeks qualitative knowledge of a 
particular country at the expense of empirical tests that 
are generalizable to other countries and regions16 
14 Ibid. p.301 
15 Schraeder et ai, p.295 
16 Ibid. p.297 
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To achieve this, their study draws upon two groups of variables. One 
set - humanitarian need, strategic importance, and economic 
potential - is traditionally employed in the empirical foreign aid 
literature; the second set incorporates three additional variables -
cultural similarity, ideological stance and region - recognised by 
regional specialists as important to a comprehensive understanding 
of the international interactions between donors and recipients. 17 In 
short, the general empirical and the more regional-focused case-
study literatures are joined together to offer a comprehensive 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of foreign aid interactions 
between the donors and recipients. 18 
In many respects, the theory of Schraeder et al is guilty of 
what it sees as wrong with other studies: the results are too general. 
Of the six key pieces to the aid puzzle that they present, some are of 
little use in a comparison of Japanese and Australian aid. 19 Yet 
others proved very useful. 'Region', for instance, is particularly 
useful. They argue that: 
... regional identification plays a potentially important 
role as a determinant of aid flows. It is clear that if 
17 Schraeder et al, p297 
18 Ibid. p297 
19 For example, one of the key tests for 'humanitarian need' is average daily caloric intake. 
This is hardly appropriate in the South Pacific, with its abundance of food resources available to 
all. Importantly, too, such statistics about the region probably do not exist. 'Cultural similarity' 
between donor and recipients clearly is not relevant. It is argued that France, for instance, will 
give aid in Africa only to French speaking nations, and thus a connection between aid and 
cultural similarity is made, and even in their own study, such a category only applied to France. 
14 
several countries comprise a natural collective - because 
of shared geographical features, historical ties, or a 
common religion - they are more likely to trade and 
share security interests with one another than with 
countries outside of their general region. 20 
Culture, in its broadest sense, and even convenience are included 
under 'region'. A key consequence of affmity with a region, they 
add, is aid relations. 'Ideological stance' is based on the belief that 
capitalist countries favour capitalist recipients, not Marxist and 
socialist, and vice versa. 21 This argument could be adapted to suit 
the region on the basis that aid did have an ideological justification 
during the Cold War. Japanese increased aid to Kiribati following its 
fishing agreement with the Soviet Union in 1985 did, to some 
extent, have an ideological basis of sorts- preventing Kiribati from 
increasing its links with the Kremlin. 
'Economic potential' is a particularly helpful category. 
Foreign aid is often justified by policymakers in terms of its 
potential contribution to donors' economies, in terms of promoting 
trade and investment. Schraeder et al argue that recipients with the 
most powerful economies or most natural resources would be 
favoured by donors. 22, Strategic importance' is equally useful. It is 
widely believed, though rarely acknowledged by policymakers that 
20 Schraeder et aI, p306 
21 Schraeder et aI, p.306 
15 
aid is a powerful tool for enhancing the security interests of the 
donor. The recipient's strategic importance, therefore, is central to 
an understanding of aid relations, though the variables used to 
operationalise the nexus between aid and security are hardly 
applicable.23 
Schraeder et al do provide an interesting theory which has 
guided this study. It was necessary, however, to look for further 
studies to build a theoretical framework. Other systematic and 
comparative analyses of aid donors do exist, but there are very few 
of them. Several others were assessed as part of this thesis. Steven 
W. Hook had written an earlier and lengthier work before combining 
with Schraeder and Taylor.24 Indeed, it could be argued that the most 
favourable elements of Hook's own work are to be found in 
Schraeder et aI, so no further comment is necessary here. Another 
key comparative was a 1979 study by R. D. McKinley. 25 
McKinley developed the ftrst systematic foreign policy model 
of aid because he believed that humanitarian considerations did not 
22 Ibid. p.304-305 
23 Schraeder et allook at such factors as the percentage of GNP spent on the military and 
the percentage of the recipient country's population that form part of the military. The small 
economies and popUlations of the Pacific Island states mean that such criteria is not a good 
gauge of the strategic importance of recipient nations for the purposes of this study. p.304 
24 S.W. Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid, Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1995 
25 R.D. McKinley, "The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model and Interpretation of 
the Distributions of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United kingdom, 
France, and Germany, 1960-1970" Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 11, No.4, January 1979, 
pp411-463 
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provide an adequate explanation of the motivations of aid donors. 
For him, then, a foreign policy view of the aid relationship, in which 
aid serves as a mechanism for the donor's pursuit of its own foreign 
policy interests, was far more accurate.26 He examined the extent of 
donor commitments to recipients, and looked at the degree of 
dependence that resulted from their aid relationship. He took from 
the general aid literature five categories of donor interest, and 
applied them to his model. Briefly, these can be summarised as (1) 
trading interest, (2) security interest, (3) power political interests, (4) 
development and performance interests, and (5) political stability 
d d . 27 an emocracy mterests. 
It must be pointed out, however, that the criteria he proposed 
to measure each category is not well suited to a study of the South 
Pacific.28 In addition, the range of statistics necessary to measure 
each is not available for the purposes of this study. Nevertheless, he 
does raise a number of interesting arguments. Trading interests, 
26 McKinley, "The Aid Relationship", pp412-413 
27 McKinley, "The Aid Relationship", p415 
28 For example, the category of 'power political interest' relates to the military capabilities 
of the recipient and consequently its threat to the international balance of power, which is not 
relevant to the South Pacific. Similarly, 'political stability and democracy interests' drew on 
variables including the number of political parties banned, the percentage of the population who 
were members of these parties, the number of military coups and the period under military rule, 
which would only be applicable to Fiji if applied to the region. In addition, 'trading interests' 
are assessed in light of the extent to which the resources of the recipient acquired through trade 
contributed to the economic growth of the donor. Clearly, McKinley's point here relates to 
recipient nations with larger economies than those found in the South Pacific. Papua New 
Guinea would be the only South Pacific nation that contributes to significant economic growth 
for Australia, its largest aid donor. McKinley, pp.412-415 
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McKinley points out, are an important motivation behind aid 
because low-income recipient countries provide the donor with 
certain essential commodities, and that is applicable to Japan and its 
need for fish. 
His rationale for the 'development and performance interests' 
category is based on the premise that economic development and 
stability provide the basis from which other donor interests may 
develop, such as trade or investment. For him, economic stability is 
an antecedent condition of political stability. 29 With regard to 
'political stability and democracy interests', McKinley argues that 
the promotion of liberal democracy provides the most enduring 
safeguard to Western security, and that, alternatively, Western 
interests may be threatened by politically unstable regimes.30 
'Security interests' related to contact with the Communist Bloc, 
which certainly motivated Australia and Japan in their aid 
relationships with the region. 
While there were difficulties with McKinley's empirically-
oriented theory, a degree of adaptation can make his categories 
applicable to the South Pacific context. Schraeder et al do build on 
what McKinley started, with the incorporation of many of the best 
features of his theory. Interestingly, however, McKinley paid closer 
29 McKinley, ppA15-418 
30 Ibid. pAl7 
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attention to the concept that the creation and maintenance of 
political stability was a significant basis behind the programmes of 
aid donors. 
It can be seen, then, that three leading systematic and 
comparative analyses of the motivations of aid donors were 
assessed, and the most compelling features of each were influential 
in this thesis. Because of the difficulty of obtaining the variety of 
statistics that these studies are based on, it was decided that a more 
qualitative-based thesis would be suitable. Nevertheless, an attempt 
was made to incorporate the initiative taken by Schraeder et al to 
'bridge the gap' between quantitative and qualitative research. 
Because of the degree of complementarity of the three studies, 
it was possible to combine the best features of each. The importance 
of 'economic potential' and 'trading interests' were incorporated 
into a category called 'commercial motivations; 'security interest', 
'strategic importance' and 'political stability and democracy 
interests' were combined into a broad category entitled 'security 
motivation'; and the concept of 'region' and 'humanitarian' 
motivations espoused by Schreader et al have also been utilised. 
Finally, a separate category which examines the sense of duty and 
the role the international community played in influencing Australia 
and Japan to step up its efforts in the South Pacific has been 
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included. It is not drawn from any of these studies, but is necessary 
if aid to the region is to be understood. 
1.2.3 Defmitions: 
Cold War: The ideological conflict between the USSR and 
its Communist Bloc in the 'East' and the USA and its capitalist 
allies in the 'West', began after World War II and effectively came' 
to an end with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
Foreign Aid: The Development Assistance Committee of 
the OECD adopted the 1969 "Recommendations on Financial Terms 
and Conditions" which defined ODA as: 
Official Development Assistance is defined as those 
flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions 
provided by official agencies, including state and local 
governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction 
of which meets the following test: 
a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as its 
main objective, and 
b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant 
element of at least 25 per cent. 
ODA focuses on development assistance and includes humanitarian 
assistance, current economic assistance, emergency relief, and food 
aid. 
20 
ODA should not be confused with 'foreign capital inflows' 
which are commercial flows of private capital. It does not include 
military aid. 
ODA IS either 'bilateral', that is, from government to 
government, or 'multilateral'. The latter takes the form of donor 
government contributions to international agencies (e.g. United 
Nations Development Program) or institutions like the major 
development banks (e.g. World Bank, Asian Development Bank) 
which are specialised in aid delivery.31 
For the purposes of this study, ODA, aid, foreign aid and 
economic assistance are used interchangeably. 
South Pacific: The South Pacific is comprised of the small 
island countries in the southern and central Pacific region, though 
some are found above the equator. Generally, however, the South 
Pacific Commission's defmition of the region IS widely 
acknowledged. In all, 22 countries make up the South Pacific: 
American Samoa, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New 
31 R. Gounder, Overseas aid motivations: the economics of Australia's bilateral aid, 
Aldershot: Avebury Publishing Limited, 1995 
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Guinea, Pitcairn, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna. 
It is important to note that when analysing Australian aid to 
the region, the 'South Pacific' does not include Papua New Guinea. 
Papua New Guinea and the 'South Pacific' are treated as separate 
parts of Australia's aid programme. 
South Pacific and 'region' are used interchangeably. 
1.3 OUTLINE: 
Chapter Two sets the international context in which the aid 
programmes of Japan and Australia need to be understood. It 
provides a brief history of foreign aid, beginning with the Marshall 
Plan in 1948, and covering the period up until the 1980s. It examines 
the major developments in the evolution of foreign aid in this period, 
and ends by discussing the origins of the aid programmes of each 
donor and their involvement in the region prior to the 1970s. 
Chapter Three is devoted exclusively to Australian ODA to 
the South Pacific. It traces the origins and changing nature of 
Australia's aid to the region, with particular emphasis on the Cold 
War period found in a number of official reports. Commercial and 
security motivations, Australian's international reputation and duty, 
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its sense of belonging to the region and humanitarian considerations 
are examined to gain an understanding of the complexity of 
Australia's aid philosophy of the time. 
Chapter Four, similarly, will focus on the aid programme of 
one donor, in this case, Japan. The same categories are used to 
discover the range of principles that guided Japan's aid during the 
Cold War. 
Chapter Five is devoted to accounting for changes in Japanese 
and Australian aid to the region in the post-Cold War period and 
discussing the future directions that both programmes may take. 
The comparative examination, or Chapter Six, begins with a 
discussion of criteria for comparison, with particular reference to the 
model provided by Schraeder, Hook and Taylor and McKinley. The 
continuities and changes of each donor's programmes in the cold 
war era and its aftermath are then discussed with reference to the 
categories provided in Chapters Three and Four. Chapter Six also 
includes a conclusion in the form of a discussion of the questions 
raised in the introduction. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION: 
Foreign aid is not a recent phenomenon.! Foreign aid, 
however, in its 'modem' guise, has its origins in the Marshall Plan. 
Officially known as the European Recovery Program, the Marshall 
Plan dispensed over $13 billion between 1948 and 1952 to Western 
European countries.2 The significance of the Marshall Plan lies in 
the fact that it signalled the beginning of a major trend which saw 
aid evolve over the following decades into the cornerstone of 
developed nations' foreign policy. The origins and development of 
Japan and Australia as aid donors, therefore, must be understood in 
this context. As such, it is necessary to provide a brief account of the 
Marshall Plan and the major trends in aid patterns between the 1950s 
and the 1970s. 
An examination of Australian and Japanese involvement 
within the region is necessary to illustrate that their aid programmes 
were in many ways a logical outcome of their affmity with the South 
Pacific. Both donors were to establish aid regimes that were to see 
ODA delivered to the four comers of the globe, not just the South 
1 The United States, for example, could be considered an aid donor as long ago as 1838. 
For more on the subject, see J. Stephen Hoadley, "Aid and National Security: The Politics of 
New Zealand's Development Assistance", in E. Olssen and W. Webb (eds), New Zealand, 
Foreign Policy and Defence, Foreign Policy School, University of Otago, 1977, p.145 
2 R.E. Wood, From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices 
in the World Economy, Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1986, p.29 
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Pacific. The myriad of reasons why Australia significantly increased 
its aid programme to the region in the mid 1970s and Japan became 
a donor to the South Pacific at approximately the same time will be 
the focus of chapters three and four, respectively. It is essential, 
however, that each donor's evolving aid regimes be examined in 
order to provide the necessary background for these chapters. 
2.2 A HISTORY OF FOREIGN AID: 
2.2.1 The Marshall Plan and its legacy: 
The Marshall Plan was the brainchild of United States' 
policy-makers, not the leaders of a decimated Europe, who held 
visions extending beyond European recovery to the creation of a 
new international order. During the war, both the United States' 
public and government officials feared a post-war depression in 
Europe, as it would inevitably have adverse economic repercussions 
for the United States. As a consequence, finding a way to maintain a 
high level of United States' exports, through European economic 
recovery was portrayed as the best way of avoiding a depression. 
The post-war dollar shortage, combined with the perceived 
inadequacy of international institutions such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund to fmance export-led recovery and 
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reconstruction, meant that a 'gift' of money was seen as the best 
means of preventing a global economic downturn. 
The Marshall Plan envisaged economic reform in Europe as 
a key means of protecting the United States' economy by the 
creation ofa new international order. From the outset of World War 
II, policy-makers from the United· States' State Department 
developed a narrow economic interpretation of the causes of the war, 
focusing on the breakdown of the world economy under the dual 
pressures of the Great Depression and the legacy of World War I. 
The end result, they believed, was increased controls on 
international trade and capital movements. The establishment of a 
multilateral world economy, based on the unobstructed movement of 
capital and labour, became their highest goae. 
President Truman, in particular, feared that international 
trade and investment would be seriously affected by restrictions and 
controls that the recovering European countries would implement. 
As a consequence, he set about creating an open world economy, as 
recent scholars have suggested, based on multilateral capitalism4. 
3 R.E. Wood, p.34 
4 See, for example, J. Kolko and G. Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United 
States Foreign Policy. 1945-1954, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, p367 and MJ. Horgan, 
"European Integration and the Marshall Plan," in S. Hoffmann and C. Maier (eds), The Marshall 
Plan: A Retrospective, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, pp.4-6 
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'National capitalism',s the dominant trend in Western Europe after 
the war, was an impediment to Truman's grand vision because of the 
reduced dependence on foreign trade which characterised it. 
The original motives behind the Marshall Plan, then, were 
economic, but the enabling legislation in the United States' 
Congress had to be based heavily on Cold War scare tactics to 
ensure its successful implementation6• Strictly in terms of the 
concrete economic objectives that motivated it, the Marshall Plan 
could be considered a failure. What really saved the Marshall Plan's 
reputation, however, was the continuation of massive aid to Europe 
after 1952, the official close of the plan. American aid merely took 
on a new name, and the bulk of aid came after 1952, so the claim 
that it completed its task ahead of time and with less money is 
misleading.7 Significantly, however, it came to be popularly labelled 
as a success, partly through a redefinition of goals. The multilateral 
goals of the State Department gave way to retrospective political and 
military goals. According to Wood, 
5 'National capitalism' is characterised by a high degree of state planning and a number of 
state-implemented control devices to ensure the creation of full employment. They include: 
exchange controls, capital controls, bilateral and state trading arrangements. For more detail, see 
RE. Wood, p.38 
6 Wood doubts the claims by many historians that the Marshall Plan served, as its main 
objective, to weaken the influence of the Left in European politics, particularly in Italy, by 
bringing about an economic recovery that would boost the conservative parties. For him, the 
Left in Europe was already weak after the ravages of war. For more, see RE. Wood, pp.36-38. 
7 Ibid, p.63 
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At the end of the Marshall Plan, conservative social 
forces had retained and greatly strengthened their 
political control in aU the Western European countries. 
European resistance to rearmament had been overcome, 
and Europe was now militarily organized under U.S. 
hegemony against the Soviet Union. The historic 
economic linkages between Western and Eastern Europe 
had been broken. In the popular mind, the Marshall Plan 
had prevented Europe from 'going communist'. 8 
While the Marshall Plan was mutually beneficial for the 
United States and Europe, arguably its greatest legacy was that it set 
in place the beginning of aid to the Third World, via the Point Four 
Program of 1949.9 The latter came at the behest of Truman, and led 
to the provision of aid to independent low-income countries 
becoming fmnly established in official United States' foreign policy. 
A triangular trade model was established, involving the United 
States, Europe and the Third World territories of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. These regions contributed to the success of the 
Marshall Plan by providing markets for European goods that had 
formerly existed in Eastem Europe, as well as being an inexpensive 
f . I 10 source 0 raw matena s. 
According to Wood, an analysis of the origins, theory and 
functioning of the Marshall Plan shows that: 
8 R.E. Wood, p.63 
9 The Point Four Program provided assistance to low-income countries in particular, 
Greece and Turkey, because of their location on the edge of the USSR although economic 
advantages were perhaps a more dominant justification for the Program. 
10 R.E. Wood, ppAO-42 
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There is no radical discontinuity between the Marshall 
Plan and the later aid programs focused more exclusively 
on the Third World. The Marshall Plan not only shaped 
the international context within which the aid regime 
subsequently evolved, but it also created a body of 
operating principles and procedures that remain an 
integral part of the aid regime. 11 
Under the Marshall Plan, the United States' established aid 
programs in most of the overseas territories of the European colonial 
powers and in forty independent Third World countries. 12 The 
choice of aid over other alternatives thus set the stage for the 
institutionalisation of aid within the world economy after the formal 
close of the Marshall Plan era in 1952, which heavily influenced all 
developed countries, including Japan and Australia. 13 
While the South Pacific region was not a direct beneficiary 
of the Marshall Plan's implementation of foreign investment and aid 
to the Third World, the plan set in place a momentum that would, in 
future decades, see the region become one of the world's largest per 
capita recipients of aid. Australia's aid to Papua New Guinea, for 
example, can largely be understood because of its former colonial 
II R.E Wood, p.65 
12 Ibid, p.66 
13 Aid by this time was in a sense 'modern' in comparison with the pre-World War II aid 
from the likes of Britain and the United States in that it had expanded in scope and volume and 
become institutionalised and internationalised. S. Hoadley, "Aid and National Security: The 
politics of New Zealand's Development Assistance", p.146 
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status. 14 Indeed, the linle between aid and decolonisation arguably 
did not get the attention it deserved from Wood. Decolonisation 
occurred first in Asia and then in Africa. Former colonial 
governments, it must be added, wanted to gain the support of their 
ex-colonies as they were also members of the United Nations and 
consequently had voting rights. The use of aid as a diplomatic lever 
for voting support, it can be argued, was at times as important as the 
maintenance of influence in newly independent countries. 15 The 
decolonisation of the South Pacific, however, took place much later 
than in Asia and Africa, but the lessons learnt about the utilisation of 
aid for a myriad of donor interests should not be under-estimated. 
Wood's analysis, as well as neglecting the influence of 
decolonisation, also failed to highlight the role that modernisation 
theory played in the evolution of aid. Elaborated after World War II, 
Modernisation Theory provided one of the major ideological 
underpinnings of the concept of aid. Modernisation theorists 
considered that external flows of capital, trade and technology were 
essential for a nation's development. 16 Development, in its broadest 
sense, was envisaged as an evolutionary movement from an original 
14 R. Gounder, Overseas aid motivations: the economics of Australia's bilateral aid, 
Aldershot: Avebury Publishing Limited, 1995, p.3 
15 R. Gounder, p.3 
16 D.E. Apter, "Towards a 111eory of Modernization" in F.A. Botchway, (ed.) 
Modernization: the economic and political transformation of society, Berkeley: McCutche 
Publishing Corporation, 1970, p.28 
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state of underdevelopment to an idealised version of modernity, such 
as Western Europe or the United States. 17 The transformation of 
agricultural practices, the rapid acceleration of industrialisation and 
the provision of infrastructure to accompany greater urbanisation, 
were key aspects of Modernisation Theory which had a significant 
influence on the aid programmes the world over. Modernisation, 
however, was not merely economic, and development in its broadest 
sense, including political development, was envisaged. Restructuring 
traditional institutions and organisations, and the adoption of 
'modem' political and social values were deemed necessary for 
development. 
By helping to foster the economIC development of newly 
independent nations, it was believed that increased political stability 
would follow. This was an important consideration in the Cold War 
era because: 
Poverty was perceived to be fertile ground for communist 
blandishments. It was believed that tiny inputs of aid at 
crucial points would jolt the poor nations out of their 
vicious circles of poverty, enable them to attract and 
productively use private capital, and set them on the road 
17 W.W Rostow's seminal work, Stages of Economic Growth, highlighted that all societies 
evolve through five stages to self-sustaining economic growth: "traditional society with a 
characteristically low level oftechnology and productivity; a transitional stage for satisfying the 
'preconditions' for change; the 'take off' stage when structural constraints to industrialization 
have been removed and an entrepreneurial class has emerged; the drive to maturity when 
industrialization is well under way and the levels of technological development and productivity 
are high; and the society of mass consumption where there is general abundance and society has 
moved beyond basic needs to the consumption of durable goods." C. Ake, "Development and 
Underdevelopment" in J. Krieger (ed), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.239-243 
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to economic development, political stability, and 
international responsibility. It was assumed that these 
nations would become good customers for Western 
exports and firm allies of the anti-communist bloc.18 
Foreign aid, therefore, was to be seen as a mechanism by the 1950s 
that could, relatively inexpensively, fulfil a host of aims. The 
spectacular recovery of Europe after the war, the beginnings of the 
Cold War and the trend towards decolonisation after the Second 
World War signalled the time from which aid came to be established 
as a cornerstone of Western nations' foreign po Hey. 
2.2.2 The Evolution of Aid: 19505 to 19805: 
Economic assistance to the Third World during the Marshall 
Plan period, in essence, came almost exclusively from the United 
States. By the 1980s, however, the aid picture had become 
enormously more complex. Separate aid programmes were now 
administered by all sixteen countries of the Development Assistance 
Committee, by at least eight communist and ten OPEC countries, by 
approximately twenty multilateral organisations in addition to 
various components of the United Nations system, by hundreds of 
private organisations, and aid programs had even been initiated by 
several Third World Countries. 
18 S. Hoadley, "Aid and National Security: The Politics of New Zealand's Development 
Assistance", in E. Olssen and W. Webb (eds.) New Zealand, Foreign Policy and Defence, 
Dunedin: Otago Foreign Policy School, University of Otago, 1977, p.147 
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The institutional complexity of the contemporary aid regime 
has, according to Wood, evolved gradually through a process that 
may be divided into four stages, roughly corresponding to decades. 19 
The first of these, the 1950s, was a period which was characterised 
by the diversification of the foreign aid programmes of the advanced 
capitalist countries. To a large extent, this intensification of Western 
economic assistance was due to the advent of Soviet and Chinese 
aid, though small in relation, which increased the ability of non-
aligned countries to press for aid from the West, and forced Western 
countries to soften the terms of some of their aid. The threat of 
communist aid led the United States to press the OEEC20 members 
to initiate or expand their aid programmes. By the end of the decade, 
most of the advanced capitalist countries were operating full-scale 
aid programs, and the rest followed suit in the early 1960s. 
Nevertheless, the United States in 1960 still accounted for over 60 
percent of all bilateral aid.21 Both Australia and Japan, importantly, 
began to make contributions towards South and Southeast Asia at 
this time under the Colombo Plan. 
19 R.E. Wood, p.69 
20 The OEEC was the forerunner to the OECD, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, which was reconstituted in 1961 with an expanded membership, 
including Japan. The DAC, or Development Assistance Committee, of the OECD was a 
'donors' club' or sorts, which was influential in the aid policies of its members. Australia joined 
the latter in 1966. 
21 R.E. Wood, p.71 
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Early in the 1950s, the World Council of Churches proposed 
that one percent of the combined national income of rich countries 
should be transferred to developing nations. This target was adopted 
by the United Nations in 1960. The United Nations General 
Assembly sought to prescribe a framework of growth for developing 
countries, known as the International Development Strategy, in its 
'First Development Decade' programme in the 1960s. Aid, targeted 
at 1 percent of national income, was expected to play an important 
role in helping to achieve annual growth rates of 7 percent by 
d I . . 22 eve opmg countrIes. 
The 1960s, the second phase, was marked by the emergence 
of new forms of multilateralism, largely under the auspices of, or 
modelled after, the World Bank.23 Bilateral aid from the advanced 
capitalist countries constituting the DAC remained the largest single 
form of external financing through the 1960s, but its share of the 
total declined from 54.2 percent in 1960 to 37.9 percent in 1970.24 
Many new multilateral institutions emerged in this period. The 
decade of the 1960s also saw the reorganisation of many bilateral aid 
programmes, reflecting both the increase in their number and a 
22 For a fuller discussion ofthe evolution of thought on the GDP/Aid ratio, see R. Gounder, 
Overseas Aid Motivations: the economics of Australia's bilateral aid, Aldershot: Avebury 
Publishing Limited, 1995, pp.2-28 
23 Ibid, p.69 
24 R.E Wood, p.72 
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redefinition between military and economic aid, with a gradual shift 
towards the latter.25 Multilateral institutions more than doubled their 
share of total flows between 1960 and 1970, but official financing 
during the 1960s was still dominated by the bilateral programmes of 
the advanced capitalist countries. Between 1960 and 1970, 
multilateral aid was equivalent only to 15 percent of DAC bilateral 
aid. In 1970, however, World Bank loan commitments surpassed 
grants and loans from USAID, the United States' aid agency, 
hitherto the world's largest aid institution. 
At the end of the 1960s, Robert McNamara, the newly 
appointed President of the World Bank, commissioned Lester 
Pearson, the former Prime Minister of Canada, to report on global 
trends in aid and development in order to stimulate the aid effort of 
individual countries. The Pearson Report endorsed the 'two gap ,26 
approach to development, but took the view that 'the one percent 
goal' was too ambitious. Instead, the Pearson Report recommended 
that a more realistic target would be 0.7 percent of developed 
countries' GNP as an aid goal. 
25 R.E Wood, p.75 
26 The 'two gap' theory of economic development which attracted much attention in the 
1960s suggested that development was constrained in poor countries by two factors: the 
inability to save and the inability to import essential goods and services. It was argued that aid 
flows, by bridging both gaps, could boost growth in developing countries. Large amounts of 
economic and military aid had evidently contributed to rapid growth in Taiwan and in the 
Republic of Korea and it was expected that these results could be replicated elsewhere. R.G. 
Jackson, Report of the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program, Canberra: 
Australian Government Printing Service, 1984, p.43 
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After 1964, the 'Group of 77', formed by developing nations 
to co-ordinate their policies to the United Nations, sought major 
financial transfers from the industrialised nations of the 'north' to 
the developing nations of the 'south' through the establishment of a 
'new international economic order'. The pressure for aid flows was 
maintained through the 1960s. The 0.7 percent of GNP target for 
official aid set by the Pearson Report in 1968 continued to be 
accepted as a desirable goal for donor nations. The international 
pressure in favour of achieving this target was evident in the United 
Nations' International Development Strategy for the 1980s. 
The 1970s, in terms of the history of foreign aid in the post 
war years, will be remembered largely for the origin of the aid 
programmes of wealthy OPEC nations. At the time, the increased 
share of multilateral aid in total aid flows, which emerged in the 
1960s, continued. As a consequence, the number of donor nations 
grew rapidly, with smaller countries which did not have programmes 
large enough to justify substantial bilateral activities making 
multilateral contributions. The provision of aid through multilateral 
institutions gained favour because it avoided charges of attempted 
political influence by donor nations. As a consequence, the World 
Bank and major regional banks, particularly the Asian Development 
Bank and the Inter-American Bank were able to build large-scale, 
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specialised aid delivery mechanisms which enhanced the arguments 
for multilateral aid flows. 
The trend towards multilateralism, however, was to lose pace 
in the 1980s. As small donors expanded their total aid programmes, 
effective bilateral programmes became possible. Donors, 
understandably, tend to prefer bilateral programmes because they 
could be used to improve political and commercial relations with 
recipient nations. Indeed, until the mid 1970s, it was widely agreed 
that commercial activities should be distinguished from aid. The 
economic recession of the 1980s, however, led to a retreat from the 
liberal attitudes that existed in the early 1970s. The practice of 
'tying' of aid to suppliers in donor countries, which raised the costs 
of goods and materials, thus reducing the value of aid, increased. 
Aid, by the 1980s, had therefore come to be acknowledged as a 
legitimate tool for serving donor interests, while at the same time 
fulfilling humanitarian objectives. 
2.3 JAPAN AS FOREIGN AID DONOR: A BACKGROUND 
Japan, like much of Europe, was ravaged by the Second 
World War. As a consequence of defeat, Japan was forced to endure 
the heavy burden of war reparations at the same time it sought to 
rebuild itself. It was not until the 1950s, then, that Japan first began 
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its aid programme, with various small scale contributions to United 
Nations agencies, which culminated in 1954 with Japan joining the 
Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and 
Southeast Asia. In that same year, Japan concluded the first of 
several war reparations agreements which committed it to provide 
grants, private loans and export credits as settlements for World War 
II-related damages. In this respect, early Japanese aid served a dual 
purpose. Not only was it provided as a means of compensation for 
war time aggression and the occupation of neighbouring countries, it 
was also linked, even at such an early stage, to Japan's own 
economic recovery, based on growth in industrial production and 
trade. Aid was to act as the catalyst for Japanese firms to gain access 
to foreign markets, as a means of securing access to raw materials. It 
also served as an effective means of promoting exports. As Tarte 
noted: 
In the early stages of Japan's aid program the term 
'economic cooperation' (keizai kyoryoku) rather than aid 
(enjo) was adopted. Economic cooperation described both 
private and government capital flows to neighbouring 
developing countries, including loans, export credits and 
private investment, encompassing profit-oriented 
activities of Japan's private sector and aid was explicitly 
linked to the promotion of those activities. The basic 
orientation of economic cooperation was to assist the 
Japanese economy.27 / 
27 S. Tarte, Japan's aid diplomacy and the Pacific islands, Suva: Institute of Pacific 
Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1998, p.19 
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In the 1960s, Japan was to become more integrated into the 
international aid community. It joined the Development Assistance 
Committee in 1961, the International Development Association of 
the W orId Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, as well as 
playing an important role in the establishment of the Asian 
Development Bank in 1966. In effect, these organisations helped to 
playa significant part in Japan rebuilding its international role and 
the forging of relations with developed and developing nations. For 
the first time, Japan began to extend grant aid that was unrelated to 
reparation payments. Indeed, by the decade's end, Japanese official 
development assistance had blossomed to encompass bilateral loans, 
grants, reparations, technical assistance, and contributions to the 
aforementioned multilateral organisations. 
What ought to be noted about Japan's aid programme at this 
time was its sole focus on Asia, in line with its post-war foreign 
policy, although the major motivating factor was economic. By the 
1970s, however, the programme evolved still further and grew to 
encompass more recipients and wider foreign policy objectives, as 
discussed in chapter four, and it was in such a context that Japan's 
aid to the South Pacific was initiated. 
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2.4 JAPAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOUTH PACIFIC: 
A BRIEF HISTORY: 
It may appear that Japan's involvement in the region as an aid 
donor after 1977 marked its ftrst real links with the islands of the 
South Paciftc, but this was not the case. In the late seventeenth 
century Japanese traders ftrst took notice of the abundance of the 
region's natural resources. By the late nineteenth century, Japanese 
labourers flocked to Micronesia and Polynesia, to such an extent that 
by 1906, approximately 80 percent of the total trade in German 
Micronesia was controlled by Japanese interests.28 
It was not only for commercial gain, however, that Japan 
sought to further its relationship with Micronesia. As early as the 
1880s, a handful of Japanese government offtcia1s, naval offtcers 
and journalists had argued for the acquisition of equatorial lands in 
the South Paciftc on the basis of economic advantage, national 
security, and geopolitics. The outbreak of World War I enabled 
Japan to move from trade partner to ruler, in line with these aims. 
Japan, as an ally of Great Britain through a 1902 agreement, took 
from Germany its Micronesian possessions of the Marshalls, 
28 One Japanese concern, the Nan yo Boeki Kabushikigaisha or Nambo (South Seas 
Trading Company), illustrates the extent to which Japanese enterprises come to dominate 
commerce in Micronesia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nambo was 
involved in ventures as disparate as the copra trade, commercial fishing operations, inter-island 
mail services and freight and passenger transport, which all combined to give it a near 
monopoly over trade in the central and western parts of Micronesia by 1914. For a fuller 
discussion on Nambo, see D. Hanlon, "Patterns of colonial rule in Micronesia," in K.R. Howe, 
C. Kiste and Brij V. Lal (eds), Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the twentieth century, 
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1994, p.l06 
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Marianas and Carolines in October, 1914. This act should be seen in 
the context of a desire for a southward advance, or nanshin, as part 
of Japan's ambition for world power status. 
With the Great War over, the League of Nations formally 
recognised Japan's occupation of the former German Micronesian 
possessions.29 In reality though, the guardianship given Japan by the 
League allowed it to practically annex the islands. As a 
consequence, Japanese private investment in agriculture, industry 
and commerce was to increase dramatically through the 1920s, to 
such an extent that the islands were no longer a drain on the imperial 
treasury. In the 1930s, the Japanese government sought to integrate 
colonial territories more extensively and quickly into the imperial 
economy. A special commission was formed to identify means to 
accelerate the settlement of Micronesia, to speed the exploitation of 
island and marine resources, and to promote tropical industry. An 
agency was created for such a purpose?O Japanese immigration to 
the islands increased dramatically in the 1930s, as a necessary 
ingredient in the quest for economic development, to such an extent 
29 Japan was granted a Class C Mandate for which it promised to file progress reports with 
the League, to forego the construction of any fortifications in the mandated territory, and to 
guarantee the right of commerce within the ten-itory to all nations. D. Hanlon, "Patterns of 
colonial rule in Micronesia," pp.94-95 
30 It was called Nan yo Takushoka or Nantaku (South Seas Colonial Corporation). It 
quickly assumed direct management of the phosphate mines in the West Carolines. It also 
established a host of subsidiary companies involved in electrical energy generation, 
refrigeration, aluminium mining, pearl fishing and commercial agriculture. D. Hanlon, "Patterns 
of colonial rule in Micronesia", pp.106-107 
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that it was believed that there were almost twice as many Japanese 
nationals in Micronesia than there were Micronesians by 1935.31 
It should be noted, therefore, that Japan did have an interest in 
the South Pacific long before the advent of its aid programme to the 
region which began in the late 1970s. While the peace settlement 
after World War II put art end to Japan's control of the former 
German Micronesian possessions, and with it, the role it had filled in 
the region, it did not signal a loss of interest in the potential that the 
islands had to offer. As has been seen, the Second World War had 
particularly disastrous consequences for Japan, and much rebuilding 
and many reparation payments had to be made before it could look 
to re-establish its links with the region. 
2.5 AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN AID: A BACKGROUND 
Australia's aid activities began before World War II when 
small 'grants-in-aid', generally below $AI00,000, were made to 
Papua New Guinea. After 1945, assistance to Papua New Guinea 
increased rapidly and remained at about two-thirds of the 
programme's total until the 1970s. In 1952, bilateral activities in 
other countries began under the Colombo Plan. A small-scale aid 
31According to Hanlon, there were 96,000 Japanese nationals in Micronesia at the outbreak 
of the Second World War. D. Hanlon, "Patterns of colonial rule in Micronesia", pp.106-107 
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programme to the South Pacific was established in 1966, the same 
year Australia became a member of the Development Assistance 
Committee of the GECD, which was no coincidence. 
In the first two decades after World War II, there were only 
. marginal changes in the geographic distribution of the bilateral 
programme, with Southeast Asia gradually gaining importance at the 
expense of South Asia. This was symbolised in 1969 when 
Indonesia overtook India as the second largest recipient, after Papua 
New Guinea. Humanitarian concerns, primarily a desire to help poor 
nations, and political considerations meant that newly independent 
countries in South and Southeast Asia were the focus of Australia's 
aid programme in the 1970s.32 
In the early 1970s, the percentage of economic assistance 
received by Papua New Guinea began to decline, though it was still 
allocated the majority of Australia's aid budget. Indeed, no other 
donor consistently devoted as high a percentage of its bilateral aid to 
a single country as Australia did to Papua New Guinea. A growing 
emphasis on Southeast Asia, particularly ASEAN countries, and the 
emergence of the South Pacific33 in Australian aid policy marked a 
new focus. 
32 Jackson, pA8 
33 It is important to note that in official Australian aid policy, the term 'South Pacific' 
refers to the island nations of the South Pacific Forum, with the exception of Papua New 
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In the early 1970s, the Whitlam government set itself the goal 
of working towards a level of aid of 0.7 percent of Gross National 
Product by the end of the decade, in line with other donors. In its 
fIrst year, Whitlam and his colleagues increased Australia's aid 
budget by 28 percent over the previous year, with 75 percent of total 
bilateral aid going to Papua New Guinea in the form of an annual 
subsidy.34 The remainder of the region, however, received less than 
0.5 percent.35 Over the next four years, 1973 to 1976, Australian aid 
to the region, which was traditional in content, totalled only $A15 
million.36 As will be shown in Chapter Three, Australian aid to the 
region was to begin a process of evolution in 1976, which mirrored 
the new place the South PacifIc was to play in Australia's foreign 
policy. 
Guinea. Because of Australia's close relationship with Papua New Guinea, which is reflected in 
the large percentage of aid the former Australian colony receives, Australian aid policy 
documents tend to treat the South Pacific and Papua New Guinea separately. 
34 Before 1973, several different government departments handled Australia's aid 
programme. Under this arrangement, the Department of External Territories was responsible for 
the administration of aid to Papua New Guinea and the Department of Foreign Affairs oversaw 
overall aid policy and administered a quarter of the total aid budget. The Treasury played a role 
in financial supervision of the aid programme and was responsible for Australia's contribution 
to the international financial institutions. The Departments of Education, Trade and Industry, 
Primary Industry, and Supply were also actively involved in the aid programme. However, the 
increasing complexity of aid and Papua New Guinea's imminent independence meant that aid 
functions were brought together into one body in 1974, the Australian Development Assistance 
Agency (ADAA), to administer and advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs on aid-related issues. 
The Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) replaced ADAA in 1976 in a further 
reorganisation ofthe aid programme. 
35 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and the South 
Pacific, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1978, p.36 
36 It was 'traditional' in the sense that it was largely devoted to the provision of educational 
scholarships, the supply of some food, and the implementation of a wide range of projects. The 
term 'traditional' was used by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 
in its 1976 report, Australia and the South Pacific, p.30 
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By the early 1980s, aid programmes for African and the 
Indian Ocean had been created, which signalled a further 
diversification of Australia's aid programme, in geographical terms. 
One point that needs to be emphasised about the Australian aid 
programme which had developed by this time, however, which is 
still evident today, is that while one country, Papua New Guinea, 
was the chief beneficiary, many others were recipients. Even the 
'large' aid programmes in Southeast Asia were relatively small, and 
in none of these countries is Australia the major donor?7 
Furthermore, Australia gives aid to a greater number of countries 
than most other donors, and in a wide variety of forms and in almost 
every sector of aid activity. As a consequence, the Australian 
programme is one of the most fragmented of all donor programmes, 
with a big 'body' of aid to Papua New Guinea and a relatively long 
'tail' of relatively small grants to over 70 countries. 38 
2.6 Australia and the South Pacific: A Background 
Australia's relationship with the islands of the South Pacific 
date back over two centuries. Trade between Australia and the 
region began in 1801 with a shipment of salt pork from Tahiti to 
37 Australian aid to Indonesia, the second largest recipient of Australian aid, for 
example, amounts to less than 5 percent oftotal aid flows to Indonesia. Jackson, p.49 
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Sydney, and continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century. 
By the 1920s, Australian commercial enterprises were operating 
extensively throughout the region, and particularly in Western 
Samoa, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, New Hebrides and the Solomons. 
Australia's relations with the region, however, were not merely 
commercial in nature. Missionaries spread Christianity, teachers 
spread knowledge and island labourers were cheaply recruited. 
Australia was to playa key role in the administration of Nauru 39 and 
Papua New Guinea 40, but Australia did not pay the region the 
attention it deserved, despite growing links over the past century. 
Only during World War II did the region playa significant part in 
Australian foreign policy, thereafter it receded into the 
background. 41 
38 Jackson, p.49 
39 In 1947, after decades as one of Nauru's largest markets for rock phosphate, full powers 
of legislation, Australia, exercised administration and jurisdiction in conjunction with New 
Zealand, over Nauru as a part trustee power, prior to Nauru's independence in 1968. 
40 In 1874, the Australian colonies requested Britain to atmex mainland New Guinea, but 
Britain refused this request and subsequent requests until 1884, when East New Guinea and the 
adjoining islands were proclaimed as a British protectorate. Formal annexation took place in 
1888, and the protectorate under the name of British New Guinea was administered by the 
colony of Queensland. In 1902, Queensland relinquished its administration of British New 
Guinea which was renamed Papua, in favour of the newly formed Commonwealth of Australia 
and in 1906, Papua became an Australian colony. In 1914, German New Guinea was taken over 
by Australia and in 1946 full control over Papua New Guinea was transferred from military to 
civil administration . 
... 41 In 1947, the Canberra Pact was formed after a conference held in Canberra attended by 
all colonial rulers in the region to discuss the future needs of the region in an age when 
decolonisation was not envisaged. During the war, Australia and New Zealand had been 
concerned about the possibility of a withdrawal of Britain from the region, though it was not 
until 1947 that efforts were made to examine the future of the South Pacific. The South Paci fic 
Commission was created as a consequence. It dealt with social and economic issues of its 
members, and was seen by Australia as an economic means of maintaining an influence over the 
region. After the creation of the South Pacific Commission, however, Australia took a less 
active role in regional affairs. 
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Australia came to terms with its Pacific geography and 
history and entered into a new phase in its relationship with the 
region suddenly and belatedly, in comparison with New Zealand. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that "Australia until the 1970s was 
more conscious of the hot air of Asia being breathed down its neck 
than of the trade winds of the Pacific.,,42 By the mid 1970s, however, 
Australia was no longer as preoccupied with issues outside the 
region as it had been in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Vietnam 
War, regional security arrangements in ANZUS, SEATO and 
AMDA were to the fore, along with the consequences of Britain's 
negotiations with the EEC. Its attention was turned to events closer 
to home, which was to result in 1976 in a greatly increased aid 
package to the region. 
In 1972, with Gough Whitlam at the helm, a greater 
emphasis was placed on Australia's special interests in the region 
and its responsibility for the economic and social development of the 
South Pacific. The new Australian Prime Minister of that year, along 
with his New Zealand counterpart, Norman Kirk, entered into a new 
phase in their countries' relationship with the region. In Australia's 
case, "the architect of this change was Whitlam, the builder was 
42 M. Boyd, "Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific" in R. Rayburn (ed), Foreign Policy 
School 1978: Australia and New Zealand Relations, Dunedin: Otago University Press in 
association with the Otago Foreign Policy School, 1978, p.36 
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Fraser, the foundations were Papua New Guinea's independence.,,43 
While Nauru had gained independence in 1968, it was Papua New 
Guinea's achievement of self-government in 1973 and independence 
in 1975 which was to capture Australian attention of the region, not 
least because the former Australian colony became in charge of its 
own foreign po licy. 
Decolonisation created a rapidly changing South Pacific in 
the 1970s. Australia, having taken great notice of Papua New 
Guinea's independence, became increasingly aware of the moves 
towards self-determination of the other islands of the region. It was 
against this backdrop of sudden change that Australia's new attitude 
to the region emerged in the mid 1970s. At the time, the Solomon 
Islands, Gilbert Islands, New Hebrides and Tuvalu were going down 
a path leading to independence, while the Marianas and the six other 
districts of Micronesia were considering their future status. 
Decolonisation within the South Pacific brought with it changed 
needs and aspirations on the part of newly-independent states. 
Australia took notice of the need for trade, foreign aid and 
investment, as well as an obligation to play a larger part in what 
essentially was its own neighbourhood. Independence resulted in a 
greater interest by external powers, particularly the Soviet Union 
43 M. Boyd, p.37 
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and China, in the region, which did not go unnoticed by Australia. It 
was, however, decolonisation rather than renewed fears of foreign 
intruders that was the real cause of Australia's growing interest in 
the South Pacific.44 Chapter Three will investigate the truth behind 
this claim. 
44 Boyd, p35 
CHAPTER THREE: 
AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN AID TO TIlE 
SOUTH PACIFIC IN THE COLD WAR ERA 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION: 
In 1976, Australia signalled a greater awareness of the South 
Pacific in the form of a massive increase in ODA allocated to the 
reg lOn, from A$15 million to A$60 million. 1 At the time, the first 
review of Australia's relationship with the reglOn was conducted 
which was indicative of the 'new' place the region played in 
Australian foreign policy. Since then, other major examinations of the 
South Pacific have taken place, including the Jackson Report, in 1984, 
the first comprehensive review of Australia's aid programme. 
Jackson's efforts have been described as a 'watershed' because they 
revealed for the first time the actual purposes of ODA. Previously, the 
true intention of policymakers had been hidden behind claims that 
humanitarian ideals were the cornerstone of aid. In the wake of the 
Jackson Report, two further assessments of the aid programme took 
place in 1989. Australia's Relations with the South Pacific and A 
Review of the Australian International Development Assistance 
Bureau and Australia's Overseas Aid Program, most importantly, were 
written in the lead up to the fall of the Berlin Wall. All four, therefore, 
were written during the Cold War, and provide evidence of aid 
policymakers' perception of the benefits to Australia ofODA. 
"! 
1 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and the South 
Pacific. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. 1978.0.30 
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As a consequence, this chapter is based on analysis of these 
reports in order to gauge the 'official' explanation of why Australia 
deemed it necessary to give aid to Papua New Guinea and the rest of 
the region. For the purposes of analysis, the major motivations which 
governed Australian ODA philosophy have been categorised as 
'commercial motivations', 'security motivations', 'Australia's 
international reputation and connection with the region', and of course, 
'humanitarian considerations'. As discussed in the introduction, each 
is broad in nature and there exists overlap between them. It is 
necessary, however, to take such an approach to create a base from 
which Australia can be compared with Japan (Chapter Six). 
3.2 COMMERCIAL MOTIVATIONS 
At the time of the first report, Australia and the South Pacific: 
Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence, 1978, the economic advantages to Australian business 
ventures in the region can be detected, though they were not 
overplayed. Significantly, the new aid package announced in October 
1976, which effectively quadrupled Australian economic assistance to 
the region, provided for increased funding of joint business ventures 
between Australian entrepreneurs and their island counterparts. Such 
an initiative came at a time when free advice, tax assistance and 
investment insurance was offered to Australian business people active 
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in the region as a means of augmenting their activities in a region in 
which over 8 percent of Australian manufactures were exported.2 
The Jackson Report was more forthright about the link between 
Australian aid and commercial gain. While there was little direct 
reference to the region, except to point out that it would remain an 
easily accessible market, particularly for Australian manufactured 
goods, for investment, and for airline and tourist organisations3, the 
general discussion on the relationship between aid and commerce is 
instructive. A growing appreciation that Australia's economic 
prospects were enhanced by sustained economic development in the 
Asian, Pacific and Indian Ocean regions is noted.4 The real benefit, 
however, would be to Australian commercial interests groups, 
including exporters of primary products, manufacturers, overseas 
investors and professional consultants, who actively lobbied Jackson's 
Committee. It was noted that: 
In the short run Australian producers, traders and 
investors benefit when the Australian aid program 
emphasises the procurement of Australian goods at 
internationally competitive prices while supporting 
development objectives. However, the argument for mutual 
economic gains is essentially a long-term one. Development 
expands the market for Australian goods and services and 
increases opportunities for direct investment abroad by 
2 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and the South Pacific, Canberra: Australian Government 
Printing Service, 1978, p.19 
3 R.G.Jackson, Report of the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid 
Programme, Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1984 (Jackson Report), p.177 
4 Jackson, p.20 
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Australian companies. Developing countries need to export 
to be able to import Australian goods and technology. 
Trade leads to specialisation and efficiency. Aid and trade 
reinforce each other. 5 
The idea of using Australian goods, whenever possible, within 
the Australian aid programme, or 'tying' aid, is prevalent in the 
Jackson Report. The potential benefits of tied aid included an 
expansion of Australian manufacturing production, the promotion of 
greater service industry exports and an increase in the number of jobs 
in Australia, as well as familiarising Australian firms with business 
conditions in developing countries and the introduction to potentially 
new customers. 6 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that in 
1982-1983, 93 percent of goods and materials purchased for bilateral 
aid programmes outside of Papua New Guinea were from Australian 
sources, and that, in total, 45 percent of Australian aid was tied.7 Such 
a practice was also defended on the basis that other donors were doing 
so. 
The preference for bilateral over multilateral aid programmes 
should largely be interpreted in light of the commercial benefits to 
Australia. The appropriate balance between the two, the Jackson 
Report concluded, should be about 25 percent multilateral, and the 
5 Jackson,p.22 
6 Ibid. p.119 
7 Ibid. p.120 
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remainder bilatera1.8 The issue of efficiency certainly played a part in 
this recommendation, but the fact that Australian firms lacked the 
interest and initiative to pursue multilateral development bank 
contracts, and because of the expense in the tendering process for such 
contracts, bilateral aid was favoured. As a consequence, the Australian 
aid programme had a much lower multilateral component than was the 
average for industrial country donors. 
The Jackson Report, therefore, provided a lengthy, if 
somewhat general, discussion on the relationship between aid and 
commercial gain. A commentary of this relationship which makes 
greater reference to the South Pacific, however, can be found in the 
report of Australia's Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
entitled Australia's Relations with the South Pacific.9 The region, it 
was noted, constituted a comparatively small proportion of Australian 
trade, as Australia has traditionally placed greater emphasis on trade 
relationships with major international partners in Europe, America and 
Asia. Australian exports to South Pacific Forum countries (excluding 
New Zealand) in 1987-1988 amounted to $AI025m and imports to 
$A228, which was a decrease on the previous year's levels. 10 
8 Ibid. p.66 
9 The Parliament ofthe Commonwealth of Australia Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade, Australia's relations with the South Pacific, Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1989. 
iO Foodstuffs, fuels, manufactured goods and machinery and transport equipment were 
Australia's major exports, with Papua New Guinea importing over 60 percent of these goods, and 
Fiii and French Polvnesia about 10 oercent each. The great majoritv of the region's exoorts to 
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Significantly, Australian investment in the regIOn had doubled 
between 1984 to 1989 from $A665m to $AI592, though $A1328m 
went to Papua New Guinea, predominantly in capital intensive mining. 
The remainder of the South Pacific, however, received only $A264m, 
which marked a notable decline since the late 1970s.11 
The link between Australian business and aid was briefly 
discussed in the report. The link, it was noted, was widely 
acknowledged and accepted. Australian aid, however, should not be 
viewed 'primarily' as a tool to improve market access for Australian 
goods and services, and aid must not be "used to provide an entree into 
the region for Australian companies.,,12 
Table 1: Country Programmes to the South Pacific, 1984-85 to 
1988-89 ($Am) 
Program Element Expenditure 
Country 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 
Fiji 11.5 12.1 12.7 13.4 22.0 
Solomon Islands 6.8 5.5 6.6 9.1 9.0 
Vanuatu 3.5 5.4 8.7 7.8 8.6 
Tonga 5.9 5.1 5.8 7.6 6.9 
Western Samoa 4.7 5.3 5.7 9.1 7.5 
Tuvalu 1.1 1.2 2.8 2.7 3.1 
Kiribati 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.7 3.1 
Cook Islands 0.9 0.4 1.0 1.3 0.9 
Niue 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 
Micronesia/Other 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Budget Support 299.0 302.8 304.5 275.0 275.0 
Programmed 3.1 4.1 7.7 9.9 14.1 
Activities 
Retirement 12.0 12.4 13.1 14.4 14.2 
Benefits 
Australia came from Papua New Guinea, a quarter from Nauru and just over 10 percent from Fiji, 
the majority of which was primary produce. Ibid, p36. For a fuller list of figures, see Australia's 
relations with the South Pacific, pp.36 to 41 
11 Ibid. p.48 
12 Ibid. p.76 
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PNGTotal 314.1 319.3 325.3 299.3 303.3 
Regional 
SPEC 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.9 
SPC 1.7 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.1 
FFA 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.6 
USP 4.4 4.6 6.0 3.5 3.7 
ACPAC 3.0 3.4 3.8 2.4 2.5 
Other 1.7 2.8 4.3 5.9 12.7 
Regional Total 363.8 372.7 397.2 369.9 388.3 
Source: Australian Parliament Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's 
Relations with the South Pacific, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989, p.58 
As the table suggests, with the exception of Papua New Guinea, 
Australia's aid programmes to the South Pacific are certainly not large. 
Statistics on Australian private investment and trade with each country 
was not available, but it seems logical to assume that aid increased in 
line with greater commercial benefits to Australia in the majority of 
these recipient nations for what effectively was a small fmancial outlay 
by the Australian tax payer. 
The final report covered, A Review of the Australian 
International Development Assistance Bureau and Australia's overseas 
aid program, 1989, contained a sizeable coverage of commercial 
interests. AIDAB, by this time, was putting considerable effort into 
improving the business community's awareness of the aid programme, 
through newsletters and seminars. As a consequence, Australian 
business and institutions were involved in virtually every aspect of 
country programme implementation: they provided the majority of 
machinery and equipment used in aid activities and Australian experts 
and consultants were designing, managing and staffmg more than 400 
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aid projects worldwide. The point that only Australian-owned 
consultancy ftnns were used in the aid programme was reiterated. This 
meant that, with the exception of Papua New Guinea's budget support, 
78 percent of total aid expenditure on goods and services were sourced 
in Australia, which in monetary terms, totalled some $A600 million.13 
A 20 percent procurement preference for Australian manufacturers and 
suppliers, introduced in the early 1980s, had a large part to play in 
facilitating the interest of Australian enterprises. In addition, the 
primary produce industries as well as educational institutions, it was 
pointed out, were key beneftciaries of the aid programme. 
The Development Import Finance Facility, Australia's mixed 
credit scheme, provided Australian businesses the opportunity to 
supply developmentally important goods and services to Third World 
countries. Mixed credits combine grant aid funds with commercial 
export credits to provide soft fmance. The result is a highly 
concessional fmance package for developing countries. DIFF had, by 
the end of the 1980s, become an important mechanism for Australian 
companies to compete in numbers of developing countries where the 
markets have been 'spoiled' by aid supported competition. Over 4 
percent of Australian aid expenditure, or $A40 million came from 
13 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade, A Review ofthe Australian International Development Assistance Bureau and 
Australia's Overseas Aid Program, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989, 
p.1l1 
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DIFF, which has made Australian offers highly competitive. 14 An 
increase of the DIFFIODA ratio, to 5 percent, was advocated, as a 
means of benefiting Australian business. 
Australia's multilateral component in its aid programme, it was 
noted, was lower than many other donors. Significantly, it was pointed 
out that the Australian private sector got back more than a dollar for 
every dollar channelled through the multilateral development banks. is 
Australia's procurement record in respect of multilateral assistance is 
less than laudable, because of a 'low key' attitude by Australia. 
Procurement through the major development banks offered 
considerable untapped commercial potential, and thus a 'concerted 
effort' to increase the success of Australian bids, through greater 
. . d·.c d d 16 aSSIstance to companies ten enng ~or contracts, was a vocate. 
The 'balanced pursuit' of Australian trade objectives and aid 
were still controversial, but were not incompatible provided the 
overriding concern was with effective development assistance. 
Interestingly, it was added that correlation between aid and trade was 
simply asserted by critics; and very little evidence was available to the 
Committee to prove the existence of the correlation. For instance, the 
number and value of consultancies engaged, and in what sectors; detail 
14 A Review of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau and Australia's 
Overseas Aid Program, p120 
15 Ibid. p.123 
16 Ibid. p.124 
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on additional follow-on contracts for the sale of goods and services; 
and trade spin-offs, it noted, needed to be available to demonstrate the 
benefit to Australian business from the aid programme. 17 
In a sense, this need for 'proof highlights several points. 
Firstly, that it is difficult to quantitatively assess the success of the aid 
programme's link: to commercial activities, though it must be assumed 
that the link: is worthwhile. This in turn, is a reflection of the need to 
have aid policy supported by the Australian public, so as to justifY the 
extent of money given to developing nations. Second, it marks the 
progression from 1976 to the end of the Cold War where the link: had 
transformed from being scarcely mentioned at all to a time when it had 
come to be seen as not only part of the aid programme, but a 
'legitimate' one at that. 
3.3 SECURITY MOTIVATIONS: 
That Australia's aid to the South Pacific is in part a result of 
broad security concerns by Australia is evident in the various reports 
published between 1978 and 1989. A closer examination of these 
reports, however, reveals that perhaps too much is made of this basis. 
Australia and the South Pacific, 1978, in essence, large side steps the 
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issue. Mention is made of the ill-fated attempts of the Soviet Union 
and China to establish missions in Port Moresby, a consequence of a 
growing awareness of the region by external, 'hostile' countries, itself 
a result of decolonisation. Such interference was not in Australia's best 
interests, because a 'military capacity' could have been established in 
the region that could not only 'threaten or harass' Australia, but 
jeopardise important American and Japanese sea routes, though the 
likelihood of this was deemed 'arguable' at best. IS Interestingly, the 
Committee felt it necessary to respond to the claim of the link between 
security and aid: "In reply it was pointed out to the Committee that the 
planning to increase Australian assistance ... was commenced well 
before the Soviet and Chinese initiatives, as was the decision to 
implement the program.,,19 
Nevertheless, the USSR had established non-resident diplomatic 
relations with Fiji in 1974, and Tonga and Western Samoa in 1976, 
which suggests that the increased Australian aid programme in 1976 
must have been influenced by these developments. 
The Jackson Report contained greater reference to the issue of 
security. It was noted that: 
17 A Review ofthe Australian futemational Development Assistance Bureau and Australia's 
Overseas Aid Program,p.118 
18 Australia and the South Pacific, pp.12-15 
19 Jackson, p.39 
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Successive Australian governments have seen the South 
Pacific region as having fundamental strategic importance 
to Australia. Australia needs to communicate across the 
region with its allies and trading partners, to move freely 
within the region, and to have access to its ports and 
facilities. Above all, Australia wants a region which is 
independent, cohesive and free of superpower rivalries. 
Political or economic crises that destable the region would 
be most unfortunate.2o 
The importance of Papua New Guinea's security to Australia, clearly 
demonstrated during World War II, is addressed and it is added that "It 
is in Australia's direct interests that political stability be preserved 
within Papua New Guinea, and that neither great nor medium-power 
rivalries become a dominant factor in the international relations of the 
area. ,,21 That aid can contribute, if only in a small way, to the 
preservation of stability in the region, however, is emphasised. The 
Jackson Report, though, did not address the security consideration 
behind aid to the extent that it did commercial motivations, and the 
1989 report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
trade, Australia's Relations with the South Pacific, is certainly a more 
useful guide to the importance Australia accorded to security concerns. 
Soviet Union and Libyan inroads into the region are examined 
in the 1989 report. In July 1986, the then Soviet leader, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, in a now famous speech signalled a greater interest and 
involvement by the USSR in the Pacific Ocean region. Although 
20 Jackson, p.177 
21 Ibid. p.146 
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much of the speech focused on the economic prospects for the Soviet 
Far-East and relations with the major North Pacific powers, it served 
to confirm the growing Soviet interest in the South Pacific. This 
interest was demonstrated by increased diplomatic and commercial 
overtures in the 1970s, which were to intensify in the 1980s. 
Understandably, Soviet inroads were met with alarm in some quarters, 
but the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade concluded 
that the Soviet Union was adopting a relatively low-key approach to 
the region. It was prepared to capitalise on opportunities as they 
presented themselves to gain additional contact and influence in the 
region, it was noted, but there was little convincing evidence of a 
Soviet 'grand plan' for the region.22 
The Soviet approach to the South Pacific was labelled as 
'opportunistic', as evidenced by the Soviet Union and its fishing 
agreements with Kiribati in 1985 and Vanuatu in 1987. Concern was 
raised at the reputation of Soviet fishing vessels for reconnaissance, 
communication and intelligence collection. Both agreements lasted 
only one year and, importantly, contained no provision was made for 
on-shore Soviet facilities. The Committee came to the conclusion that 
"Soviet interest in fishing was motivated by both political and 
commercial reasons, and that in reaching a commercial decision it 
22 Australia's relations with the South Pacific, p.184 
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sought to exploit that for whatever political advantage was possible.,,23 
It was mentioned, however, that both Kiribati and Vanuatu entered 
into the fishing agreements for economic reasons. 
Libyan encroachment into the region during 1986 and 1987 was 
a great concern for Australia. The training in Libya of dissidents from 
Vanuatu and members of the militant faction within FLNKS, the 
Kanak United Liberation Front (FULK), and diplomatic relations with 
the former, heightened Australian suspicions . .The Committee was 
unclear as to Libya's aim: 
Some have suggested that Libya was acting as a proxy of 
the USSR and was seeking to foster anti-Western sentiment 
and internal instability in the region. Others have 
suggested that Libya sees the South Pacific as an area 
where, for a relatively small outlay, a great deal of trouble 
can be caused to Libya's two greatest enemies - the United 
States and France.24 
Mention of the declining influence of Libya for 'mischief-maki~g' was 
made, as was a need for vigilance to ensure that it never regained its 
gains in the region. 
It is profitable at this stage to examme how Australian 
responded to the challenges to the region's security from Soviet and 
Libyan activity. In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union was unsuccessful 
in establishing a diplomatic mission in Papua New Guinea. With 
Australia's close defence cooperation ties, and as Papua New Guinea's 
23 Australia's relations with the South Pacific, p.186 
24 Ibid. p.191 
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largest aid donor, it is likely that aid was used as a tool to persuade a 
change in attitude on the part of Australia's closest neighbour. In the 
case of the Soviet and Libyan overtures to the region in the middle and 
later years of the 1980s, the relationship between aid levels and 
security concerns is less clear. Certainly, in the case of Vanuatu, with 
its fishing agreement with the Soviet Union in 1987 and its links with 
Libya at the time, a noticeable increase in aid from Australia is 
evident. In 1984-85, $A3 million of programme aid was made 
available to Vanuatu, which increased to $A5.5 million one year later, 
and to $A8.7 million in 1986-87. By 1987-88 the level had tailed off 
slightly, to $A 7.8 million, though a slight increase was evident in 
1989?5 
In the case of the Soviet-Kiribati fishing deal of 1985, there is 
little evidence of Australia using aid to influence the foreign policy 
directions of the Micronesia nation. Indeed, the level of assistance 
remained static, at $A2.4 million for 1984-85 to 1985-86, followed by 
a slight increase in the following year to $A2.8 million?6 This pattern, 
however, merits comment. It highlights, above all, the fact that it is 
difficult, statistically, to see strong correlations between aid volume 
and an independent nation's 'foreign policy initiatives, which challenge 
2S Australia's relations with the South Pacific, p.58 
26 Ibid. p.58 
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the donor's own security interests. Australia certainly was concerned 
by Kiribati's decision to enter into a fishing agreement with the Soviet 
Union.27 As the region's major donor at the time, as well a key player 
in regional affairs, Australia did exert a great deal of influence on 
Japan to increase its aid flows to Kiribati after 1985. If Japan had not 
done so, it was likely that Australia, or the United States or Japan 
would have played a greater role in meeting the demands of the former 
British colony. While this is speculation, it does indicate a degree of 
coordination exists on the part of aid donors to the region to ensure 
that Western security interests are accommodated. 
The evidence of the nexus between Australian aid levels and 
threats to the region's security from foreign nations, while not 
compelling, reveals one of the central tenets of Australian aid 
diplomacy. It is profitable, however, to examine internal crises within 
island states, particularly Fiji, to test the security-aid nexus further. 
The military coup in Fiji in May 1987 presented the Australian 
government with its biggest dilemma in the history of regional 
relations. Australia's reaction was strong in its condemnation, and its 
government, it is noted, quickly moved to suspend aid and military 
cooperation. A host of economic sanctions were also imposed on Fiji. 
Australia, however, subsequently moderated its approach, motivated 
27 See, U.F. Neemia-Mackenzie, "Russophobia and Self-Determination", in R. Walker and W. 
Sutherland (eds), The Pacific: Peace, Security and the Nuclear Issue, Tokyo: UN University 
Studies on Peace and Security, United Nations University, 1988, pp.196-198 
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by the lack of condemnation or action against Fiji by other regional 
countries, the lessening of Australia's ability to influence events within 
Fiji due to much reduced contact with the new regime, and the 
restoration a civilian government of sortS.28 
By January 1988, however, Australian civil aid to Fiji was 
subsequently resumed and steps were taken to normalise relations. The 
Committee believed that there were obvious limits to the extent to 
which Australia could have exerted influence in Fiji to support the 
democratic humanitarian values that Australia espouses: 
Diplomatic and economic pressure can achieve only a 
limited amount, and may in some cases prevent access and 
dialogue that may lead to a more moderate line being 
taken. The fact remains that Australia is dealing with a 
sovereign nation, and that ultimately the self-interest and 
concerns of those in power in that country will dictate what 
29 path they choose to follow. 
Significantly, Australia used aid as a lever for reform in Fiji in early 
1988, by linking an additional $AI0 million to 'political, 
constitutional, economic and social developments in Fiji, including 
human rights'. 30 The Committee was quite critical of the additional aid 
package, believing that it, by implication, endorsed the status quo in 
Fiji and indirectly assist a government to ameliorate the disastrous 
economic effects of its own making. Conversely, had the Australian 
28 Australia's relations with the South Pacific, p.211 
29 Ibid. p.215 
30 Ibid, pp21-216 
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government not proceeded with the package, it would have alienated 
the regime in Suva even further which would have made it the subject 
of regional criticism of trying to buy influence with aid.31 Those 
democratic, politically stable states in the region, which only gained a 
moderate aid increase in 1988, had a right to feel aggrieved. Overall, 
the Committee believed that Australia should not have linked the 
supplementary aid to improvements in the internal political situation of 
Fiji, as the assessment of 'improvements' was so subjective that it 
proved pointless. Consequently, 
The Committee urges that the way in which supplementary 
aid was supplied to Fiji be avoided in future if similar 
situations occur elsewhere. Care should be taken in future 
to avoid placing conditions on recipient countries that are 
difficult to assess, and impossible to enforce.32 
The security of the South Pacific, therefore, is an important 
concern for Australia, and this concern is reflected in its aid 
programme. That the region has largely remained pro-Western and 
democratic was seen as a 'happy coincidence', but the uncertainty of 
the future, was a cause for concern. The region was deemed a central 
region in Australia's own defence policy, to the extent that Australia 
was to see itself as a 'big brother' to the numerous island states. In 
reality, however, the threats to the region from outside or intra-
31 Australia's relations with the South Pacific, p.216 
32 Ibid. p.217 
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regional conflict are, in the Committee's words, 'slight'. The greatest 
security risk would come from domestic internal instability.33 
Certainly, the Fiji situation in 1987, which did not meet with 
Australian approval, did "not necessarily endanger Australia's own 
security or the interests of the Western alliance." Had it done so, 
Australia's response, using aid as a powerful tool, presumably would 
have been more demonstrative. 
While not devoting a good deal of time to the question of the 
role aid plays in meeting Australia's own security concerns, the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia's Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade's 1989 report, A Review of the 
Australian International Development Assistance Bureau and 
Australia's Overseas Aid Program, is nevertheless interesting for 
several reasons. It labels aid as a 'blatant instrument' for achieving 
specific foreign policy objectives, which indicates that aid to the South 
Pacific had evolved since 1976 to incorporate the a range of 
motivations, among them keeping the region secure from meddlesome 
activities of outsiders.34 While these included China, in the 1978 
report, Australia and the South Pacific, which thereafter received no 
mention, and Libya in the mid 1980s, the real concern was the new-
33 Australia's relations with the South Pacific p.149 
34 A Review of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau and Australia'S 
Overseas Aid Program, p.127 
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found interest of the Soviet Union in the region. This, after all, was the 
era of the Cold War, and as submissions to the various reviews 
attested, there was a widespread fear, often unfounded, that the USSR 
had grand designs for the region. While the paranoia of AIDAB 
officials and their governmental colleagues in Foreign Affairs and 
Defence may not have matched that of members of the Australian 
public, the uncertainty regarding the true motivations of the Soviet 
Union was an ever-present dilemma for the former. 
The other notable point made in the 1989 review was that, 
unlike some of the commercial effects of aid, the benefits to 
Australia's foreign relations and strategic interests are not 
quantifiable.35 That Australian aid to the South Pacific did increase 
tremendously after 1976 does suggest that Australia's security fears 
were a central tenet of the aid philosophy at the time. Though, 
statistically, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which aid programmes 
were motivated by these said fears, the official reviews, as seen, did 
indicate a growing awareness of this dimension of aid diplomacy. 
From attempts to make very clear that no such link between aid and 
security existed, in 1978, the reviews mirrored the transformation in 
thinking that saw aid openly acknowledged as a 'blatant instrument' 
by the end of the Cold War. 
35 A Review of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau and Australia's 
Overseas Aid Program, p.126 
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It has been shown, therefore, that commercial and security 
factors were key determinants in Australia's aid philosophy from 1976 
to the end of the Cold War. Security and commercial considerations 
alone, however, were part of wider aims, and need to be understood in 
this context. Obviously, the defence of Australia was ftrst and 
foremost, but a commitment by Australia to the Western Alliance, 
through the likes of ANZUS, helped shape Australian aid diplomacy. 
To be successful in this role, Australia had to improve its relations 
with the region. As the offtcial reports show, Australia's reputation in 
the international arena has always a concern of aid policy-makers. 
The 1978 report by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, Australia and the South Paciftc, which signalled 
Australia's 'new awareness' of the region, reflected in a 'broadened' 
and a 'more positive' relationship with the many island states. 
Decolonisation in the region, necessitated a new devotion by Australia, 
inspired in part by the meddling of China and the Soviet Union, but 
also because of a sense of obligation to meet the needs of the newly-
independent states: 
By virtue of our size and past history of involvement in the 
South Pacific we have inherited and accepted a 
commitment as a neighbour, to make a genuine and 
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worthwhile contribution to the national and regional 
development of the South Pacific community.36 
Australia's 'tarnished' image in the region, because of a number of 
dubious business ventures by Australian nationals, and its 'belated' aid 
programme in comparison with other donors, were used to indicate the 
need for Australia to make more of a contribution to the region. 
Australia had no wish to 'dominate or dictate' Pacific nations, and was 
conscious of paying close attention to its 'special and close' 
relationship with Papua New Guinea, although not creating the 
impression that it saw the rest of the region as 'secondary,.3? 
The 1978 report, then, showed the degree to which Australia 
was conscious of its reputation within the region, particularly criticism 
of its past involvement, and the greatly increased aid package of 1976 
was used herald in a new relationship with the region. The social and 
economIc 'advancement' of individual countries through aid 
programmes, however, was as much to do with 'increased 
international opinion' to the effect that Australian needed to make a 
greater contribution to the South Pacific. 
The Jackson Report reveals a growing sense of Australian 
identity with the region, because of its status as the major aid donor 
and trade partner which created a 'highly visible presence'. Australia 
36 Australia and the South Pacific, pp.1l-12 
37 Ibid. p.5 
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had assumed a role as "the 'proximate 'big' power which gives it a 
certain authority and a concomitant responsibility". 38 This 
'responsibility', it would appear, had as much to do with catering to 
the needs of the islands as it did with Australia's reputation on the 
world stage, reiterating the philosophy of the 1978 report: 
Australia's international credibility, particularly in 
relations with major allies, rests partly on its ability to be 
involved in and to understand the region and to have 
influence with island states on matters of regional and 
international concern such as decolonisation and nuclear 
testing. Other countries, rich and poor, see Australia as 
having an obligation to assist small and economically weak 
neighbours in the South Pacific. 39 
Interestingly, the neither 'dictate or dominate' stance of the 1978 
report was replaced by the benefits of 'influence' over the region, 
particularly at the height of the discord over nuclear-testing. 
'Influence', too, presumably extended to efforts to prevent a stronger 
Soviet or Libyan foothold in the region, though the report did not 
name them directly. Instead, mention was 'great or medium rivals' .40 
That the aid programme could serve the national interest in a 
multitude of ways was addressed in the Jackson Report. It was stated 
that aid would enhance Australia's status in countries of strategic 
significance, though, again, Papua New Guinea was the only nation 
38 Jackson, p.183 
39 Ibid. p.l77 
40 Ibid. p.146 
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named. It is clear, however, that the benefits of aid were well 
understood: 
For Australia, stability in Asia and the Pacific is of special 
significance. Aid can contribute, if only in a small way, to 
the preservation of this stability. More broadly, aid serves 
Australian foreign policy interests by contributing to the 
maintenance of its good standing as a member of tbe world 
community. However, aid is at times taken for granted and 
its cessation - or even reduction - can damage relations 
between donor and recipient. It is therefore important that 
aid decisions are closely integrated with foreign policy, 
witbout jeopardising development objectives. 41 
It is in this context, that the discussion on the balance between 
multilateral and bilateral aid is most easily understood. It has been 
illustrated in the above discussion on commercial motivations (3.2) 
that Australia has a preference for bilateral aid, particularly because it 
enables the donor to have political influence and economic advantages, 
especially when the donor nation is the principal donor.42 The 
multilateral component for aid, though justified largely on the grounds 
that it can be more efficient than bilateral aid because large 
international organisations tend to be more highly specialised, exists 
for another reason: "Australia's [multilateral] contributions should be 
seen as supporting the international character of global, sectoral and 
regional forums and agencies.,,43 While reference to Pacific regional 
41 Jackson, pp.22-23 
42 Ibid. pp.65-66 
43 Ibid., p.67 
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agencies was not mentioned, it can be assumed that this rationale was 
an important consideration in the final formulation of aid budgets. 
Australia's Relations with the South Pacific (1989) reveals in 
greater detail many of the statements made in the Jackson Report, 
because of its sole focus on the region. The 'benign, paternalistic 
fashion' and general disinterest which characterised Australia's links 
with the region prior to the mid-1970s, had been transformed by a 
number of events in the 1980s. These "have brought the changing 
nature of the region home to public and government alike in a very 
powerful way and forced a reappraisal of policy toward the region.,,44 
They included the increased interest by the super-powers, particularly 
the USSR, and other non-Pacific nations, such as Libya, continued 
conflict in New Caledonia, civil disturbance in Vanuatu and two coup 
d'etat in Fiji. 
"The furtherance of a favourable strategic situation III the 
South-West Pacific,,45, one of Australia's principal national defence 
interests, was justified along similar lines to the Jackson Report. 
Essentially, Australia's lines of communication with Japan, its major 
trading partner, and the United States, its major ally, ran through the 
region. Any 'unfriendly maritime power' in the region would, 
therefore, pose a risk to Australia's east coast which contain its major 
44 Australia's relations with the South Pacific, p.5 
45 Ibid p145, from the Defence White Paper, The Defence of Australia, March 1987 
74 
cities, and jeopardise the United States' ability to supply military 
equipment in the unlikely event of conflict.46 
It was argued that Australia has been labelled a 'big brother' 
seeking to impose on the Pacific the Western Alliance viewpoint, and 
identifying with the United States interests rather than the Pacific 
concerns about economic survival. In answer to such criticism, the 
Committee revealed much about its approach to the region: 
While this criticism may have been valid in the past, there 
is evidence that Australia is moving to adopt a more 
sensitive, pro-Pacific stance, and seeking to use its influence 
to attempt to ameliorate US actions. Pressure on the US to 
reach an agreement with the region on tuna fishing, and 
Australian support of the South PacifIc Nuclear Free Zone 
are two examples of Australia wanting to work for the 
• 47 
regIOn. 
The Committee did, however, go on to reveal where Australia's 
loyalty lay: 
It is a fact, and must be recognised as such, that Australia 
by virtue of its history, culture and political attitudes, 
remains firmly a member of the Western alliance and that 
there is a strong correlation in Australia's interest and the 
interests of her major allies. To this extent, and also by 
virtue of her size and power, both economic and military, 
Australia will always stand somewhat apart from the other 
Pacific island countries, but hopefully will form a bridge 
between the super-powers and the small PacifIc states.48 
46 Australia's relations with the South Pacific. p.145 
47 Ibid p.147 
48 Ibid. p.147 
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Greater contact with individual countries, it is argued, 
encourages in them a pro-Western outlook as does participation in the 
many regional organisations, especially the South Pacific Commission 
and the South Pacific Forum, 'to strengthen its ties of friendship with 
each of the countries'. 49 Indeed, this desire to work more closely with 
the region is evident in a speech by the then Australian Foreign 
Minister, Senator G. Evans, in 1988 which put forward the 'newly 
thought-through Australian policy approach' to the South Pacific 
region. The strategy of 'constructive commitment' as he put it 
involved closer cooperation and the creation of a regional approach to 
situations, internal and external, which put regional stability at risk. 50 
As the Cold War era drew to a close, Australia's obligations to 
the 'Western Alliance' had played an integral role in shaping its aid 
philosophy. At the same time, an increased sense being part of the 
South Pacific was evident. The end result was a dilemma: 
The continuing fluidity of the relationship between 
Australia and the region will require sensitive handling and 
management, to avoid Australia being either seen as a 'big 
brother', attempting to dictate to the region, or 
alternatively as wishing to distance itself from the region 
and remaining uninvolved, should Australia hold back 
from proffering assistance and advice.51 
49 Australia's relations with the South Pacific. p.165 
50 Ibid. p.166 
51 Ibid. 0.223 
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That such a dilemma arose is an indication of the transfonnation that 
had taken place since 1976, when the South Pacific aid programme 
was effectively quadrupled. From a 'benign' relationship at this time, 
to the 'big brother' role a mere 13 years later, Australia had developed 
a dual obligation to both its immediate region, the South Pacific, and 
to the Western Alliance, particularly through ANZUS. That dual 
obligation, arguably, was as much about wanting to be seen to be 
playing its part. It was, as the reports suggested, all too aware of 
criticism of its role in international affairs, and was, to an extent, 
guided by it. As a middle power, playing a key role in the region, as 
the major aid donor, gave it a fair degree of pride, though its sense of 
duty to 'major powers', predominantly the United States, was its first 
priority. Aid to the region constituted a minute amount of Australia's 
wealth and, with the exception of Papua New Guinea, a relatively 
small part of its total aid budget. Yet, it was to be an important source 
of development assistance for a number of South Pacific nations, and 
in some cases, there largest donor. Aid, therefore, proved to be a most 
cost-effective foreign policy tool, and one that gave it a great return 
within the region. 
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3.5 HUMANITARIAN MOTIVATIONS: 
The discussion thus far has focused on the commercial, 
security motivations as well as Australia's reputation within the region 
and beyond. It has been shown that these are interconnected, and have 
all, to varying extents, shaped Australia's aid programme to the South 
Pacific. It must be stressed, however, that while self-interest, in the 
above fonus, certainly shaped the aid philosophy, that a humanitarian 
element was a guiding principle outlined in the various reports. 
The 1978 report, Australia and the South Pacific, makes very 
clear that humanitarian concerns, expressed in terms of the social and 
economic 'advancement' of the peoples of the region, were the key 
detenuinant behind the aid programme. It should be noted, however, 
that because of its understating of commercial and strategic 
motivations, that humanitarianism would be overplayed. The need to 
guide the Pacific nations in their development was a central theme of 
the report. 
The Jackson Report of 1984 contained a more lengthy 
discussion on the humanitarian basis behind the aid programme. Aid, it 
is stated, has a moral justification firmly based on the practices of the 
major religions. Its basic principles were outlined: a desire to eliminate 
starvation, relieve malnutrition and eradicate disease; distress at the 
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existence of poverty; a sense of kinship and responsibility for the 
human community, particularly its poorest members; and a belief that 
a more just and equal world would be more stable and peaceful. 52 The 
latter, it is added, reflected Australian self-interest: "Greater equity 
with higher living standards and a fairer income distribution will bring 
about a more secure world with greater economic opportunities for 
all. ,,53 The faster development occurs, it is argued, the better 
Australia's strategic and economic interests will be served. In all, over 
65 percent of Australians supported assisting developing countries. 54 
Australia's Relations with the South Pacific, 1989, provided a 
limited coverage of the humanitarian factors behind Australian aid. 
Economic progress, it was argued, would bring about social and 
political stability. While not sidestepping the issue, it was content to 
reiterate the essential argument articulated in the Jackson Report: 
Jackson argued that development of a country, and hence 
improvements in the living standards of its people, could 
only be achieved through economic growth. A corollary to 
this argument is the assumption that economic self-reliance 
is attainable by all countries if the appropriate 
developmental policies are followed.55 
52 Jackson, p.19 
53 Ibid. p.19 
54 Jackson, p.20. For a fuller discussion of the attitudes of Australians to their country's aid 
programme, see G. McCall (ed), Arguing for Aid: Some Australian Voices, Kensington, NSW: 
Centre for South Pacific Studies, the University of New South Wales, 1992 (Pacific Studies 
Monograph No.5) 
55 Australia's relations with the South Pacific, p55 
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The 'growth with equity' approach expounded by Jackson, had been 
replaced by a more realistic approach to the region's potential for 
development. The end-point of development, economic self-
sufficiency, it was noted, just was not possible in every country. The 
Cook Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru and Niue were singled out as 
being countries where economic development should no longer be the 
chief determinant, and a changed emphasis towards improving the 
'quality of life' was seen as more appropriate. Only Papua New 
Guinea and Fiji were regarded as capable of independent and self-
sustaining economic growth. The Solomon Islands, Western Samoa, 
Vanuatu and Tonga, were awkwardly labelled as countries which fitted 
not into either category, though economic self-sufficiency in the long-
'b'l' 56 term was a POSSI 1 lty. 
A Review of the Australian International Development 
Assistance Bureau and Australia's Oversea's Aid Program, 1989, 
provides a greater coverage of the poverty focus of aid than the 
Jackson Report. The debate between those who see that aid 
programmes should focus on poverty and those who see that economic 
growth should be the basis of aid was outlined, and it was noted that 
"growth and equity are compatible goals ... ,,57 The particular 
56 Jackson, pp.60-61 
57 A Review of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau and Australia's 
Overseas Aid Program, p.17 
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conditions of a recipient country should dictate the nature of its aid 
programme, but the first priority should be a contribution to its social 
d . 58 an economIc progress. 
By the end of the Cold War, therefore, an Australian ODA 
philosophy, characterised by the connection between security and 
commercial considerations, the role Australia saw itself playing in 
international affairs, a growing realisation of Australia's place within 
the region and a host of humanitarian justifications, had emerged. As 
will be shown, Japan shared similar motivations for giving aid to the 
South Pacific, though there were marked differences. 
58 A Review of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau and Australia's 
Overseas Aid Program. 013 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
JAPANESE FOREIGN AID TO THE 
SOUTH PACIFIC IN THE COLD WAR ERA 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION: 
Japan's ascendancy from a position as a minor regional aid 
donor in the late 1970s to one where it had caught up with Australia as 
the South Pacific's largest supplier of ODA by the end of the 1980s 
took many by surprise. 1 In 1980, only 0.6 percent of Japan's bilateral 
aid found its way to the island states. Thirteen years later, however, that 
amount was to almost quadruple, a ten-fold increase in real terms, given 
Japan's rise into the position of the world's largest aid donor. 2 
What accounted for this massive transformation in Japan's 
involvement with the South Pacific? Chapter Two has shown that Japan 
was part of an international movement which saw developed countries 
provide ODA for the 'advancement' of Third World nations in the 
aftermath of World War II. It was also highlighted that Japan has had a 
long-standing connection with the South Pacific dating back several 
centuries, which indicated that Japan's involvement within the region as 
an aid donor was in many ways a logical development. For the purposes 
of analysis, Japan's motivations for assuming the role of aid donor are 
categorised in this chapter into a number of separate, though inter-
I Even the official reports on Australian aid during this time, including the Jackson Report 
(page 180) and the 1989 review, Australia's relations with the South Pacific, (page 192) suggested 
that Japan was playing a larger role in the region but did not indicate an awareness ofthe extent to 
which it was increasing its aid levels. This was inspite of the fact that by the mid 1980s, Japan had 
established itself as the region's fourth largest donor, behind only the United States, France and 
Australia, superseding New Zealand and Britain in the process. 
2 Between 1975 and 1990, Japan's South Pacific aid commitments increased from US$5 million to 
US$1l4 million. I Takeda, " Japan's Aid to the Pacific Island States", in B. Koppel and R.M Orr 
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related, sections: Commercial and security considerations, the 
importance of Japan's international reputation, its affinity with the 
region, and finally, humanitarian considerations. These are assessed to 
highlight the complexity of Japan's aid philosophy and its 
transformation over time. In addition, the categories were selected to 
provide a basis for comparison with Australia, as alluded to in the 
Introduction, which is the focus of Chapter Six. 
4.2 COMMERCIAL MOTIVATIONS: 
4.2.1 Japan's Demand for Marine Resources and Fisheries Grant 
Aid: 
The genesis of Japan's aid programme to the South Pacific was, 
to a large extent, founded on commercial considerations, principally a 
need for fish by one of the world's foremost distant-water fisheries 
nations. Any analysis of the evolution of Japanese foreign aid to the 
South Pacific, therefore, must take as its starting point the fact that the 
region has played a central role in meeting the daily dietary needs of 
Japanese nationals, dating back to the time of its colonial presence in 
Micronesia. Due to its own heavily exploited coastal fisheries and 
limited land, Japan is incapable of producing enough non-fish protein 
reds], Japan's Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp.229-
230 
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for the national diet, and has relied, therefore, on fishing abroad. 
Japanese nationals, it must be emphasised, are the world's highest per 
capita consumers of fish products, to the extent that fish as a source of 
animal protein was as high as 51 percent in the early 1970s. Moreover, 
Japan was dependent on the Pacific for as much as 85 percent of its 
total tuna catch in 1975? 
The viability of fishing ill the South Pacific, however, was 
seriously challenged in 1977 in the form of a new legal framework 
governing international jurisdiction over marine resources, which led to 
the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).4 Japan had fiercely 
fought their creation 5 as it stood to be profoundly affected by their 
introduction,6 but its efforts proved fruitless. In the late 1970s, most 
newly-independent Pacific island nations formed EEZs that measured 
3 I. Takeda, "Japan's Aid to the Pacific Island States", in B. Koppel and R.M. Orr reds], 
Japan's Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, p.232 
4 The development of the EEZ concept had its origins in the early years after the Second World 
War, but international consensus on detail, particularly the extent ofEEZs, dogged its progress. As a 
consequence, the United Nations General Assembly resolved in 1970 to convene a conference on the 
Law of the Sea to settle these issues. The formal sessions of the conference lasted almost ten years, 
but the EEZ issue was resolved in principle by 1977. Pacific Island countries declared their 200-mile 
zones between 1977 and 1979, with only Fiji (1981) and Tuvalu (1984) not doing so until the 1980s. 
Access agreements were concluded with Papua New Guinea, Kiribati and Solomon Islands in 1977. 
These were followed by the French territories in 1979, and the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the 
Federated States of Micronesia in 1981. For a fuller examination, as well as analysis ofJapan's own 
stance on the issue, see S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, Suva: mstitute of 
Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1998, pp.74-97 
5Japan was a constant critic of EEZs in the Law of the Seas conferences. Japan favoured 
unrestricted high seas fishing, but found itself increasingly isolated in the lead up to the 1977 
resolution. Because of its' need for fish, Japan wanted EEZs to be as small as possible. As time 
progressed, however, Japan's stance softened towards 'conditional acceptance' of EEZs, due to 
international condemnation. 
636 percent ofJapanese fishing catches were affected by the creation ofEEZs, and this meant 
that the cost of access would be passed on to Japanese nationals whose fish intake was four times the 
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in total about 20 million square kilometres, which in effect was many 
times the countries' land area. Shock-waves spread quickly through the 
Japanese fishing industry which reached government ministries. Fishing 
access agreements became a necessity within Pacific nations' territorial 
waters, and it is in this context, that the catalyst for Japanese foreign aid 
to the region can be found.· 
Foreign aid to the reglOn, in the form of fisheries grant aid 
projects/ was a direct response to the creation of EEZs. While in part 
fisheries grant aid served as a means of assisting the promotion of 
fisheries in developing countries, its real purpose was as a tool in the 
negotiation of fisheries agreements. Because of regional dissatisfaction 
with the rate of return offered by Japanese industry, fisheries grant aid 
served as a compromise between the demand for higher fees and what 
industry was prepared to pay. According to Tarte: 
Fisheries grant aid thus became part of a strategy of 
modifying, through negotiation, 'restrictive coastal state 
policies'. In order to protect the interests of the fishing 
industry, the role of aid would be to 'smooth' access 
negotiations - that is, provide additional incentives for 
global average. I. Takeda, "Japan's Aid to the Pacific Island States", in B. Koppel and R.M. Orr 
(eds), Japan's Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, p.232 
7 ill 1973, with the commencement of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, the Japanese 
government created a special fisheries grant allocation within its ODA budget. While initially small 
-about 6 percent of the ODA budget - it soon became an integral part of Japan's strategy of 
protecting its fishing industry after the creation ofEEZs. 
The creation of EEZs hastened a number of changes within Japan's government. New 
administrative demands, particularly negotiating fishing access agreements and regulating overseas 
fishing ventures, led to the restructuring and renaming in 1978 of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries to reflect the enhanced role of fisheries. ill addition, the Overseas Fisheries 
Cooperation Foundation (OFCF) was established to support private sector fisheries cooperation with 
developed and developing countries. 
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coastal states to conclude access agreements with Japan. For 
this reason, it was important to establish a separate aid 
allocation ... which would be closely tied to the access 
t ' t' 8 nego Ia IOns. 
The long-established and powerful fishing industry, so important to the 
functioning of Japan, needed assistance from its government in the 
wake of the creation of EEZs, and fisheries grant aid was, in effect, 
used as an indirect subsidy to maintain the effectiveness of the industry. 
Fisheries grant aid, however, was multidimensional. On a 
diplomatic level, it was designed to be a gesture of goodwill, and 
served to build friendly relations between Japan and the region. It 
should be noted, however, that in the 1970s, economic goals were 
given precedence over diplomatic aims, and to great effect. Pacific 
island officials observed that while they sometimes sought aid to 
establish domestic fishing industries, the Japanese government was 
reluctant to provide aid that had the potential to create competition in 
the region for its fishing fleets. The precedence of Japanese interests 
over the preferences of the recipients has remained a constant feature 
of Japan's aid programme to the region.9 Furthermore, fisheries grant 
aid could be provided in anticipation of access agreements being 
concluded, often at the request of Japanese fisheries industry 
representatives, which enabled some Japanese vessels to gain bargafu 
8 S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, p.84 
9 For a fuller discussion, see S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, p.96 
86 
prices for licensing fees 10. All countries in the region, from the largest, 
Papua New Guineal1 , to the smallest,· Tuvalu, have at times 
experienced pressure from Japan regarding fisheries access 
agreements. Aid has, on occasion, been suspended when access 
agreements have not been to Japan's liking. 12 The fact too, that since 
the 1970s, Japan operated almost exclusively on a bilateral basis with 
island governments, enabled it to play one island off against another at 
the negotiation table. 13 It can be seen, therefore, that fisheries grant aid 
has overwhelmingly proved a particularly successful means by which 
10 The Japanese government denies that there is a link between fisheries grant aid and fishing 
access agreements, but does admit that the state of a nation's fisheries relationship with Japan would 
influence the priority of a development project. This comes through clearly in the words of a senior 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official: "" .as budgetary limitation exists and while plenty of 
requests are received, there is a possibility that, in order to decide acceptance or priority of each 
request, the situation of the fishing relationship between the country [and Japan] might be 
considered." R. Grynberg, "The Tuna Dilemma", Pacific Islands Monthly, Volume 63, Number 5, 
May 1993, p.9 
11 Papua New Guinea and Japan began a lengthy and ultimately unsuccessful period of 
negotiation in July 1985 to review their access agreement. Throughout, the promise of aid, and 
conversely the withholding of aid, was used to pressure PNG. 
12 A Japanese-funded boat building project, for example, was cut offwhen Fiji refused to sign a 
bilateral access agreement. This was in line with the stance of the Japanese government that further 
provision of fisheries grant aid would depend on Fiji entering into an access agreement with Japan. 
Tarte has suggested that the pressure placed on Fiji, in particular, was part of a plan to undermine the 
regional support for a multilateral access agreement with Japan, because Fiji, in diplomatic terms, 
was seen as a regional 'opinion leader'. It was hoped, then, that by concluding an access agreement 
with Fiji, Japan could encourage other countries to continue with bilateral arrangements. S. Tarte, 
Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, pp.118-121 
13 Japan has been successful in creating disunity in the region with regard to access agreements. 
The Federated States of Micronesia, for example, a key fishing partner of Japan, has made it quite 
clear that its preference is for keeping access arrangements bilateral. By keeping negotiations 
bilateral, Japan is able to exploit divisions between states to maximise its bargaining power. 
Another interesting example of disunity with links to access agreements came at the 
height of the debate over drift and gill net fishing. Japan was able to persuade New Caledonia to 
break ranks with other island nations and allow uninhibited access for its ships to fish in the latter's 
EEZ by offering increased aid as an incentive. 
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the Japanese government has been able to exploit the region's 
abundance of marine resources. 
What also makes aid so prudent an investment for Japan is the 
extent to which it is economically sound. Japanese vessels, it is 
estimated, pay only about $19 million under bilateral access 
agreements, which is equivalent to between 4.5 and 5.5 percent of the 
catch value. 14 Furthermore, what so often appears, superficially, to be 
a project designed to greatly benefit the recipient nation, can over the 
long-term be of tremendous benefit to the Japanese fishing industry. 15 
The extent of project-tied grant aid, a key aspect of Japanese aid 
policy since the 1950s, further highlights the benefits of aid to Japan. 
All contracts must be carried out by Japanese nationals, so as to prevent 
misappropriation by corrupt leaders in recipient nations. In reality, 
however, project aid ensures the involvement of Japanese firms and 
thus the recycling of Japanese money. In tum, the use of private firms, 
it is hoped, will lead to increased Japanese private investment within 
the recipient nation. 
In the case of the South Pacific, Japan proved particularly 
successful off-setting the costs of its project aid. Most fishing access 
14 S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, p.l3 
15 The Japanese-financed Kiribati Fishermen's Training Centre, it has been-argued, was built 
principally as a means of providing the Japanese tuna industry with cheaper'selirCes of labour for its 
fishing fleets, despite the fact that it appears as a wise investment for the:4tlture of repUblic. S. Tarte, 
Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, p.126 
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agreement payments include a goods and servIces component to 
recipient nations, 75 percent of which is funded by Japan's Overseas 
Fisheries Cooperation Foundation, while industry pays the balance. 
Usually they are fisheries-related, and included such things as outboard 
motors, vessels, fishing gear, nets or office equipment to be used by the 
fisheries administrations. . In reality, these goods, which effectively 
serve as a subsidy to Japan's fishing industry, are often surplus to 
requirements in Japan and are thus relatively inexpensive. Significantly, 
between 1977 and 1993, the largest share of this assistance was 
received by Oceania.16 Japan was the only distant-water fishing nation 
to do so. Others pay the entire access fee in cash. Though there is a 
wide variation in the percentage of goods and services to total access 
fees, in some cases they were quite substantia1. 17 The end result, 
therefore, is that fisheries grant aid proved to be such an effective too I 
and fmancially viable proposition for Japan that it is little wonder that it 
has remained at the centre of Japan's aid programme to the South 
Pacific. 
16 94 out of 135 cases, S. Tarte, Japan Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, p.87 
17 The Solomon Island's access agreement payments for 1984 and 1987 were 40.84% and 
42.59%, respectively. While these are at the extreme end, at least 10% of the access agreement 
payments of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, in the period 1980 to 
1988 were made up of goods and services. S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, 
p.88 
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4.2.2 Aid and Private Investment: 
A connection between aid and Japanese private investment in 
recipient nations has always drawn criticism from those who hold the 
view that Japan's aid was devoted more to fulfilling its own objectives 
than bringing about development. One critic, in particular, eloquently 
noted that: 
As occasional ice-falls of yen melt from the glacier of 
Japanese concern for indigent Pacific nations, a closer view 
dispels the illusion of snowy purity and reveals a prospect as 
grubby as any black market pocket. Is this yet another 
colonial treadmill beginning, with the Islanders doing the 
treading and the Japanese the mHling?18 
Certainly, such a view comes from the more radical end of the spectrum 
of analyses of Japanese aid to the region, but it does raise an important 
issue: what, officially, was the role of aid in encouraging private 
enterprise? That answer comes through clearly in Japan's annual 
reviews of ODA. The growth of the private sector, it was noted, was 
'vital' to the long-term economic growth of developing nations. The 
focus of DAC forums on the importance of foreign investment to 
economic development was used to justify Japan's stance: 
18 C. Burgoyne, "Japanese Pacific Aid Suspect", Pacific World: An International Quarterly on 
Peace and Ecojustice, Volume 19, May 1991, p.13 For a further example of criticism ofthe 
centrality of commercial considerations in Japan's aid policy to the region, see W.R. Nester, Japan 
and the Third World: Patterns, Power, Prospects, London: Macmillan, 1992, p.277 
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In this context, many commentators have started to 
emphasise the 'catalytic effect' of development aid. The use 
of aid to develop infrastructure, which is vital for private-
sector investment and other environmental improvements, 
stimulates private-sector investment in the developing 
countries and also makes a major contribution to the growth 
of industry. Private-sector business activity, whether by 
foreign or domestic enterprises, is vital to the development 
of developing countries. Asia's experience has verified the 
potential of ODA to contribute to the establishment of the 
necessary conditions, and due emphasis should be placed on 
this fact.19 
While economIC development reqUIres private investment, foreign 
investment does not necessarily lead to economic benefits for 
developing nations. This interpretation of the benefits of investment 
conveniently overlooks this point. It suggests, moreover, that in the 
context of aid to the region, Japan was well aware of the potential 
benefits to its own businesses. The extent of lobbying from Japan's 
fishing industry for increased aid throughout the Cold War era 
highlights the connection between aid and investment, although as will 
be shown, Japan's interest in the region, from an investor's perspective, 
was not limited to fish alone. 
4.2.3 Aid and land-based resources: 
It has been shown that the need for fishing access agreements 
helped shape Japan's South Pacific aid programme. It is necessary, 
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual Report, 1990 
Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990, p.20 
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however, to pay attention to the acquisition of other resources that 
influenced the nature of Japanese aid policy to the region. The 1973 Oil 
Crisis, it has been argued, "alerted Japanese officials to a policy blind 
spot to the South and stimulated 'resource diplomacy' to secure 
minerals and timber from Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and 
New Caledonia.,,20 The potential for undersea mineral exploitation, 
which will be discussed in Chapter Five, it needs to be pointed out, 
certainly must have had a bearing on Japanese policymakers during this 
time, even though the technology to make such mining economically 
viable did not exist during the Cold War era. 
A closer examination of the trade relationship with Papua New 
Guinea and the Solomon Islands reveals much about Japan's 
motivations in the region. 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Table 2: Japanese Trade with Papua New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands, 1980-1994 ($US m): 
Exports to Imports Trade Exports to Imports Trade 
PNG fromPNG Balance Solomon from Balance 
Islands Solomon 
Islands 
167.2 405.2 -237.2 12.8 27.7 -14.8 
178.1 328.1 -150.0 8.7 34.0 -25.2 
127.4 286.3 -158.9 8.3 42.9 -34.6 
141.5 322.2 -180.6 14.9 35.2 -20.3 
141.5 283.9 -142.3 15.1 42.0 -26.8 
133.5 251.5 -118.0 16.0 43.2 -27.2 
20 S. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, North Sydney, NSW: Allen and 
Unwin in association with the New Zealand Institute of Intemational Affairs, 1992, p.44 
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1986 137.5 294.5 -156.9 19.7 30.8 -11.1 
1987 180.3 398.1 -217.8 18.2 29.2 -11.0 
1988 208.8 564.6 -355.7 16.9 32.3 -15.3 
1989 202.6 542.2 -339.6 31.2 38.7 -7.8 
1990 138.9 332.6 -193.7 18.7 41.7 -23.0 
1991 163.0 319.0 -156.0 23.0 31.0 -8.0 
1992 167.0 367.0 -200.0 21.0 49.0 -28.0 
1993 189.0 606.0 -417.0 13.0 83.0 -70.0 
1994 179.0 661.0 -482.0 17.0 79.0 -62.0 
Source: K. Monden, Japanese Interests within the South Pacific, Wollongong: University of 
Wollongong, 1996 (Research Essay), pp.58 and 71 
The table illustrates that the trade relationship between Japan and the 
Solomon Islands is in Japan's favour, with imports outweighing exports 
in all years. What the table does not show, however, is the extent to 
which aid is used as a mechanism to gain favourable access for 
Japanese industry to the natural resources of both countries. With the 
statistics that exist, it would be almost impossible to quantify the 
relationship, though doubtless one exists.21 
A look at the nature of exports and imports further assists an 
understanding of what Japan wanted from the region. Papua New 
Guinea exports to Japan, in the late 1980s, consisted almost entirely of 
raw materials (96.4%), of which copper (68.7%) and timber (19.9%) 
dominated. Similarly, the Solomon Islands exports were dominated by 
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timber (59.5%), though fish products at 15.3 percent were greater than 
for Papua New Guinea at just 3.2 percent. Japanese exports to Papua 
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands were comprised overwhelmingly 
of machinery and vehicles.22 Throughout the region, a wide range of 
resources were destined for Japan, not merely fish, and these vary 
greatly from country to country .23 As a consequence of the different 
resource base of Pacific Island countries, Japanese trade volumes with 
the region vary enormously, from the larger resource producing nations 
including Papua New Guinea, New Caledonia, and the Solomon Islands 
to those less blessed by nature. In all, Japan's exports to the region 
totalled US$I.3b against US$839m in imports in 1988,z4 
Between 1977 and 1989, therefore, Japan had come to see the 
region as a key source for a number of resources other than fish. Fish 
had in many respects renewed Japan's interest in the region during this 
time, which in tum created an awareness of the other resources, 
particularly minerals and trees. From a rather small trading relationship 
with the South Pacific countries prior to the 1970s, things changed 
21 Tony Siaguru, the leader of the League for National Advancement in Papua New Guinea, for 
example, is critical of the link between aid and access to his country's resources. See W.R. Nester, 
Japan and the Third World: Patterns, Power, Prospects, London: Macmillan, 1992, p.277 
22 K. Monden, Japanese Interests in the South Pacific Region, Wollongong: University of 
Wollongong, 1996 (Research Essay), pp.52-84 
23 For example, sugar constitutes about half of Fiji's exports to Japan, while a similar ratio of 
Vanuatu's exports to Japan comes from meat. 
24 W.R. Nester, Japan and the Third World: Patterns, Power, Prospects, London: Macmillan, 
1992, p.274 
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quickly. In many respects, the trend in Japan's aid levels to the region 
mirror its increased trade relations, and such a trend is not coincidental, 
suggesting further that the link between aid volumes and commercial 
benefits for the donor was very much in evidence. Japanese aid to 
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, respectively, increased 
from US$3.7m in 1982 t6 US$36m by 1989, and from US$4.7m in 
1987 to US$14.3m by 1989.25 In addition, Fijian exports to Japan 
increased from US$10m in 1983 to a high of US$40m by 1987, which 
was accompanied by vastly increased aid which lends further weight to 
the argument that aid and trade were linked. 26 
4.3 SECURITY MOTIVATIONS: 
4.3.1 'Comprehensive Security' and Aid's role within it: 
While it was the issue of fishing access that saw Japan become 
an aid donor to the region in the 1970s, a move away from commercial 
considerations towards broader foreign policy initiatives, particularly 
for Japan's own and the West's security, played a major role in 
increased aid volumes. The link between purely commercial 
considerations and other motivations behind Japan's ODA programme, 
in the Pacific context, stem in part from a major component of Japanese 
25 K. Monden, pp.61,75 
261bid, pp.64-68 
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security, adhered to by successive post-war governments: attaining self-
sufficiency in food production. This in itself is indicative of the multi-
dimensional nature of aid policy. 
The philosophy behind aid evolved quickly and this helps to 
explain the increase in Japanese aid to the region from the late 1970s 
until the end of the Cold War. Third World resource diplomacy, 
particularly the 1973 Oil Crisis and the creation of EEZs, coup led with 
growing pressure from Western allies, particularly the United States, to 
play a greater role in world affairs, were to have a major impact on 
Japanese foreign policy makers at the time. Increases in Japanese aid to 
the region can, in part, be understood against the backdrop of these 
developments. 
In the 1 970s, ODA became a central component in Japan's 
nascent 'peace diplomacy' as a non-military means of support for the 
Western defence effort. In the post-war era, the Japanese government 
relied on the United States for its defence under the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security, as Japan was precluded from maintaining 
military forces under its own Constitution. In this respect, the changing 
role of the United States in the international arena, characterised by 
defeat in Vietnam and subsequent military withdrawal from the 
Southeast Asian mainland, led to increasing pressures on Japan to 
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assume more responsibility for its own defence, as well as that of the 
West. 
It was in the late 1970s that the broad-based policy of 
'comprehensive national security' fIrst emerged. SignifIcantly, it 
marked the beginning of a change in Japan's aDA philosophy to the 
region, away from fIshing access, to a more political orientation, with 
the promotion of its own security becoming a important basis for aid. 
At the time, the link between aDA and security was ambiguous and ill-
defmed and appeared to be a rationale mainly articulated for the benefIt 
of foreign audiences and allies, whereas the link between aDA and 
economic security fItted more easily into Japan's established approach 
to 'economic cooperation' .27 Moreover, the relationship between 
comprehensive security and economic cooperation was confusing. It 
was not clear whether comprehensive security was the overriding 
framework for aid policy, or one component within an 'overall 
philosophy of economic cooperation' .28 Comprehensive national 
security was an evolving policy, however, which was fmally drafted in 
1989, which accounts for the confusion that surrounded it when it was 
fIrst articulated in the late 1970s. 
27 S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, p.26 
28 D. Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: strategic aid and Japan's foreign policy, Lexington: 
Lexington Books, 1986, p.32 
97 
'Comprehensive security' should be seen as a complex concept, 
which incorporated trade, aid and diplomatic policies alongside defence 
policies, into a foreign policy framework designed to meet Japan's as 
well as Western security interests. For Japan, economic and military 
. security came to be seen as very much interrelated goals, which could 
be safeguarded by minimising Japan's reliance on its trading partners 
while maximising their dependence on Japan. As Nestor argues, Tokyo 
actively sought to spread its sources of foreign markets and resources as 
widely as possible, while making other nations dependent on Japanese 
products, fmance, technology and markets.29 Whether Nestor was 
entirely correct matters little. What it does suggest, however, was the 
degree to which Japan used aid as an instrument by which it sought to 
fulfil a number of different, though often inter-connected, foreign 
policy goals. 
An equally integral part of 'comprehensive security' was the 
substitution of aid for military efforts. With pacifist elements having a 
significant voice in Japan's government since the end of World War II, 
this is hardly surprising. In part, this pacifism stems from a realisation 
that the potential cut off of oil and foodstuffs and the protectionist 
closure of overseas markets posed a greater threat to Japan than all 
unlikely military invasion. In this respect, aid, as a means of ensuring 
29 W.R. Nestor, Japan and the Third World: Patterns, Power, Prospects, London: Macmillan, 
1992, pp.278-279 
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access to markets, was to emerge as a central component of Japanese 
foreign policy. 
The final component of the evolving policy of 'comprehensive 
security' that needs to be noted was the desire to use aid to encourage 
political stability in the South Pacific as a means of protecting some of 
its most important shipping lanes and its vulnerable southern flank. In 
this respect, aid functioned as a non-military countermeasure in 
. d' 1 30 preventative Ip omacy. 
4.3.2 The Kiribati-Soviet Union Fishing Agreement, 1985 
As has been seen, the increased Japanese aid to the region in the 
1980s, while part of a major shift in its aid philosophy worldwide, was 
also a response to developments in the South Pacific at the time. It is 
profitable, therefore, to look more closely at what was happening in the 
region in the 1980s to assist an understanding of the increased aid 
volumes that followed. 
The fishing agreement between Kiribati and the Soviet Union in 
1985 had a significant bearing on Japan's attitude to the region. 
Moscow had attempted, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to sign 
fisheries agreements with Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tuvalu and the 
3Dn. Yasutomo, "Why Aid? Japan as an 'aid great power"', Pacific Affairs, Volume 62, Winter 
1989/90, p.494 
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Solomon Islands, but the influence of their colonial and fonner colonial 
rulers successfully prevented any deals. When, however, in October 
1985, the government of Kiribati reached a fishing agreement with the 
Soviet fishing company, Sovryjlot, it carne as a shock to Western 
. observers. Kiribati's independence from Britain m 1979 virtually 
coincided with the exhaustion of its phosphate deposits. While 
phosphate was being mined, the rest of the economy was left largely 
undeveloped.3! Because of its tiny landmass, poor soil and low rainfall, 
Kiribati government planners saw the main potential for post-
independence development from its abundance of fish stocks within its 
massive EEZ, which comprised about 3,000,000 square kilometres. 
Following independence, Kiribati initiated fishing licensing agreements 
with Japan, South Korea and the American Tunaboats' Association, 
although the latter expired at the end of 1984 and no succeeding 
agreement was reached in 1985. The importance of licensing fees as a 
source of government revenue, meant that Kiribati was prepared to 
accept offers from elsewhere. Moreover, the United States' insensitivity 
to the rights of a small island state by continuing to fish illegally, the 
potential for income generated by fees to act as an alternative to aid, 
31 At the time, 85 percent of export earnings, 45 percent of GDP and over 50 percent of 
Government revenue came from phosphate. U.F. Neemia-Mackenzie, "Russophobia and Self 
Determination", in R.Walker and W.Sutherland (eds), The Pacific: Peace. Security and the Nuclear 
Issue, Tokyo: UN University Studies on Peace and Regional Security, United Nations University, 
1988, p.196 
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especially tied aid, and the desire on the part of a newly-independent 
government to pursue its own interests, were additional factors behind 
the Kiribati-Soviet agreement.32 
Despite the fact that the Kiribati-Soviet fishing agreement 
existed only for a year, with the official reason being that the Soviet 
Union was unwilling to pay the level of fees sought by Kiribati, it 
proved to be something of a watershed. Soviet inroads into Micronesia 
were a grave concern for the United States, and so the fishing 
agreement with Kiribati challenged a cornerstone of US policy in the 
region, 'strategic denial' of access to unwelcome nations. The success 
of such a policy depended on keeping the island nations as client-states 
of the United States or its allies. According to Pentagon officials, the 
Soviets were not interested in the economic return that fishing in 
Kiribati waters offered, and they argued instead that Soviet motives 
were politico-strategic. Soviet trawlers, it was argued further, were 
regularly used for intelligence collection, and Kiribati's location was 
apparently ideal for such a purpose.33 
Whatever the actual Soviet motives were, there emerged a 
consensus that more attention needed to be paid by Western allies to 
prevent unfriendly foreign nations encroaching on the region in the 
32 U.F . Neemia-Mackenzie, pp.196-197 
33 The United States had a MX missile testing ground on the nearby Marshall Islands, while a 
space tracking station was also situated close by, on Canton Island. The security of both, it was 
believed, could easily be compromised by Soviet surveillance. 
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wake of the Kiribati-Soviet fishing agreement. When Libya's courting 
of Vanuatu, and the latter's own fishing agreement in 1986 with the 
Soviet Union are also taken into consideration, fears were raised that a 
newly-independent South Pacific nation might follow Cuba or Malta in 
establishing a regime hostile to Western interests that might undermine 
the region's security. The end result was that Australia and New 
Zealand increased their aid levels to the former British colony, and the 
U.S. became involved in this capacity for the first time. Of the greatest 
significance, however, was Japan's role in establishing itself as 
Kiribati's major aid donor?4 
To a large extent, the United States was responsible for 
encouraging the increased influence of Japan in Kiribati and the rest of 
the region. In June, 1986, then U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, 
met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe. At their meeting 
in Manila, Shultz had emphasised the need for Japan to counter the 
Soviet Pacific drive by increasing its economic assistance to the region. 
The U.S., Shultz argued, could not do so given the tense relationship 
between it and the South Pacific island nations over the issues of 
nuclear policy and fishing agreements, and because of the budgetary 
34 Although the levels of Japanese grant aid vary greatly from year to year, in the case of 
Kiribati, the construction of a major causeway followed in 1985 as a result of its entry into the 
fishing agreement with the Soviet Union. Japan had previously declined the project on the grounds 
that it was too expensive and unnecessary. Other large infrastructure projects followed, including the 
construction of a new central hospital, at the cost of close to 500 million yen in 1989. 
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limitations that the U.S. was facing?5 At the time, significantly, U.S.-
Japanese trade relations were in an especially problematic phase, and 
the potential for aid to mitigate economic friction with trading partners 
was not lost on Japan. 
4.3.3 The Kuranari Doctrine: 
In 1987, Japanese Foreign Minister, Tadashi Kuranari, visited 
the South Pacific region, and his speech in Suva gave rise to what 
became known as the Kuranari Doctrine. The doctrine itself was the 
articulation of Japanese policy towards the region, and was heralded as 
a new beginning in the relationship between Japan and the Pacific 
Island countries. His visit signalled that Japan's post-war quest to 
regam a place in the international arena and to rebuild ties with 
neighbouring countries had finally reached the South Pacific. The 
doctrine itself was a direct response to the conclusion of Soviet fishing 
access agreements with Kiribati and Vanuatu. It emulated U.S. policy in 
that aid was viewed as a way to preempt further intrusions by the Soviet 
35 The United States was clearly worried by the anti-nuclear policies prevalent in the region in 
the early to mid 1980s, which were viewed as undermining Western strategic interests and 
advancing the interests of the Soviet Union. The regional South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 
(SPNFZ) adopted in 1985, the anti-nuclear constitution in the US Trust Territory of Palau, Vanuatu's 
anti-nuclear and non-aligned posture, the New Zealand Labour government ban on nuclear powered 
and armed ship visits in 1985 (which led to the abrogation of ANZUS), and an anti-nuclear Fijian 
Labour party after 1985 showed the depth of anti-nuclear feeling in the region at the time. 
Tension between the region and the United States grew out of the latter's unwillingness t6 
recognise coastal state sovereignty over tuna which resulted in the US tuna industry'S failure to 
comply with licensing conditions set by the Pacific Island states. From the early 1980s, US 
policymakers recognised that the issue had the potential to push the island states into closer relations 
with the Soviet Union. The issue was resolved in 1986 when the US government concluded a 
multilateral access agreement with the region, largely as a response to the Soviet fishing agreement 
with Kiribati (1985), and Vanuatu (1986). 
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Union in the region. The antecedents of the doctrine included pressure 
on Japan to assume a greater aid presence in the region, overtures by 
the South Pacific Forum to Japan for more economic assistance, and the 
influence of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone. Under him, Japan's aid 
policy had developed an increasing politico-strategic rationale as an 
instrument of 'comprehehsive security'. He was to provide the 
necessary leadership and political will to embrace strategic aid openly 
as part of a forthright foreign policy posture. 
Kuranari's speech advanced five principles on Japan's future 
relation with the region. 36 The concern for 'political stability' in the 
region needs closer examination. It should be seen as a concern for 
keeping the Soviet encroachment to a minimum, rather than a means of 
preventing domestic instability within the region. Japan's response to 
the Fiji coups of 1989, for example, helps illustrate this point. Japan 
was much less critical than Australia and New Zealand, and no 
suspension of aid followed.37 This suggests that Japan's concern for the 
security of the region was somewhat narrow. Inroads from powers that 
the Western Alliance feared, particularly the Soviet Union, were, after 
36 The promotion of bilateral relations and respect for countries' 'autonomous initiatives'; 
support for regional cooperation and strengthening of dialogue with the South Pacific Forum; 
preservation of political stability in the region; provision of economic assistance; and the building of 
mutual understanding. 
37 See, for example, S. Tarte, Japan's aid and the Pacific islands, pp.179-181 or S. Hoadley, 
The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p.44 
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all, the driving-force behind Japan's conception of strategic aid as it 
related to the South Pacific during the Cold War era. 
Kuranari's speech alluded to an expansion of bilateral aid levels, 
but the reality is somewhat different, as the following table suggests. 
Fiji 
Kiribati 
Table 3: Japanese grant aid to Pacific island countries, 
1988-93 (million yen) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
245 352 52 1,146 1,043 68 
130 1,011 630 1,183 107 -
Marshall Islands 648 599 337 375 588 148 
FSM 515 672 824 749 1,130 1,193 
Palau 330 493 414 404 469 691 
PNG 2,129 2,126 1,839 1,888 1,739 1,243 
Solomon Islands 897 1,018 909 4 122 1,041 
Tonga 270 824 613 548 517 671 
Tuvalu 107 146 - 396 3 -
Vanuatu 
-
1,115 352 4 6 6 
Western Samoa 690 925 674 854 1,457 1,342 
Total 5,961 9,281 6,644 7,551 7,181 6,403 
Source: S. Tarte, Japan's aid dlplomacy and the Paclfic lslands, Suva: Institute of Pacific 
Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1998, p.178 
Certainly, a short-term rise in bilateral grant aid followed with an 
increase of some 75 percent between 1987 and 1989, while technical 
assistance rose 42 percent in these years, from 2.2 to 3.1 billion yen. 
Tarte argues that this was because of the protracted project cycle in 
Japan which meant that the impact of Kuranari's initiatives were not 
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felt in 1987, but over the ensuing two years.38 The recipient request-
based nature Japanese aid, to a large extent, accounted for the variation 
between years, with 1989 being a year in which an unusually large 
number of large-scale grant aid projects were funded. While that is 
certainly true, the reduction in Japanese aid to the region after 1989, the 
year that symbolises the end of the Cold War, suggests that broader 
strategic concerns, most notably Soviet inroads, played a significant 
role. Tarte's claim that the declining levels after 1989 was a reflection 
of the short-lived political interest in the region, is difficult to accept, as 
will be highlighted in Chapter Five. 
4.4 JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION: 
The above discussion of the Kuranari Doctrine, in terms of 
Japan's security concerns, does not entirely do justice to the complexity 
of motivations behind Japanese aid to the region. It has been shown that 
Japan was heavily influenced by the United States to contribute more 
aid to the region in terms, and to share the 'burden' of the Western 
Alliance's efforts to prevent the expansion of Soviet activities in the 
South Pacific in the late 1980s. In the 1970s, however, Japan's decision 
to increase its aid volumes world-wide was inspired, in part, by how 
other nations perceived it. In 1974, anti-Japanese riots in some 
38 S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the South Pacific, p.178 
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Southeast Asian capitals greeted Prime Minister Kakuei whilst on 
official visits. These demonstrated not only the lingering animosity for 
Japan still evident in the region after the Second World War, but also 
the tension between using aid to promote Japan's economic interests 
while attempting, ostensibly, to building goodwill with recipient 
countries. 
Furthermore, pressure by the international donor community for 
Japan to contribute more aid as a percentage of GDP, given its 
persistent current account surpluses since the 1960s, was to heavily 
influence Japanese aid policy. In 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda pledged 
that Japan would double its ODA within three years, as a direct 
response to a need for Japan to improve its reputation as an aid donor. 
This goal was realised in 1980, and subsequent doubling plans were 
achieved between 1981-1985 and 1986-1992 (completed by 1988). 
Such growth in aid volumes was accompanied by much rhetoric on 
'burden-sharing' and 'international obligations and responsibilities' and 
a desire on the part of Japan to show 'aid leadership'. 
The fusion of Japanese economic interests with foreign policy 
objectives after the late 1970s, signalled the massive growth in Japan's 
foreign aid levels worldwide. This was a major departure from early 
Japanese aid in the 1950s which focused almost entirely within Asia, 
for the purposes of acquiring the much needed resources and trade for 
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its own 'economic miracle'. By 1979, Japanese aid increased almost 
exponentially to a level of US$2.6 billion. Ten years later, that figure 
stood at US$9.134 billion, an almost four-fold growth.39 Indeed, by the 
end of the 1980s, Japan was on the verge of superseding the United 
States as the world's largest aid donor. In short, the rapid rise of 
economIc assistance levels was, arguably, the most striking 
development in Japanese foreign policy since the end of World War II. 
The momentum in Japan towards 'aid leadership' worldwide, 
along with security and commercial motivations, as shown, were to 
shape Japan's aid to the South Pacific after 1977, although the latter 
would not have been possible if aid did not have domestic support in 
Japan. It is estimated that 80 percent of the Japanese public supported 
maintaining or increasing aid volumes in the Cold War era. They were 
to take great satisfaction from seeing Japan emerge as a 'great aid 
power' because of their strong pacifist spirit, a growing sense of 
nationalism at the time and the extent of support for a greater Japanese 
role in world affairs.40 
39 A. Rix, "Japan's foreign aid policy: a capacity for leadership?", Pacific Affairs, Volume 62, 
Winter 1989/90, p.461 
40 D. Yasumoto, "Why Aid? Japan as an 'aid great power"', Pacific Affairs, Volume 62, Winter 
1989/90, p.497 
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4.5 CONNECTION TO REGION: 
It should be noted that if Japan did not have an affinity with the 
South Pacific, it probably would not have given aid to the region to the 
extent it did during the Cold War period. Chapter 2 highlighted Japan's 
involvement in the region which began in the late seventeenth century. 
Commercial gain dominated the increased contact of Japanese nationals 
with Micronesia after that time, but security interests also played a part 
in Japanese thinking after 1880, and from the start of the twentieth 
century, Japan took over the running of the former German Micronesian 
possession of the Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines. By 1935, there 
were twice as many Japanese nationals residing in Micronesia than 
there were Micronesians. After the Second World War, however, Japan 
was stripped of its Micronesian possessions. A need to rebuild itself in 
the wake of the war and a sense of anger for its wartime activities in the 
region saw Japan tum its attention elsewhere. Thereafter the region 
gained little attention from Japan, until the 1970s. 
The creation of EEZs and the 1973 Oil crisis returned Japan's 
focus to the region, as shown, of which "Japan regards itself as a natural 
member ... by virtue of its proximity, insular geography and historical 
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involvement. ,,41 As early as the start of the 1960s, however, Japanese 
scholars and business leaders proposed a pan Pacific community. In 
1967, then Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki began a period of 
examination of an 'Asian Pacific policy' based on increased 
cooperation and aid programmes, and the need to diversify Japan's 
supply of natural resources and markets. Increased diplomatic contact 
with the South Pacific and the concept of a Pacific free trade area were 
also mooted at the time. 
Though such ideas remained largely dormant for the next 
decade, they received new impetus in 1978 when Prime Minister 
Masayoshi Ohira advocated a 'Pacific Rim Community'. The Pacific 
islands were not included in the first Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Conference that followed in 1980 to discuss the idea, but thereafter they 
were incorporated into Japan's pan-Pacific diplomacy. The economic 
and political stability of the region, from Prime Minister Nakasone's 
perspective, had the potential to affect the stability of the entire Pacific 
basin in the years leading up to Kuranari's historic speech in 1987.42 
The region, therefore, had become integrated within Japan's broader 
economic and political interests, but without Japan's previous 
41 S. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p.43 
42 S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the South Pacific, p.153 
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involvement in the region prior to the Second World War, it could be 
argued that the extent of aid to the region might well have been less. 
4.6 HUMANITARIAN MOTIVATIONS: 
It would be wrong to argue, however, that self-interest 
exclusively motivated the Japanese aid programme to the South Pacific 
in the Cold War years. Security and economic concerns, and the issue 
of international prestige had, to a large extent, dictated Japan's aid 
philosophy to the region, but humanitarian considerations also played a 
central role in the development of this philosophy after 1975. 
Japan's international reputation, as well as the support for its 
aid 'leadership' among Japanese people, no doubt required the aid 
programme to be based on a concept of development. In many ways, a 
uniquely Japanese conception of how a country could 'develop' 
emerged as a legacy of Japan's own experience. Support for 'economic 
take-off inspired by development theorists, in particular the writings of 
W. W. Rostow,43 was a central aspect of Japan's aid philosophy as it 
43 Rostow's seminal work, Stages of Economic Growth, was highly influential in the 
emergence of development theory which thereafter has been a driving-force behind the progranunes 
of aid donors to the Third World. He believed that all societies evolve through five stages to self-
sustaining economic growth: "traditional society with a characteristically low level of technology 
and productivity; a transitional stage for satisfying the'preconditions' for change; the 'takeoff' stage 
when structural constraints to industrialization have been removed and an entrepreneurial class has 
emerged; the drive to maturity when industrialization is well under way and the levels of 
technological development and productivity are high; and the society of mass consumption when 
there is general abundance and society has moved beyond basic needs to the consumption of durable 
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was for other DAC members. By rebuilding itself after World War II, 
Japan learnt a valuable lesson that core infrastructure and industry were 
essential prerequisites to development, which in tum accounted for why 
Japan preferred to fund large-scale infrastructure projects in the South 
Pacific, and elsewhere. The belief that developing countries themselves 
are ultimately responsible for their own development and that they must 
take initiative in their own development has always been a notable 
feature of Japan's aid diplomacy.44 This, therefore, accounted for the 
'request-based' nature of Japanese aid, again evident in its dealings 
with the region. 
An examination of Japan's aDA Annual Reports reveals that 
"Japan's basic reason for providing aid to the developing countries is 
that these countries are impoverished and are in need of assistance from 
richer countries.,,45 Humanitarian considerations, broadly defmed as 
'working earnestly' towards the achievement of social and economic 
development, and the 'recognition of interdependence' ( of nations), it is 
goods." C. Ake, "Development and Underdevelopment" in J. Krieger (ed), The Oxford Companion 
to Politics ofthe World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.239-243 
44 A recent DAC assessment of Japan, Development Cooperation Review of Japan, 
(btm:llv.'WW.oecd.org.dac/htm/ar-japan.htm) provides a useful summary of the history of Japan's aid 
philosophy. Of interest, it is noted that Japan's belief in 'self-help' on the part of aid recipients was 
partially attributable to the fact that Japan's own attempts to develop, from the Meiji era onwards; 
while necessitating the use of West em advisors, were controlled by Japanese nationals. 
Japan's non-interventionist stance in the domestic affairs of recipient nations, it is noted, stems 
from the fact that it invaded several Asian countries this century. 
45 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual Report, 1990, 
p.3 
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noted, are the central tenets of a Japanese aid 'philosophy' .46 The 
acknowledgement that aid was 'closely and inextricably' linked to 
Japanese foreign policy interests, and that aid was 'substantially 
influenced' by changes in the international political situation, should 
• 47 
come as no surpnse. 
By the end of the Cold War, therefore, Japan's South Pacific aid 
programme had been influenced by a number of different, though inter-
related goals. In Japan's case, ODA could no longer be 
"compartmentalized into clear-cut categories, such as economlC-
commercial, political-diplomatic [or] strategic ... it is now all of these 
and more.,,48 The complexity of Japanese aid is perhaps best summed 
up by the view espoused by its Ministry of Affairs: 
The basic principles of Japan's aid philosophy are 
humanitarian considerations and the recognition of 
interdependence. This is not to say that these two principles 
are the only reasons for providing aid ... Japan as a wealthy 
nation has a responsibility towards countries that are less 
developed ... Japan achieved prosperity with the support of 
the international community and under favourable 
international conditions and should therefore repay 
society ... Japan should match the other aid contributions of 
other advanced nations from a viewpoint of international 
harmony ... o 
46 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual Review 1990, 
p.16 
47 Ibid. pp.5-6 
48 D. Yasutomo, ''Why Aid? Japan as an 'aid great power'" , Pacific Affairs, Volume 62, 
Winter 1989/90, p.503 
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In addition to this basic phiiosophy ... Japan's position 
as an economic superpower, its status as the world's leading 
creditor nation and the nation with the largest surplus, its 
high level of dependence on other countries, its commitment 
to peace, and its position as the only non-Western developed 
nation as reasons why Japan should provide aid.49 
This official stance highlights the plethora of rationales which made aid 
such a key aspect of Japan's foreign policy. Perhaps understandably, it 
neglected to highlight the trading benefits to Japan that aid helped bring 
about which largely shaped its aid to the South Pacific region in the late 
1970s. While being a comment on Japanese ODA programmes 
everywhere, Japan's efforts in the region were heavily influenced by 
this ethos. The South Pacific, after all, was but a tiny component of 
Japan's aid regime that was to become the world's largest. 
49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual Report, 1990, 
p18 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
JAPANESE AND AUSTRLAIAN FOREIGN 
IN THE POST -COLD WAR ERA 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION: 
Having now established the key motivations of Australian and 
Japanese aid during the Cold War era, it is now profitable to examine 
the changes that have occurred since. Chapter One highlighted how the 
Cold War dramatically increased the strategic importance of the South 
Pacific. It produced for the region's states what one commentator 
labelled 'a devil's bargain'. lChapters Three and Four indicated the 
range of motivations behind the aid programmes of Australia and Japan, 
respectively. The centrality of security motivations in the aid 
philosophies of both donors was addressed. The utilisation of ODA to 
curb Soviet inroads into the region, and the perceived threats to both 
Japan and Australia that could result from the establishment of a 
'hostile regime', were noted. 
After the Cold War, however, the significance accorded to the 
region, from the perspective of the Western Alliance was to decline. In 
the decade since, Australia and Japan have remained the region's two 
largest aid donors. It is necessary to examine to what extent the aid 
programmes of each donor have changed in the 1990s. It must be noted 
that in terms of aid motivations, the major categories (Commercial, 
Security, International Reputation, Regional Affmity and 
I J. Dalton, p.2 
115 
Humanitarianism) have remained. Rather than dealing with all of them 
again, this. chapter will highlight the changes more than the continuities. 
Country 
Cook Is. 
Fiji 
Kiribati 
Nauru 
PNG 
Solomon Is. 
Tonga 
FSM 
Man;hallIs. 
Palau 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
'V. Samoa 
Table: Japan's ODA Disbursement to South Pacific, 1986-
97($USm) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
2.2 0,3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 
11.0 10.3 9.0 7.5' 9,0 8,2 16.3 20.3 11.2 13.9 18,6 
4.3 6.5 5.3 5.3 9.4 7,3 13.9 5.4 3.5 4.2 4.5 
- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 
10.4 17.6 43.1 39.6 38.0 42.3 87.9 27.4 21.8 46.1 98.2 
0.9 4.6 13.8 14.2 8,6 10,8 8,0 26.4 16.0 17.1 18.2 
3.6 5,1 3.5 5.3 10.1 3.4 5.9 12.1 8.7 14.3 11.5 
-
5.3 1.7 6,7 6.9 11.6 10.3 15,2 17.0 18.2 8.7 
-
4,8 4.0 5.1 6.5 3.9 5.3 5.4 3,0 5.7 13,7 
- - 2.1 4.8 0.5 3.9 5.1 4.2 7.2 9.5 4.0 
0.0 0,2 0.3 2,5 1.0 0.5 3.5 0.2 1.3 1.5 4.6 
1.1 5.5 3.7 2.9 8.1 5,8 1.1 1.9 11.6 12.8 2.2 
9.1 6.9 7.6 6.0 9.2 10,0 6,8 15.8 22.7 14.6 14,3 
Source: Japanese MlllIstry of ForeIgn AffaIrs, Japan's Official Development Assistance 
Annual Review (various years) 
5.2 JAPANESE COMMERCIAL MOTIVATIONS: 
5.2.1 Fisheries Grant Aid 
Commercial motivations, as they were in the Cold War, remain 
a key determinant of Japanese ODA to the region. A demand for access 
to fish continued, although favourable terms of agreements have 
become more difficult to obtain. From Japan's perspective, access 
agreements had been easier to negotiate in the 1970s. After the Forum 
Fisheries Agency signed a multilateral access agreement with the 
1997 
0.1 
17.0 
6.7 
0.4 
49.2 
21.0 
8.0 
12,8 
5.5 
13.8 
6.7 
2.8 
10.0 
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United States in 1987, and with more foreign nations vying for access 
rights in the region, Japan found itself under greater pressure at the 
negotiation table. As has been seen, Japan favoured bilateral dealings in 
the region, a long-established feature of its aid programmes world-wide, 
because of its position of strength. It was, consequently, opposed 
entering into a multilateral accord with the region, via the Forum 
Fisheries Agency. In essence, this was because it feared that a common 
regional negotiating stand would prove vastly more effective than 
bilateral dealings and would, as a result, lead to increased access costs 
for its own vessels. 2 
The changing nature of access negotiations, therefore, led to a 
modification of Japan's fisheries grant aid after the late 1980s. Rather 
than giving in to pressure to sign a multilateral fisheries access 
agreement with the Forum Fisheries Agency, and as a means of 
placating opposition, Japan introduced several new fisheries initiatives 
principally aimed to increase the benefits of, and support for, existing 
bilateral access agreements.3 They should be seen as a blatant attempt to 
2 Japan, it should be noted, was not opposed, in principle, to multilateral negotiation. Japan, in 
fact, wanted to see the formation of a regional fisheries organisation that would include the major 
distant-water fishing nations which were prominent in the region. In essence, Japan wanted such a 
body created as a means to counterbalance the collective strength of the Forum Fisheries Agency in 
negotiations over fisheries-related issues, particularly access agreements and the resource 
management. 
3The first of these was small-scale fisheries grant aid. It was designed to fund projects smaller 
than the usual grant aid projects, which could only be granted annually, and as such the new-found 
Japanese flexibility of negotiation served to appeal to the smaller countries of the region. 
The second was the Fisheries Development Assistance for Pacific Island Nations project. It was 
specifically created for the region (a major concession in itself), and aimed to carry out maintenance 
and repair of fisheries equipment and infrastructure provided under grant aid. 
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perpetuate bilateral negotiation, as only countries with existing bilateral 
fisheries access agreements with Japan would be eligible for them. 
Moreover, because these initiatives were to be granted in addition to 
standard larger-scale fisheries infrastructure projects, they should be 
judged as a further means by which Japan tried to undermine the Forum 
Fisheries Agency. In any event, they highlight the degree of response 
by Japan to changing circumstances. As a donor not prone to radical 
departures from its rigid aid delivery mechanisms, these measures are 
indicative of the importance it placed and continues to place on the 
region's fisheries. 
Japan's modification of its fisheries-related aid went further and 
is additional proof of the extent to which it was prepared to adapt to 
achieve its aims. Japan's global record on environmental matters had 
been by no means laudable. From its opposition to the Law of the Sea, 
to the issues of whaling, drift-net fishing, and the large numbers of 
dolphins killed in tuna catches, Japan's reputation had suffered greatly. 
As a response to international criticism, the increased role 
environmental aid has played in the programmes of DAC members, and 
its perception of itself as a 'world leader' of aid donors, Japan 
ostensibly attempted to improve its environmental record. In 1992, as a 
The final initiative, a project titled Technical Cooperation for Fisheries Development, provided 
up to 150 million yen to promote 'coastal fishing development.' See S. Tarte, Japan's Aid 
Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, pp.104-111 
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consequence, a new policy was developed that aimed to promote the 
management and effective utilisation of fisheries' resources. Such a 
sudden about-turn towards conservation, it has been suggested, was part 
of Japan's on-going quest to have a voice in a regional fisheries 
organisation. A powerful input into the future direction of fishing in the 
region would result, at a time when environmental concerns and 
campaigns threaten the closure of fishing grounds not only with EEZs, 
but also on the high seas.4 
Whatever its real basis, the fact remains that it is an indication of 
the extent to which Japan's fisheries grant aid had skilfully developed 
since the 1970s to meet the changing nature of both the region and the 
international community. The island nations of the South Pacific still 
only receive an average of 5 percent of the value of the catch taken by 
Japanese fishing ventures, whereas the United States, as a consequence 
of its multilateral access agreement, pays 10 percent. 5 The use of aid to 
facilitate favourable access for Japan's fishing fleet, a constant feature 
of its aid diplomacy, is likely to continue because it has remained 
highly successful. 
4 S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, pp.140-144 
5 G.A. Finin and T. Wesley-Smith, "A New Era for Japan and the Pacific Islands: The Tokyo 
Summit", Pacific Islands Report, Pacific Islands Development Program/Center for Pacific Island 
Studies, Analysis from the East-West Center, University of Hawaii, No.32, September 1997, p.6 
(available: http://pidp.ewc.hawaii.eduIPIReport/Special/anewera.htm) 
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5.2.2 land-based Resources: 
By the late 1990s, Japanese trade with the region had developed 
to the extent that a Japan had become the most important export market. 
In all, some 30 percent of total exports from the region found their way 
to Japan. By this time, the latter was the recipient of the largest share of 
exports from Papua New Guinea (24 percent), Solomon Islands (43 
percent), Tonga (70 percent) and Vanuatu (20 percent). Japan had 
become the main market for tropical timber harvested in Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, and, to a lesser extent, in Vanuatu.6 As table 
4 suggests, all were major recipients of Japanese aid. 
Of particular interest is that Japan's long-term interests in the 
region are now focused on the resources of the ocean floor, including 
the enormous deposits of minerals such as manganese, copper and 
nickel that have been discovered on the seabeds of the central and 
eastern Pacific. Japan has led the efforts to explore their potential 
through the investment of more than $100 million over the last decade. 
It should be noted, however that the technology needed to profitably 
extract the minerals is yet to be created, and is unlikely to be in the near 
future. It is likely though that the potential returns are " ... attractive 
enough to encourage Japan to maintain good relations with the Pacific 
Island nations which control these resources and the multilateral 
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organizations that will manage and monitor the mining.,,7 The use of aid 
to 'maintain good relations', in this respect, seems particularly prudent. 
5.3 STRATEGIC MOTIVATIONS: 
With the end of the Cold War, as mentioned, the strategic 
importance of the regIOn went into decline. This is not to argue, 
however, that the region no longer has an influence on the part of 
Japanese defence policymakers. With a wide variety of commercial 
interests in the South Pacific, and the untapped potential that exists on 
the sea floor, Japan would not want to see political instability or the 
entry of new and potentially hostile actors. Significantly, Japan is aware 
of China's growing diplomatic and economic activities, fuelled in part 
by a rivalry with an equally active Taiwan. The region contains some of 
the vital sea lanes used by Japan, and the maintenance of access through 
the region is essential to the success of Japan as a major trading nation. 
In the minds of Japanese defence policymakers, therefore, the region 
still has a strategic importance, although the Soviet threat is no longer 
the dominant concern. 
6 G.A. Finin and T. Wesley-Smith, p.6 
7 Finin and Wesley-Smith, pA 
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5.4 JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION: 
In the post Cold War era, Japan along with Australia remained 
the largest aid donors in the region. The role of other donors has 
changed quite dramatically, however, during this time. The United 
States reduced its diplomatic and economic profile south of the equator. 
With a Soviet threat no longer, its attention shifted to other parts of the 
world with greater strategic importance. It has implemented planned 
reductions of its massive subsidies to the Federated States. of 
Micronesia and Republic of the Marshall Islands. In 2001, the compacts 
of free association which have guaranteed United States' funding to 
these Micronesian nations will expire. In the 1990s, however, Japan has 
increased its aid commitments further into Micronesia. The Marshall 
Islands, for example, receive in the order of US$4-5 million annually 
for a range of development projects, mostly fisheries related.8 The 
expansion by Japanese ODA into Palau9 and the Federated States of 
Micronesia further highlights the extent to which Japan is, in a sense, 
starting to fill the gap created by a gradual United States' aid 
withdrawal, for reasons of duty to its ally and because of potential 
economic benefits to Japan. 
8 M.R. Ogden, ''MIRAB and the Marshall Islands", ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies, 
2:2, Dry Season, 1994 (University of Guam), pp.264-265 
9 Palau is a voting member of the U.N. General Assembly, and it is quite likely that Japan 
began as a donor there because of this fact 
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The influence of Great Britain and other nations has also 
declined in the 1990s. The former's withdrawal from the South Pacific 
Commission in 1995, signalled its retreat from its previously large role 
in regional affairs, although there are indications that it wants to rejoin 
that institution. Metropolitan actors, particularly New Zealand and 
France have retained their territories, and while they still have a keen 
interest in regional affairs, they lack the money necessary to further 
the level of their engagement. The leaders of these nations generally 
view Japan's activities as complementing rather than compromising 
their own interests and agendas because "Tokyo has not demonstrated 
a desire to translate its considerable de facto influence into an explicit 
bid for regional dominance .... ,,10 
Japan has, in a sense, continued the 'burden sharing' stance that 
the United States pressured it into during the 1980s, and its desire to 
be a 'great aid power'. The opportunity that the theatre of the South 
Pacific offered an ambitious nation like Japan to disp lay an increased 
commitment to the international community, as well as a desire to 
counter China's and Taiwan's increased role, have further 
strengthened its duty to the region. On a broader level, its efforts can 
be seen as a "symbol of the contribution Japan can make to 
international society" and its 'earnest efforts' globally have 'earned' it 
10 Finin and Wesley-Smith, p.2 
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a "trusted and honored position in the world community".l1 The 
motivation to be seen as such should not be under-estimated. 
5.5 EFFORTS TO CREATE A MORE FAVOURABLE IMAGE OF 
JAPAN WITHIN THE REGION: 
The post Cold War era, as indicated above with regard to new 
forms of fisheries grant aid, has seen Japan respond in new ways to the 
demands of the region. In many ways, Japan has tried to portray itself in 
more favourable terms to the Pacific Island countries. Japan has been 
generally supportive of regional efforts to hasten the decolonisation of 
New Caledonia, and has supported attempts to end nuclear testing at 
Moruroa Atoll at a time when the United States was reluctant to do so. 
Partly as a consequence of its desire not to interfere in domestic politics 
of recipient nations, and partly to maintain support of island leaders, 
Japan has persisted with a respectful diplomatic style. It should come as 
no surprise then, that in its response to the political turmoil in Fiji in 
June 2000, Japan was characteristically conspicuous by its lack of 
criticism. 
This continuing quest to gain respect within the region is further 
evident in a number of other changes in Japan's aid diplomacy aft(1r 
1990. While the majority of Japanese aid remains bilateral in nature, an 
11 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual 1998, 
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increasing proportion has been given to regional organisations in recent 
years, including the South Pacific Forum, the East-West Center's 
Pacific Islands Development Program at the University of Hawaii, the 
South Pacific Regional Environmental Program and the South Pacific 
Commission. Until recently, Japan has not advocated major structural 
adjustment in the region, Unlike Australia, largely because regional 
leaders balk at this method of stimulating economic growth. 12 
5.6 AID FOR VOTES? 
The use of aid to gain favour in the region during the 1990s can 
be seen as part of a growing awareness of the political power that some 
Pacific island countries possess within international institutions. A 
commentator on regional affairs, Bill Bodde, a former high ranking 
American diplomat in the Marshall Islands and Fiji and non-resident 
U.S. Ambassador to Kiribati, Tonga and Tuvalu, believes Japan has 
three major aims that it wishes to achieve by giving aid: the goals of 
fishing rights, deep seabed rights and votes in the United Nations. 13 The 
first two have been addressed, but the fmal goal requires comment. 
Eight of the region's countries are voting members of the United 
Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998 
12 Finin and Wesley-Smith, p.8 
13 W. Bodde, "Summit to boost Japan's influence in Pacific", Pacific Islands Report, Pacific 
Islands Development Program/Center for Pacific Island Studies, October 12, 1997, p.1 
(http://pidp.ewc.hawaii.edulpireport/speciallpjj-03.html) 
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Nations General Assembly.14 These states co-ordinate their diplomacy 
through the South Pacific group (SOP AC) and the Alliance of Small 
Island States and have the potential, as a bloc, to tip the balance in a 
vote crucial to Japan. All, as table 4 indicates are reliant on Japanese 
aid. Furthermore, while the request-based nature of Japanese aid and its 
preference to finance large scale infrastructure projects makes it hard to 
gauge trends in aid levels, it is apparent that aid to these nations has 
increased, and the Micronesian countries have become recipients of 
Japanese aid. 
Japan's attempts to sway these eight countries with voting rights 
on the United Nations was evident during the Japan-South Pacific 
Forum Summit Meeting, or Tokyo Summit as it was popularly known, 
held on October 13 and 14, 1997. The summit was significant in that it 
marked the first time the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
shown real signs of a desire on the part of key Foreign Ministry 
officials to hold collective talks with the Forum countries. IS During the 
summit, Prime Minister Hashimoto called, in particular, for the Forum 
members to support Japan in the Third United Nations' Conference on 
Climatic Change, held in Kyoto, several months after the summit. 
14 Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau 
15 The summit's purpose, ostensibly, was to examine new means of attaining economic self-
sufficiency in the region and for advancing relations between Japan and the Forum. Topics including 
trade, investment, aid and tourism were discussed by the presidents and prime ministers of sixteen 
independent or self-governing nations who attended. 
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During his keynote address, Hashimoto noted: "I would like to request 
your cooperation for the success of this historic conference. ,,16 He 
elaborated on Japan's basic philosophy to further promote its relations 
with the region, which he called "Four-Pillar Cooperation",17 which 
was indicative of just how important 'cooperation' through the use of 
South Pacific island voting rights had become for Japan. 
5.7 THE TOKYO SUMMIT: AN ASSESSMENT: 
The Tokyo Summit, while a useful diplomatic exercise for 
Japan, appeared to produce little of substance for the future. The Joint 
Declaration of both the Forum members and Japan, it must be noted, 
was particularly vague, and included no real action agenda of 
substance. IS Hashimoto's eloquent speech, when read as a whole, 
indicated the need to make Forum members aware of Japan's reduction 
16 Pacific Islands RepOli, Pacific Islands Development Program/Center for Pacific Studies, 
East-West Center, University of Hawaii, "Keynote Speech by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto at 
the Japan-South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting, October 13, 1997",p.3 
(http://pidp.ewc.hawaii.edu/PIReprt/Specialll 0-21-A.html) 
17 Hashimoto's First Pillar concemed the preservation of the region's "blissful character" of 
natural resources and cultural traditions. 
The second alluded to the need to foster economic self-reliance in the region. 
The third, 'cooperation through official development assistance', referred to how Japan 
would continue to give high priority to the region in its aid budget. He added, however, that "at the 
same time, I ask your cooperation towards fuliher effective and efficient economic implementation 
of the economic assistance, given that Japan is currently promoting all-out financial reforms under 
an extremely difficult financial situation." 
The fourth and final pillar was "cooperation in the intemational fora to tackle global 
issues", Ibid.pp.2-3 
18 111 the Joint Declaration, Japan and the Forum members recognised that their development 
was mutually supportive; that they ought to work together in the United Nations and other 
intemational fora to protect the environment; that youth exchange programmes be set up; that public 
sector reforms aimed at promoting sustainable development and a closer integration into the world 
economy be continued; and that private sector development was vital to the future of the region. 
Pacific Islands Report, Pacific Islands Development Program/Centre for Pacific Studies, "Joint 
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of aid to the region by up to 10 percent as a result of Japan's own 
economic downturn. Thus, greater economic self-reliance was called 
for by the Japanese Prime Minister. 
Given the lack of any real new policy initiatives, was the 
summit "an epoch-making event paving the way for the future in a long 
history of cooperation" between Japan and the Forum members, as 
Hashimoto stated?19 It is profitable to look at the contrasting views of 
commentators to assess it significance. It came, Sandra Tarte argues, at 
a time when Japan, like other donor governments, wanted to reduce its 
aid levels to the region. She was very critical of it, and added, "If they 
think about the region at all now, it is in terms of votes in the United 
Nations, tuna and as a holiday destination", such is the marginal place 
the Pacific Islands play in Japanese foreign policy.20 Tarte's criticism is 
perhaps unfounded. Japan remains committed to the region as 
evidenced by the departure in policy towards multilateral dealings with 
the island leaders in the form of a summit. Certainly, the summit served 
Declaration on the occasion of the Japan-South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting", October 13, 
1997 ,pp.l-3 \'.".'11' ,uln,e< ',"Y '''''c'-C'C'Cl'0,'''-',,",'.!.!C.'. "ll".!c""'~'~J!..'Cv'C".!..!="",=, 
19 Pacific Islands Report, Pacific Islands Development Program/Centre for Pacific Islands 
Studies, East-West Centre, University of Hawaii, "Keynote Speech by Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto at the Japan-South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting, October 13, 1997" 
"",',!:"""=""..c":,,,"=,,',',.,,,',=.c:,'=.,,==:.;cCC,~C:="',=3~' .. =~','='C'.L p.3 
20 Tarte believes it was all so low-key that the term summit was hardly appropriate. The fact 
that no major announcements on aid occurred, usually a standard part of Japanese summit 
diplomacy, and because the most highly contentious and politically sensitive area in the region's 
relations with Japan, fisheries management, was not on the agenda, made it a rather pointless affair. 
Islands Business, 50-51 
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to express reduced aid, but that did not necessarily mark a 
marginalisation of the region, as future events were to show. 
For Gerald Finin and Terence Wesley-Smith, on the other hand, 
the summit marked the appropriate time for Japan to advance the nature 
of its relationship with the Forum members. They argue that the summit 
occurred, deliberately, at a time when other Pacific powers, most 
notably the United States, were reducing their roles in the region, as 
discussed above. It should be noted, however, that the United States' 
role in the region had begun to decline prior to 1997, which brings into 
question the basis of their assessment. 
The summit, Finin and Wesley-Smith believe, may well signal 
Japan's desire to become a more influential leader in the region; a move 
away from its 'leading from behind' stance.21 In addition, they argue, it 
is indicative of Japan's intention to continue, and probably expand, its 
involvement in the region, which is part of a wider effort to take a more 
active role in the Asia-Pacific region, not an unwanted bid for regional 
hegemony. Thus, Japan has an 'obligation' to ensure the security of the 
region in the face of a declining American role, and the meddling of 
other powers. This 'obligation', they point out, is matched by 
'opportunities' which are complex and "include a determination to 
cement relations with countries whose vast marine Exclusive Economic 
21 G.A. Finin and T. Wesley-Smith, p.2 
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Zones are rich in as-yet-untapped seabed minerals, possess the bulk of 
the world's tuna, and whose larger islands contain gold, oil, gas, 
copper, timber, and other raw materials. ,,22 
It should be seen, therefore, that the Tokyo Summit did receive 
critical analysis by commentators, yet the lack of consensus of Japan's 
motives seemed indicative of the uncertainty concerning Japan's future 
relationship with the region. It is useful, therefore, to examine 
developments since that time, most notably the second summit between 
Japan and the South Pacific Forum members, to assess how Japan's 
involvement in the region may change in the twenty first century. 
5.8 PALM 2000 AND BEYOND: 
A second summit recently took place in Miyazaki, Japan, on 
April 22, 2000. PALM 2000, as it was commonly known, was attended 
by the leaders of 14 Forum nations. Like the first summit, little of any 
substance emerged from the meeting. 'Concrete results' were limited to 
an increase of U.S. $4 million in aid 23 and a joint declaration on 
environmental issues in the region. The latter was typically vague. It 
'recognised' the range of environmental issues facing the region, and 
advocated conservation and sustainable management of biodiversity to 
22 Finin and Wesley-Smith, p.2 
23 $1 million was set aside for Information Technology training, $2 million for health-related 
schemes, and $1 million for student exchange programmes. 
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ensure that the regIOns 'precious resources' were passed down to 
b . 24 su sequent generatIOns. 
The "Miyazaki PALM Declaration: Our Common Vision for the 
Future", while also not specific, is most interesting as a guide to how 
Japan now views the region. The 'common vision on Tomorrow's 
Pacific' is particularly noteworthy. It is said that the region's leaders 
need to take an 'active role within international frameworks as viable 
players.' With eight regional cO,untries as members of the United 
Nations, as well as a host of other major international institutions, 
attempted persuasion of these countries to support Japanese initiatives 
may be a defining aspect of Japan's future aid diplomacy. 
To achieve their 'potential', a commitment to reforms aimed at 
promoting sustainable development through a number of mid-to-Iong-
term priorities by Pacific island countries was advocated.25 Other 
24 "PALM 2000: Statement on Environment in the Pacific", Pacific Islands Report, Pacific 
Islands Development Program/Centre for Pacific Studies, East-West Centre, University of Hawaii, 
April 26, 200 ~lJ; Il}'ci ,I Jm*':;YLI·"J.A;L2Y;II!! l'I~I·I!;.C11S,i',\1L;L61\1\,!,:Jj 3J.1lJll,'L'j"" 'c":\J.lo',ll!.I,llJ 
25 These were: 
(l)Capacity-building through improvement of education and training, support for 
industrial development and promotion, active use and dissemination of information and 
telecommunications technology; 
(2) promotion of economic reform, private sector development and improved trade and 
investment environments; 
(3)Environmentally sound improvement of basic infrastructure forming the basis of the 
Forum member's lives and industries, including the development of clean energy; 
(4)Seeking a balanced outcome for all economies including Forum member countries 
through future negotiations on global trading rules; 
(5)Creation and adoption of appropriate measures to address and mitigate the effects of 
the economic and environmental vulnerability of Forum member countries. 
"Miyazaki PALM Declaration: Our Common Vision for the Future" Pacific Islands Report, 
Pacific Islands Development Program/Centre for Pacific Studies, East-West Center, University of 
Hawaii, April 26, 2000, p.2 
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priorities, of a more general nature, were mentioned for the mid-to-
long term. Of note, was the 'strengthening cooperation in addressing 
issues relating to seabed mineral and renewable resources; cooperation 
in promoting dialogue between coastal states and shipping states to 
address the concerns of Pacific island countries regarding the 
shipment of radioactive materials through the Pacific region; joint 
efforts at promoting common interests in international organisations 
and at international fora; and the early realisation of comprehensive 
United Nations reforms, including Security Council reforms.26 A 
closer networking with the Forum Secretariat and international 
organisations such as the United Nations was also advocated. Further 
summits, every two to three years, were agreed to. 
So what can be made of it all? For one observer, PALM 2000 
served, from Japan's perspective, to build better relations with the 
regional governments in its continuing effort to secure a permanent 
United Nation's Security Council seat, access to tuna, and rights to the 
island nations' undersea mineral wealth. 27 The quest for economic 
reform is most interesting. Japan had been reluctant for much of the 
1990s to encourage macro-economic policy revision in the region, 
26 Miyazaki PALM Declaration, p.3 
27 A. Hulsen, "PALM 2000 Summit Ends in Miyazaki with Announcement of New Japanese 
Initiatives", Pacific Islands Report, Pacific Islands Development Program/Centre for Pacific 
Studies, East-West Center, University of Hawaii, April 24, 2000, p.l 
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according to prescriptions of stmctural adjustment set out by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as alluded to above. 
The emphasis on economic reform since the late 1980s has 
become increasingly pronounced in multilateral aid fora because of 
economIc reform in donor countries, which led to fiscal austerity 
measures; the end of the Cold War, which removed political 
imperatives to aid; the apparent economic successes of those 
developing countries which have pursued market and export oriented 
development strategies; and the worsening cycle of poverty in other 
developing countries, burdened with debt, overpopulation and 
environmental degradation.28 For the South Pacific, the World Bank's 
recommended approach to development is based on "the need to invest 
in people, to foster a climate for enterprise, to integrate in the world 
economy, and to pursue stable macro-economic policies. ,,29 
Because of a respect for the sovereignty of recipient nations, 
Japan has been averse to using aid to encourage structural adjustment 
policies and political reform. While it did begin to change, a uniquely 
Japanese perspective on what ought to constitute stmctural adjustment 
perpetuated.30 PALM 2000, however, championed World Bank 
28 S. Tarte, Japan's aid diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, p.211 
29 Ibid. p.212 
30 Japan disagreed with the World Banle's view of structural adjustment characterised by the 
free market approach, based on liberalisation and privatisation. It favoured, instead, an 'activist 
government model of East Asian development'. For more, See S. Tarte, Japan's aid diplomacy and 
the Pacific Islands, pp.214-216 
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rhetoric, which is an interesting transfOlmation for Japan. Whether this 
policy reversal reflects an acceptance of the World Bank philosophy 
remains to be seen. It is perhaps more likely that it reflects Japan's 
willingness to be seen by the donor community to be a 'leader' because 
of its role as the world's largest source of ODA. 
Part of the answer to how Japan's aid diplomacy may develop in 
the future may be found in a recent survey of Japan's ODA by the 
DAC.31 In it, Japan was criticised for making 'few interventions' to 
encourage economic reform and 'good governance' in recipient nations, 
in spite of the 'decisive' role both play on the path to 'development'?2 
The Asian economic crisis, however, had forced Japan to reconsider its 
'development model' which emphasises economic infrastructure to one 
with "a broader concern with social development, poverty, institutional 
and governance issues" which is beginning to emerge. As a 
consequence, it was noted that 
Japan's thinlring has evolved recently, endorsing the ideas 
that 'human-centred development' and the enhancement of 
individual's welfare should be the key concepts in Japan's 
ODA, and that economic growth is only a means to achieve 
them. There has also been a shift from a formal 'request 
basis' stance to a more pro-active approach in proposing 
projects in areas such as environmental, human rights, 
capacity building, and good governance.33 
32 Ibid. pA 
33 Ibid. p.2 
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Japan's 'more pro-active approach' is evident in a new focus on 
'poverty elimination', 'women in development', 'human resource 
development' and other DAC-endorsed concepts. ODA's future 
directions, as outlined in annual reports by the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, include further adherence to the Initiatives for 
Sustainable Development, increasing humanitarian assistance, and 
responding to environmental degradation, population explosion, AIDS, 
food and energy crises, drug abuse, terrorism and even intemational 
crime. 34 Japanese aid, therefore, has corne to represent a broad range of 
aims. Whether the rhetoric becomes reality and how the 'new' Japanese 
aid philosophy impacts upon the South Pacific will become evident in 
the years ahead. It seems likely, however, that Japan will continue as a 
leading donor in the region, such are the range of motivations that its 
ODA is able to fulfil. 
34 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual 
Report, 1998, p.206 
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5.9 A CONCERN WITH REFORM AND EFFICIENCY: A NEW 
AGENDA: 
Changing Aid for a Changing World, a 1992 policy paper by 
the Ministry for Trade and Overseas Development, is a particularly 
interesting examination of Australian aid in the post-Cold War era. 
It was the ftrst signiftcant review of Australia's aid programme to 
focus on the changed international environment after the cessation 
of the East-West rivalry. Its analysis of the 'new' world was 
particularly instructive. The demise of a bi-polar world, it noted, saw 
collective and global security enhanced. As a consequence, other 
issues, most notably economic reform, good governance and human 
rights became the subject of greater international debate. The end 
result was that development was deemed more, not less, urgent, as 
donors had to adapt to the world of the 1990s.35 
To a large extent, Australian policy makers were influenced 
by the 1992 United Nations' Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro. Agenda 21, as it 
came to be called, represented a new benchmark in global consensus 
on the approached needed for sustained development in recipient 
countries, and gained Australian backing. Central to the success of 
35 Ministry for Trade and Development, Qllmging Aid for a Changing World: Key Issues 
for Australia's Aid Program in the 1990s, Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 
1992, pp.I-3 
136 
sustainable development were a number of policies: 1) sustained 
and broad-based economic growth to generate employment and 
income which would increase individual opportunities as well as 
providing the necessary resources for fundamental economic and 
social-infrastructure; 2) a greater role for the private sector to 
encourage its development; 3) reform of the public sector, by 
reducing its size and role and improving its quality to ensure its 
efficient and transparent operation; 4 )the need for freer trade, 
improved market access and the urgent removal of trade distorting 
practices; 5) priority attention to strengthening the human resources 
base of developing countries, including the role of women in 
development and the need for health, education, family planning 
and other social services; 6) the participation of people of 
developing countries in the development process; 7) an emphasis on 
ecologically sustainable development.36 All seven, can now be 
found in Australian aid policy. 
Broad-based economic growth to generate the resources 
necessary for sustained development was the philosophy proposed 
to guide Australia's aid programme in the 1990s. Specific attention 
to private sector development was advocated, but because it did not 
improve the living conditions of all, emphasis was placed on the 
36 Changing Aid for a Changing World, pp. 6-7 
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human dimensions of development, especially population, health, 
children, HIV / AIDS, women, education, human rights and good 
governance. An 'integrated' approach to sustainable development, 
incorporating economIC, ecological, social and cultural 
'd . d 37 cons! erations was propose . 
Of significance, is the discussion of good governance. It 
stressed that Australia, unlike other donors, does not make aid 
conditional on either good governance or respect for human rights, 
or equate the former with the imposition of Western-style models of 
democracy. It is "understood more broadly as effective management 
of a country's social and economic resources in a manner that is 
open, transparent, accountable and equitable. ,,38 In reference to the 
South Pacific, 'sluggish' economic growth, despite the relatively 
high levels of aid received, was because domestic policies were 
hampering performance.39 Thus, a need for regional governments to 
make crucial structural reforms and to stimulate private sector 
investment to foster more effective growth was deemed necessary, 
as increased aid flows were not the solution. The role of the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank in policy dialogue, because 
37 Changing Aid for a Changing World, pp.I-3 
38 Ibid. p.17 
39 This was the World Bank's assessment of the region's lack of economic growth. 
138 
of their expertise, was strongly stated and was a central theme of the 
1· 40 po ICY paper. 
There were few other specific references to the South 
Pacific, although it was noted that the 'special relationship' with the 
region would remain a priority for Australian aid because of 
humanitarian, strategic and commercial reasons. Structural reform 
was justified on the basis that Australian aid was of 'critical 
importance' to the region, and thus 'efficient and effective' delivery 
was essential. A major policy shift for Papua New Guinea away 
from untied budget support towards programme aid, on the grounds 
that it would foster development while resulting in substantial 
returns for Australian industry, was advocated.41 Furthermore, such 
a move would be more accountable to Australian taxpayers, enable 
greater coordination with the World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank, as well as creating a greater opportunity for Women in 
Development programs.42 It was indicative, therefore, of the degree 
to which aid in the post-Cold War era had to be justified on a 
40 Changing Aid for a Changing World, pp.21-22 
41 The radical re-shape of the Papua New Guinea aid progranulle, it is pointed out, would 
see a phasing out of budget support by the year 2000. At the same time, a progressive increase 
in programme aid would [ollow, with a target level of expenditure of A$300 million by that 
year. It will focus on such sectors as law and order, health, education, economic infrastructure 
and agriculture, including an emphasis on rural development, poverty alleviation and the 
environment, rather than designed around a specific project or activity. Ibid. pp.20-22 
42 Changing Aid for a Changing World, p.21-22 
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number of grounds, as the security threat posed by the Soviet Union 
could no longer justify aid expenditure. 
5.10 THE SIMONS' REPORT AND THE QUEST FOR 
INCREASED SELF-RELIANCE: 
A significant development in Australian aid philosophy after 
the 1992 policy paper, Changing Aid for a Changing World, is 
evident in the Simons' Report. In it, aid dependency is criticised 
because "it can compromise national sovereignty, stifle local 
initiative and create problems of mendicancy. ,,43 Many Pacific 
island countries, it is noted, would remain aid-dependent for the 
foreseeable future, but larger and wealthier ones did not have to be. 
A 'graduation' from Australia ODA, therefore, was recommended 
for countries in the latter group, including Fiji, which had the most 
potential to become 'self-reliant'. Tonga and Westem Samoa, 
because of their smaller and narrower resource bases and good 
'social and economic indicators' have the potential to develop 
'under their own steam.' Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands are seen 
as having good long-term prospects, while Tuvalu and Kiribati are 
adjudged as never being able to achieve self-reliance.44 
43 P. Simons, Report of the Committee of Review on Australia's Overseas Aid Program, 
Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1997, pp.1 09-110 
44 P. Simons, p.1l2 
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Because of the differences between Pacific island countries, 
in terms of their potential for 'self-reliance', 
A differentiated approach to the development needs of 
the Pacific is therefore required. The approach needs to 
be based on: the level of income and incidence of 
poverty; their capacity for self-reliance; the extent to 
which the government can demonstrate a genuine 
commitment to sustainable development policies; and 
broader foreign policy interests. Broadly, such an 
approach has been pursued by Australia, but it may be 
appropriate to re-examine the quantum and nature of 
• 4-~ t ° dO °d ItO 45 aSSlSu.nce 0 III IVl ua coun nes. 
A reconsideration of aid relations with individual countries should 
be interpreted in light of Australia's quest to spend its aid more 
efficiently in the 1990s and the great emphasis placed on aid 
conditionality. The latter is evident in Australia's Policy and 
Management Refonn Program, established in 1995, to assist island 
governments to implement reform of the public sector. Over A$9 
million was allocated to this programme and allocated in addition to 
bilateral country allocations of ODA based on a commitment to 
change to provide "both an incentive for reforn1 and the means to 
pursue it". 46 
As part of the efficiency drive, support for regional 
organisations, including the Forum Secretariat, the South Pacific 
45 Ibid. p.1l2 
46 P. Simons, p.ll!. The restructuring and upgrading of Western Samoa's Treasury over a 
5-year period, for a cost of A$7 million, is a good example of the nature of reforms encouraged 
under the programme. 
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Commission and the University of the South Pacific, was further 
encouraged: 
There are obvious economies of scale to be gained from 
effective development-focused regional organisations and 
programs active in the Pacific. Australia is a major 
supporter of the regional framework of organisations 
and programs. This support complements Australia's 
bilateral aid programs to the region and can also provide 
a useful opportunity to enter into dialogue with island 
governments on economic reform and resource 
t . 47 managemen Issues. 
Support for multilateral and regional agencies was seen as the most 
effective means to support countries outside of the 'core group,48 
although continued membership of these organisations was 
dependent on their viability and relevance of mandates, as well as a 
lack of duplication.49 
When read as a whole, the Simons' Report endorses the 
need for economic and social reform and good governance 
expounded in Changing Aid for a Changing World: 
Open, transparent, accountable and equitable 
government practices are prerequisites for sustainable 
development. An aid program can, and should, 
encourage good governance directly, through activities 
aimed at strengthening the capacity of political, 
administrative and legal institutions, and indirectly, 
through the ongoing dialogue that surrounds an effective 
aid relationship, both in day-to-day project 
47 Ibid. p.111 
48 The 'core group' comprised Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
and Western Samoa. 
49 Ibid. p.112 
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implementation and in broader policy and planning 
discussions. 50 
Good governance, including effective government policies and 
administration, respect for human rights, the rule of law and 
participatory development, IS necessary for sustainable 
development, it is noted. Effective governance should also be the 
criteria used in deciding the allocation of Australian aid.51 A move 
towards development, according to how Australian perceives it, has 
thus become an established feature of the 'new agenda' for aid to 
the region. 
5.11 AUSTRALIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION: 
As in the Cold War, how the international donor community 
perceived Australia had a major bearing on the direction its aid 
philosophy has taken. Changing Aid for a Changing World 
continued the theme: ''the aid progran1 represents one of the ways in 
which the world perceives and interacts with Australia. The 
program also contributes significantly to Australia's role as a good 
international citizen and our position as a middle-ranked power.,,52 
The use of the term 'middle-ranked power' is a development from 
the 1980s, and suggests a development in how Australia sees its role 
50 P. Simons, p.3 
51 Ibid. p.14 
52 Changing Aid for a Changing World, p.8 
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in world affairs. A greater volume of aid and role in setting an 
agenda for how it is utilised, should be interpreted in this light. 
The Simons' Report included a rationale for maintaining 
Australia's aid programme on the basis that other traditional South 
Pacific aid donors were no longer doing so. Mention of the reduced 
United States' aid budget, which essentially restricted its support to 
the former United States' Trust Territories, Palau, the Federated 
States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, and the declining 
roles of Great Britain and the European Union, were outlined.53 A 
need to fulfil its duty to the international aid community, while 
appearing to be a better 'global citizen' had perpetuated. 
5.12 COMMERCIAL MOTIVATIONS: 
As in the Cold War, the commercial benefits to Australia 
from its aid programme are outlined in Changing Aid for a 
Changing World. What had changed, however, was the justification 
of economic reform on the grounds that it would further the 
development process in recipient nations, which in turn would have 
positive consequences for Australia. Thus, the liberalisation of trade 
and market-oriented economies would improve the 'capacity' of a 
53 British ODA, it was noted, declined from US$20 million in the early 1990s to US$9 
million by 1995. P. Simons, p.109 
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developing nation, which would then lead to increased trade 
relationships with Australia.54 The role Australian aid played in the 
economic success of the Asia-Pacific region, which brought with it 
'significant dividends' in economic terms, proved influential in this 
regard. 
The Simons' Report, as the Jackson Report had 13 years 
earlier, examined the variety of benefits that involvement in the aid 
programme would result in, as well as the argument that economic 
growth in recipient nations would in the long-term boost the 
Australian economy. However, no other commercial justifications 
were discussed by Simon and his Committee. 
5.13 SECURITY MOTIVATIONS: 
Changing Aid for a Changing World does not devote much 
attention to security considerations as a motivation behind aid.55 
Certainly, with the Soviet threat no longer, this was not surprising. 
Security, in a broad sense, in terms of international and regional 
stability, is justified on the grounds that it is a prerequisite for the 
freeing of world trade which is essential for Australia's future well 
54 Changing Aid for a Changing World, p.8 
55 Perhaps this is because it was a policy paper by the Ministry for Trade and Overseas 
Development, unlike the Jackson Report and the 1989 review of aid which took more into 
consideration the Ministry of Defence's position on the utilisation of aid. 
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being. 56 The greater connection between democracy and economic 
growth, however, further suggests that security had an increasingly 
economic basis in the 'new' world of the 1990s. 
It would be wrong, however, to portray the regIOn as no 
longer being important for Australia in the post-Cold War period. 
This comes through clearly in a 1997 Australian Department of 
Defence publication, Australia's Strategic Policy. In it, it is argued 
that "Australia's basic geo-strategic interests in Papua New Guinea 
and the smaller island states of the Southwest Pacific are similar to 
the interests we have in Indonesia - to prevent their territory being 
used as a base close to Australia for attacks upon us. ,,57 In effect, 
this meant that Australia, as was argued during the Cold War, had 
"an enduring strategic influence in ensuring that no potentially 
hostile power achieves undue influence which undennines the 
sovereignty of our Southwest Pacific neighbours. ,,58 Meeting the 
economic needs of the region and strengthening the 'habit' of good 
governance would, it was noted, continue to serve Australia's 
. . 59 
strategIC mterests. 
56 Changing Aid for a Changing World, pp.1-3 
57 Australian Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Policy, Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1997,p.13 
(http://wv.[w.minister.defence.govt.au!/sr97 Iwelcome.html) 
58 Ibid. p.13 
59 Ibid. p.20 
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A more recent Green Paper by the Department of Defence, 
Defence Review 2000, expanded on the themes evident in 1997. 
Australia's immediate strategic interests, in the 'arc' stretching from 
Indonesia to the islands of the Southwest Pacific, could be 
threatened by the 'weakening' of 'national cohesion' throughout the 
region, makes political instability all the more likely. The Southwest 
Pacific was assessed as being a potential threat to Australia because: 
... the political, economic and territorial fragility of these 
countries makes them vulnerable. Our planning may 
need to take into account the possibility - albeit remote 
at present - that at some time these countries could be 
subject to attempts by non-state actors or potentially 
hostile countries to erode their sovereignty.60 
'Non-state actors', it can be assumed from a reading of the paper, 
included the threat posed by organised crime to the region. The 
interconnected world of the twenty first century means that turmoil 
anywhere in the world has the potential to impact on Australian 
trade. Thus, security was thus further defined in economic terms, in 
contrast with the Cold War, when ideological concerns governed 
defence policymaking and expenditure. 
60 Australian Department of Defence, Defence Review 2000 (Govemment Green Paper on 
defence policy), Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 2000, p.13 
(http://whitepager.defence.govt.au) 
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5.14 HUMANITARIAN MOTIVATIONS: 
The whole economIC and political reform agenda and 
conception of good governance, as discussed above, was justified on 
the grounds of a concern with increasing the efficiency of 
Australia's aid programme, but also humanitarian foundations. The 
principle of social justice, a defining characteristic of policy under a 
Labour Government, it is noted, is the basis of the aid programme. 
Furthermore, humanitarianism is the 'centre' of aid philosophy. By 
making recipient countries more democratic and market-oriented, 
quicker economic growth can be achieved.61 The concern with 
expanding efforts to expand the aid programme to benefit particular 
groups in society, while heavily influenced by the World Bank 
conception of development, did represent a greater emphasis on 
improving the quality of life in developing nations. As a 
consequence, greater attention was paid to the human dimensions of 
development. These included, among others, education, health, 
poverty alleviation, Women in Development, children, HIV / AIDS, 
human rights, encouragement of the rural sector and population 
issues, so that the benefits of change would be felt more widely 
61 Changing Aid for a Changing World, pp.7-8 
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throughout society. 62 The importance of the environment, as part of 
the integrated approach to sustained development, was also 
addressed. 
An increased proportion of Australia's aid budget for 
multilateral organisations was justified on the grounds of efficiency 
and humanitarianism. As a result, 12.3 percent of Australian aid in 
1991 had found its way to the Major Development Banks and 
various United Nations' organisations compared with only 5.6 
percent in 1983.63 The Major Development Banks, because of their 
expertise in reform and ability to coordinate donor activities, were 
preferred. The benefits to Australian firms and consultants from 
multilateral contracts was again used to justifY Australia's stance, 
but greater emphasis on the ability of multilateral institutions to lead 
the new reform agenda had become the strongest selling-point. This 
was in contrast to the Cold War era when the commercial benefits to 
Australia were the major justification. 
5.15 2000 and beyond: 
By the end of the twentieth century, and even after the threat 
posed by the Cold War had subsided, Australian aid policy 
62 Changing Aid for a Changing World, pp.22-25 
63 Ibid. p.36 
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maintained a posture based on a very simple philosophy: 
"Australia's development cooperation has a single objective: the 
promotion of sustainable economic and social advancement of 
people in developing countries. It springs from multiple 
motivations: humanitarian concern, foreign policy and commercial 
interests. ,,64 While the philosophy has changed little since the 
Jackson Report, the Cold War brought about a growing emphasis 
on political and economic reform and efficiency based on the need 
to bring countries to 'graduation' or self-reliance. A greater 
concern for the human dimension of development can be seen as 
part of a quest to be a dutiful donor, in line with the prevailing 
development orthodoxy. The commercial basis of aid has 
perpetuated, while security has always been at the forefront of 
policy discussion. 
According to DAC, "With its geographical location, 
Australia's security and economic progress are probably more 
closely linked to the fortunes of a particular set of developing 
countries than is the case for most other Member countries 
in ... DAC.,,65 A concern with this ethos runs through two later 
policy papers, the White Paper on foreign and trade policy, In the 
64 Changing Aid for a Changing World, p.6 
65 DAC, Aid Review of Australia, p.l (http://wwv •. oecd.org/dac/htm/australia99.htm) 
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National Interest and Better Aid for a Better Future.66 As a result, 
the 'South Pacific' and Papua New Guinea should continue to be 
allocated aid well into the future. 'Graduation', if it occurs, will 
reduce the number of Pacific island nation recipients, although for 
a few, aid from Australia or elsewhere will remain a necessity. 
Australia has satisfied that requirement, and will feel compelled to 
continue to do so. With the exception of Papua New Guinea, the 
remainder of the region receives a tiny percentage of Australia's 
total aid budget. From Australia's perspective, therefore, ODA to 
the region has proved a particularly prudent investment in terms of 
meeting its range of motivations. 
66 DAC, Aid Review of Australia. pp.I-2 
CHAPTER SIX: 
COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION: 
Having individually examined Australia and Japan as ODA 
donors during the Cold War and its aftermath, it is now possible to 
compare the two. The individual focus hereto was influenced by the 
collaborative efforts of Schraeder et aI, who deemed it necessary to do 
so to highlight the extent to which there was overlap between donor 
motivations, but also differences, prior to making a comparison. 1 Their 
approach to 'cross-national analysis' demonstrated that donors are 
influenced by varying combinations of foreign policy interests, as a 
result of their different historical backgrounds and positions with the 
international system. They concede that no two are alike, although 
'general conclusions' of similarities can be drawn. 2 The evidence 
sun-ounding Japan and Australia confirms the claim of Schraeder et al 
that ''the results clearly reject the rhetorical statements of policymakers 
in the industrialized North who publicly assert that foreign aid is an 
altruistic tool of foreign policy.,,3 
This chapter concludes the thesis by drawing together the 
examinations of Japanese and Australian aid in the Cold War and post-
Cold War periods. A comparison, based on the categories used in 
1 Schraeder et ai, p.301 
2 Ibid. p.319 
3 Ibid. p.319 
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Chapters Three, Four and Five (Humanitarian, Commercial and 
Security motivations, 'Connection with Region', and International 
Reputation) is now possible, although some of these have been 
combined to illustrate the inter-connection between them. A discussion 
on the actual aid programmes of each follows, which serves to 
supplement the discussion on policy. The aid programmes of each 
donor worldwide, the extent of aid conditionality and the 
bilateraVmultilateral ratio are examined as they account, in part, for the 
similarities and differences that exist between Japanese and Australian 
aid to the region. The thesis concludes with a discussion: the 
implications for future research on aid in the South Pacific. 
6.2 HUMANITARIAN MOTIVATIONS AND EACH DONOR'S 
DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY: 
Humanitarian motivations, in the study by Schreader et aT, were 
adjudged not to have been a factor in the African context. In the South 
Pacific, however, as shown, Australia and Japan did have a concern for 
bringing about development, which was evident in their aid 
philosophies, to varying extents. The statistics relating to expenditure 
on different sectors, the overall purposes of aid, (Table 5) reveal the 
153 
different focus of both donors world-wide, which can guide an analysis 
of their commitments to the region. 
TABLE 5: Aid by Major Purposes, 1998: 
Selected Catcgories Australia (%) Japan (%) 
Social and Administrative 55.9 
Education 21.7 
Health and Population 10.6 
Water Supply and Sanitation 3.9 
Economic Infrastructure 12.6 
Transport and Communication 8.9 
Energy 1.8 
Production and Agliculture 9.6 
Programme Assistance 2.8 
Emergency Aid 8.6 
.. Source: StatIstical Annex ofthe 1999 Development CooperatIon Report 
(http:www.oecd/org/dac/dacstats.htm#Dactables) 
19.6 
5.9 
2.7 
9.5 
37.8 
24.3 
13.0 
12.4 
11.9 
1.0 
The table indicates, among other things, a major difference between the 
donors on how best to use economic assistance to improve the living 
standards in recipient nations. 
Japan's greater emphasis on economic infrastructure, has been a 
reflection of its own 'rebuilding' experience in the wake of World War 
II. A belief that 'take off is best attained through economic growth 
which result in social benefits, rather than a more even distribution of 
aid between economic and infrastructure and social spending, is 
reflected in its ODA to the Pacific and elsewhere. It is arguably a 
narrow, economic-oriented attitude, but it highlights the 
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complementarity which exists with the role Japanese foreign investment 
and trading relations play in the development process. The comparative 
lack of social spending might also be construed as an indication of the 
real nature of Japanese 'humanitarianism': that concern for improving 
living standards in rhetoric is seldom reflected in reality. Further, the 
connection between economic growth and po litical stability can be 
similarly interpreted as a concern more with the protection of Japanese 
commercial and security interests than with human rights. Its intention 
to pay closer attention to 'human development' could be interpreted in 
this light. 
Australia, in contrast, has become more focused on the World 
Bank model of economic and political reform in the post-Cold War era. 
Japan's basic approach to development has changed little since the 
1970s, in part an indication of its reluctance to interfere too heavily in 
the domestic affairs of recipient nations. Australia's development 
philosophy has rapidly evolved since the Cold War. The possibility that 
every recipient nation could achieve economic growth, the core of 
development, has been replaced by an acceptance that, in the South 
Pacific context at least, improving the quality of living was a more 
realistic goal. Yet this is not to suggest that Australia has been reluctant 
in the 1990s to attempt to improve the lot of recipient nations, reflected 
in its insistence on greater aid conditionality to foster widespread 
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refonn in line with the prevailing developmental orthodoxy of the time, 
as espoused by the World Bank: and DAC, in particular. 
How should this be interpreted? It has been shown that, in part, it 
was related to Australia's quest to be seen as a responsible donor: a 
good 'international citizen'. On the other hand, it would be fair to 
construe its intention as part of a greater altruistic focus in its aid 
policy. With an end to the Cold War-inspired use of aid to curry favour 
with recipient nations to check any Soviet advance, Australia has the 
opportunity to support greater social and economic change. The new 
emphasis on 'graduation' of a number of Pacific Islands, including Fiji, 
Tonga and (formerly Western) Samoa can itself be viewed as a need to 
make the ODA budget more accountable to a dubious public no longer 
taken in by Cold War rhetoric. It might also be interpreted as a desire to 
more efficiently use that budget to bring about greater 'integrated' 
development. Australia, therefore, has adapted the humanitarian basis 
of its aid to reflect the post-Cold War era to a greater extent than Japan, 
a donor renowned for its rigidity. Australian aid is perhaps more 
humanitarian than ever before, though a range of other interests make 
interpreting it solely as a deeper concern for its 'near neighbours' 
somewhat simplistic. 
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6.3 THE SECURITY DIMENSION, REGIONAL AFFINITY 
AND INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION: 
With the disappearance of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, 
the role ODA played in broad 'security' concerns has changed greatly in 
nature. For both Japan and Australia, a commitment to its major ally, 
the United States, has meant that both continue to attempt to ensure that 
'hostile' nations do not establish a foothold in the region. That 
likelihood, however, has declined greatly in the 1990s, and with it, a 
justification for aid reflecting this rationale. With the declining United 
States and British roles as aid donors in the South Pacific, both Japan 
and Australia have widened the countries they give to. The concern, 
now, is more with being seen to be 'doing good' in the eyes of the 
international community, rather than a need to prevent the advances of 
unwelcome actors in the region. Both have a 'duty' then to maintain 
their efforts, and will presumably continue to do so. 
Australia's geographic location, as noted, has had a major 
bearing on its economic assistance levels to the region. The islands of 
the South Pacific constitute much of the 'arc' of its immediate security 
concerns. While any invasion of Australia is highly unlikely, it would 
be launched from within the 'arc' and this has an impact on Australia's 
defence planning considerations. It should come as no surprise then that 
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the region is accorded the status of first priority m its recent ODA 
planning. 
For Japan, a nation further away from the region, the security 
threat that its aid aims to address now is the important shipping lanes in 
the region. Were these compromised, the consequences for Japan, 
because of its extremely high dependence on trade, would be 
particularly severe. Again, the likelihood of this is extremely minimal 
but it does influence Japanese aid diplomacy. 
Both donors, as noted, have a connection with the region dating 
back several centuries, which has influenced their desire to have aid 
programmes in the South Pacific. Security and commercial motivations, 
however, have more of a bearing on aid flows than 'regional affinity' 
rhetoric which helps justify their aid levels to the Pacific island states. 
The chief distinction is that Australia has been guided more by the 
fOlmer, and Japan the latter, particularly after the end of the Cold War. 
While, therefore, the 'connection with the region' argument should not 
be overstated, it must not be neglected. 
6.4 COMMERCIAL MOTIVATIONS: 
The Japanese aid programme to the South Pacific was founded 
on a need for fish, compromised by the creation of EEZs in 1977, and a 
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'resource diplomacy', similarly influenced by the 1973 Oil Crisis. For 
this reason, the aid programme has primarily been influenced by 
commercial considerations. The majority of Japan's fisheries grant aid 
budget finds its way to the region as a means of 'smoothing' fishing 
access agreements, and most likely will continue to do so. Other 
resources, including timber and minerals are important for Japan, and 
for this reason, it is now the region's largest trading partner. The 
potentially enormous gain that could follow the discovery of cost-
effective methods of extracting the abundance of mineral deposits on 
the ocean floor is a consideration that continues to guide Japanese 
policymaking. This is despite the fact that it is by no means certain that 
extraction would be possible because of the issues of cost and 
environmental destruction, as the latter would almost certainly have 
adverse consequences for Japan's international reputation. 
Economic gain and the need for the region's natural resources 
has largely shaped Japanese aid to the region, although there certainly 
have been other influences. The pressure applied by the United States to 
Japan in 1987 to take a greater responsibility for Western security as a 
response to Soviet 'inroads' was to result in greater aid levels and a 
'doctrine' to illustrate the extent of its concern for the region. Behind it 
all, however, economic benefits were never far away, and will continue 
to be into the future. 
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Australia, like Japan, has a range of commercial benefits which 
relate to its aid programme. It must be borne in mind, however, that 
Papua New Guinea aside, Australian trade with the region is relatively 
small. Yet commercial considerations persisted through the Cold War 
period and into the 1990s. They were not the major determinant of aid 
that they were for Japan, it could be argued, though they were an 
important consideration when aid policy was formulated, as reflected in 
the various official reviews that have been conducted. 
6.5 THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF EACH CATEGORY: 
Having now examined each motivational category, it is necessary 
to reach a conclusion regarding the relative weight each had and has on 
Japan's and Australia's aid policy as it relates to the South Pacific. The 
evidence suggests that Japanese aid has Commercial Motivations as its 
chief determinant. 'Security Considerations' are still evident, though 
they are less of an influence now than during Cold War. The fact that 
the Soviet threat did not translate into increased aid until the mid 1980s, 
and the end of the Cold War soon after, further suggest that economic 
benefits largely determined the nature of Japan's aid relationship. 
International Reputation has always been central to Japan's aid 
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philosophy, while 'Region' and Humanitarian Motivations have been 
less so. 
In Contrast, Security Motivations have been the single largest 
influence on Australian aid over both time periods. Commercial 
Motivations are less important for Australia, though they were still 
significant. Humanitarian Motivations, particularly after the Soviet 
threat ceased, have grown in significance, while International 
Reputation remains a notable incentive. As with Japan, Regional 
Mfmity was the least important determinant of Australian aid 
diplomacy. 
6.6 A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE AID 
PROGRAMMES: 
Having examined the broader humanitarian, security and 
commercial motivations behind the aid policies of Japan and Australia 
as they relate to the South Pacific, it is useful to have a closer look at 
the actual programmes and what they indicate. Table 6 reveals much 
about the aid commitments of both donors in the 1990s. Two important 
impressions are evident. Firstly, the extent to which Japan and Australia 
are the largest donors, and secondly, the degree of complementarity 
regarding which countries they choose to assist. 
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Country 
Cook Is 
Fiji 
Kiribati 
Nauru 
PNG 
Solomon 
Is. 
Tonga 
FSM 
Marshall 
Is. 
Palau 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
TABLE 6: AUSTRALIAN AND JAPANESE AID TO THE 
SOUTII PACIFIC IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA (US$m) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
NZ 8.4 NZ8.8 NZ7.8 NZ7.0 NZ 8.0 NZ8.2 
Aust 1.3 Aust. 1.8 Aust. 2.0 Aust. 1.8 Aust. 1.6 Aust. 1.3 
Japan 0.3 Japan 0.5 France 1.3 Japan 0.5 Japan 0.5 Japan 0.6 
Aust 19.4 Aust.20.5 Aust. 24.6 Japan 20.3 Aust. 15.8 Aust. 14.0 
Japan 9.0 Japan 8.3 Japan 16.4 Aust. 15.2 Japan 11.2 Japan 13.9 
NZ6.2 NZ2.8 NZ5.9 NZ7.3 NZ3.3 NZ6.6 
Japan 9.4 Japan 7.3 Japan 13.9 Japan 5.4 Aust. 5.9 Aust. 4.2 
Aust. 3.6 Aust. 3.2 Aust. 4.4 Aust. 4.4 Japan 3.5 Japan 4.2 
UK. 3.0 UK. 3.2 U.K. 2.3 NZ 1.6 NZ 1.6 NZ1.6 
Aust. 0.13 Aust. 0.31 Aust.0.19 Aust. 0.3 Aust. 2.4 Aust. 1.8 
Japan 0.02 Japan 0.06 Japan 0.05 Japan 0.1 Japan 0.1 Japan 0.4 
NZ 0.01 F.R.G.0.01 
-
Germ. 0.0 Germ. 0.0 NZO.O 
Aust. 262:2 Aust. 262.3 Aust. 242.8 Aust. 221.8 Aust. 234.6 Aust. 238.6 
Japan 38.0 Japan 42.3 Japan 87.9 Japan 27.4 Japan 21.8 Japan 46.1 
F.R.G.8.0 F.R.G.7.4 F.R.G.1O.0 Germ. 9.7 Germ. 9.8 Germ. 6.8 
Aust. 11.5 Japan 10.8 Aust. 10.6 Japan 10.8 Japan 16.0 Japan 17.1 
Japan 8.7 Aust. 9.3 Japan 8.0 Aust. 9.5 Aust. 10.6 AusL 8.5 
U.K. 6.6 U.K. 5.5 U.K. 6.2 U.K. 6.7 U.K. 7.5 NZ3.8 
Japan 10.1 Aus!. 7.6 Aust. 8.7 Japan 12.1 Japan 8.7 Japan 14.4 
Aust. 8.6 Japan 3.4 Japan 5.9 Aust. 7.1 Aust. 8.5 Aust. 8.1 
NZ3.8 NZ2.8 NZ 3.4 NZ4.6 NZ3.4 NZ5.l 
NA NA Japan 10.3 USA 45.0 USA 83.0 USA 52.0 
Germ. 1.1 Japan 15.2 Japan 17.1 Japan 18.2 
USA 1.0 Aust. 0.9 Aus!. 1.2 Aust. 1.4 
NA NA Japan 5.3 USA 24.0 USA 42.0 USA 26.0 
NZO.O Japan 5.4 Japan 3.1 Japan 5.7 
-
Aust. 0.4 Aust. 0.5 Aust. 0.2 
NA NA NA NA USA 191 USA 132 
Japan 7.2 Japan 9.5 
Canada 2.1 AusL 0.2 
Aust. 1.7 Aust. 1.6 Japan 3.5 Aust. 1.8 Aust. 1.8 Aust. 3.5 
NZ 1.1 NZ1.4 Aust. 1.6 NZ 1.1 Japan 1.3 Japan 1.5 
Japan 1.0 UK 0.8 NZ3.0 Japan 0.2 NZ 1.2 NZ 1.2 
Aust. 11.7 Fran. 10.4 Aust. 10.4 Aust. 10.2 Japan 11.6 Japan 12.8 
Fran. 9.2 Aust. 8.8 Fran. 9.5 Fran. 7.8 Fran. 11.1 Aust. 10.8 
Japan 8.1 U.K. 8.6 UK. 8.8 U.K. 5.6 Aust. 9.8 Fran. 10.3 
W. Samoa Japan 9.2 Japan 10.0 Aust. 12.1 Japan 15.8 Japan 22.7 Japan 14.6 
Aust. 8.9 Aus!. 9.2 NZ7.9 Aust. 7.6 Aust. 8.9 Aust. 8.6 
NZ5.8 NZ4.2 Japan 6.9 NZ5.7 NZ5.1 NZ6.3 
.. Source: Japanese MUllStry of Foreign Affmrs, Japan's Official Development ASSistance Annual 
Report, various years. 
1996 
NZ5.6 
AusL 1.1 
Japan 0.3 
Japan 18.6 
Aust. 12.5 
NZ6.6 
Aust. 4.8 
Japan 4.5 
NZ2.0 
Aust. 2.4 
Japan 0.5 
NZO.O 
Aust. 243.6 
Japan 96.2 
NZ 5.5 
Japan 18.2 
Aust. 8.0 
NZ4.3 
Japan 11.5 
Aust. 8.1 
NZ5.6 
USA 102 
Japan 8.7 
Aust. 1.0 
USA 55.0 
Japan 5.7 
Aust. 0.2 
USA 58 
Japan 4.0 
Aust. 0.2 
Japan 4.6 
Aust. 3.1 
NZ1.4 
Aust. 11.7 
Fran. 9.1 
NZ3.7 
Japan 14.3 
Aust. 8.4 
NZ6.7 
In Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu and Western Samoa, Japan and Australia are the two biggest 
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donors. Even in Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall 
Islands, both have taken on a responsibility, albeit small, to assist the 
United States. The vying for top donor status is evident throughout, and 
in Fiji, Solomon Islands and Western Samoa, Japan has surpassed 
Australia. Australia's 'core group' of recipients, Western Samoa, 
Tonga, Kiribati, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu are also the 
largest recipients of Japanese aid. The levels of aid and which countries 
receive it would tend to suggest that each donor's programmes are very 
similar, though this is quite misleading when the programmes are 
examined more closely. 
A closer look at the geographical distribution of each donor's 
bilateral aid (Table 7) reveals the relative insignificance of the region. 
Nevertheless, the South Pacific has been and still is important for both. 
A far greater percentage of Australian aid finds its way to the region, 
when Papua New Guinea is taken into consideration. It reveals, 
therefore, that the region does have more significance for Australia, 
which is reflected in the new reform agenda. 
Table 7: Major Recipients of Australian and Japanese Bilateral Aid 
(0/0): 
1977-78 Australia Japan 1987-88 Australia Japan 1997-98 Australia Japan 
Europe 0 0.7 Europe 0 2.6 Europe 0.1 1.4 
North of 0.4 9 North of 0.9 3.1 North of 2 2.1 
Sahara Sahara Sahara 
South of 2.9 6.9 South of 7 12.2 South of 6.2 10.2 
Sahara Sahara Sahara 
North 0.1 2.3 North 0.1 2.2 North 0.1 4 
and and and 
Central Central Central 
America America America 
South 0 5.7 South 0 4.8 South 
America America America 
Middle 0.1 9.8 Middle 0.2 2.8 Middle 
East East East 
South 8.1 25.3 South 4.9 22.3 South 
and and and 
Central Central Central 
Asia Asia Asia 
Far East 16.5 39.8 Far East 33.2 48.7 Far East 
Asia Asia Asia 
Oceania 71.9 0.4 Oceania 53.6 1.3 Oceania 
Total 100 100 Total 100 100 Total 
Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral 
Source: Statlstical Annex of the 1999 Development Cooperation Report 
(http:www.oecdlorgldac!dacstats.htm#Dactables) 
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0 5.3 
0.5 3.9 
6.9 21.3 
37.8 49.7 
46.5 1.8 
100 100 
The growth in aid delivery by both Japan and Australia has 
changed much over the last four decades, in line with the multiple 
benefits ODA presents to the recipient. This is evident in Table 8. Their 
contributions to the region have, in a sense, mirrored their world-wide 
aid vo lumes. 
TABLE 8: Total ODA Expenditure, Selected Years ($US m): 
Year Australia Japan 
1960 59 105 
1965 119 244 
1970 212 458 
1975 552 1148 
1980 629 3353 
1985 749 3797 
1990 955 9069 
1995 1194 14489 
Source: Statistical Annex ofthe 1999 Development Cooperation Report 
(htlp:www.oecd.orgidac/dacstats.htm#Dactables) 
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Australian and Japanese aid can, therefore, be understood in part by 
their ODA volumes world-wide, but it is necessary to taken more into 
account the nature of their aid programmes to the region, including their 
administration, to show their degree of similarity and difference. 
6.7 THE RESPECTIVE ODA ADMINISTRATIONS: 
In many respects, the differences in the South Pacific aid 
philosophy of both donors stems from their vastly different ODA 
administrations. Australia, through AusAID, has a more coordinated 
administration, under the control of one government ministry, Foreign 
Affairs. Yet other ministries do have an input into the aid decision-
making process, which results in an aid philosophy which reflects a 
broader range of motivations. For the Japanese, however, aid policy is 
less centralised. The Japanese International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Fund (OFCF) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Fisheries Agency (JFA), 
among others, have all played varying roles in the formulation of 
Japanese aid policy. JFA and OFCF, especially, have seen to it that 
favourable fishing access through fisheries grant aid has stayed as the 
basis of Japanese aid since the mid 1970s. The Japanese Ministry of 
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Foreign Aff+airs itself is no stranger, as has been shown, to legitimising 
the link between aid and commercial gain. 
6.8 AID CONDITIONALITY AND THE 
MULTILATERALIBILATERAL RATIO: 
Perhaps one of the most significant differences between 
Australia and Japan as aid donors has been their varying perceptions on 
the extent to which ODA should be conditional on reform within the 
recipient nation. It has been shown that Japan has been reluctant to 
interfere in developing nations' domestic politics, despite the specific 
reference in its 1992 ODA Charter.4 The fact that it is often unpopular 
with the recipient further justifies its stance. Australia, on the other 
hand, has increasingly adopted the W orId Bank ethos on coordinating 
its bilateral aid policy, engaging in policy dialogue good governance 
initiatives, structural adjustment and other reforms. Its greater emphasis 
on encouraging reform and democracy, however, was evident during 
the 1987 Fijian coups, when Australia, albeit briefly, suspended its aid. 
Similarly, in the coup of 2000, Australia halted most non-humanitarian 
development projects - a 30 percent reduction in Australian aid - and 
criticised Fiji at the diplomatic level. Japan, in contrast, was 
conspicuous by its lack of criticism on both occasions. 
4 Japan's ODA Charter, 2 (4): "Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and 
introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights 
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Because of its reluctance to interfere in the domestic politics of 
recipient nations, Japan has difficulty subscribing to the prescriptions of 
the multilateral agencies. Japan's preference for bilateral aid, because of 
its position of strength, means that it will continue to rely on this form 
of aid, although the amount of its multilateral assistance has increased 
in the 1990s. Only when Japan gives money through multilateral 
institutions does it encourage reform (in line with the other donors), 
which accounts for why the vast majority of Japanese aid has remained 
bilateral. Australian aid, it needs to be noted, is largely bilateral, 
although more assistance has been given to multilateral agencies in 
recent years. Both donors, therefore, have preferred bilateral aid. 
Australia's more favourable opinion on multilateral aid, in line with its 
reform agenda, means that an increasing amount of its ODA will most 
likely be given in this form. 
The above discussion on the Australian and Japanese aid 
programmes to the region, and world-wide, help reinforce the claims 
made regarding their different motivations for giving aid. For both, 
'opportunity' , particularly for economIC gam, IS a defining 
characteristic. So, too, is a 'duty' to allies, their standing m the 
international community, and to a lesser extent, the region. Now, with 
the dawning of a new century, a reform 'agenda' is evident in 
and freedoms in the recipient country." Section 3 (e) relates to Japan's support for structural adjustment 
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Australia's aid philosophy that is movmg it further away from the 
Japanese aid ethos. Both have made a significant contribution to the 
region, through ODA, since the mid 1970s, and while they are 
influenced by differing motivations, the greatest similarity between 
them has been and will continue to be the uneasy nexus between self-
interest and altruism. 
6.9 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON AID IN 
THE SOUTH PACIFIC: 
There is a greater need for research to focus more on donor 
motivations from a perspective which is not guided by anyone of the 
three major International Relations theories (Realist, Idealist, Marxist). 
While doubtless each is useful as a 'window' through which attempts to 
understand the region can be made, they have a tendency to greatly 
distort reality. In the case of Japanese aid, for example, the range of 
perspectives on aid motivations .vary enonnously. At one end of the 
continuum, some believe that Japan sought and continues to seek the 
establishment of a neo-colonial relationship with the region, centred 
upon the exploitation of resources and the fostering of dependency of 
recipient nations for Japan's own benefit. s At the other, Japan is 
deemed to have no 'grand design' in the region.6 
policies. 
5 For example, C. Burgoyne, "Japanese Pacific Aid Suspect", Pacific World: An international Quarterly on 
Peace and Ecojustice, Volume 19, May 1991 or F.V. Sevele, "Aid to the Islands Reviewed", in A. Hooper 
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What does this suggest? Certainly, it reveals the difficulties 
inherent in assessing the situation from a particular perspective. More 
seriously, however, it indicates the problem that the true intention of 
donors may never be known, such is the difference between rhetoric 
and reality. Furthermore, in the South Pacific context, the lack of 
readily available statistics on all aspects of aid delivery (which hindered 
this thesis) means that all too often assessing the motivations of aid 
donors involves a degree of 'guess work' on the part of the researcher. 
The tiny amount of aid allocated to the region by Japan and 
Australia (with the exception of Papua New Guinea) as part of each 
donor's overall aid budget also has implications for future research. 
This study has relied, for instance, on a number of official Australian 
reviews of aid policy. Careful attention was paid to the sections which 
specifically dealt with the region, but wider policy initiatives found in 
these reports were also taken into account. The extent to which 
Australia considers the South Pacific in isolation from other regions 
around the globe, or as part of a larger, more universal aid philosophy is 
not particularly evident in this literature. Future research must address 
this issue. 
(ed.) Class and Culture in the South Pacific, Auckland: Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Auckland, 
1987. 
6 For example, S. Hoadley, "Japan's Pacific Island Policies", New Zealand Intemational Review, Volume 
16, Number 3, May/June 1991 and his The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin in Association with the New Zealand Institute of Foreign Affairs, 1992 
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The dearth of comparative analyses of aid donors, particularly in 
the South Pacific, presents great opportunities for further research. Until 
more quantitative data is available, however, comparative analyses, 
such as those discussed in Chapter One, will prove difficult to 
successfully accomplish. This is not to argue, however, that a 
qualitative approach is any less important. Indeed, such an approach 
can teach us much about foreign aid - a key component of any 
developed nation's foreign policy - and should thus be vigorously 
pursued by scholars in the years ahead. 
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